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Abstract
The New York Philharmonic Strike of 1973
by
Kuan Cheng Lu
Advisor: Professor David Olan

The New York Philharmonic Strike of 1973 is a story waiting to be told. The sole
volume to mention it, John Canarina’s The New York Philharmonic, devotes less than
two pages to it. Until now, the full story has lain buried in archival documents, newspaper
articles, and in the memories of those who experienced it firsthand. This dissertation
represents the first comprehensive examination of this event. The research upon which it
is based consists on: interviews with the New York Philharmonic members; research in
the New York Philharmonic Archives; newspaper articles and reviews. The results are
presented here in three interrelated narratives: a) the historical background to the subject
of labor relations between orchestral musicians and their respective managements in the
United States going back more than a century, with a detailed focus upon past labor
relations of the New York Philharmonic; b) a comprehensive narrative of the 1973 strike;
and c) a study of the consequences of the strike for the Philharmonic with an overview of
current and potentially future problems in labor relations for both the Philharmonic and
American symphony orchestras in general.
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Introduction
On 25 September 1973, the negotiations for a new contract between the New
York Philharmonic Society and the musicians of the orchestra represented by Local 802
of the American Federation of Musicians broke down. At issue were higher wages,
pensions, and other fringe benefits. The 106 members of the New York Philharmonic
Orchestra then voted to strike immediately. The Philharmonic musicians had last struck
in 1961, when they walked out for one week over a disagreement on a contract for yearround employment. The 1973 strike, which dragged on for ten weeks, was the longest in
the history of the orchestra. Tempers often flared on both sides, with the management
blaming the musicians for trying to capitalize on the substantial financial donation made
by Avery Fisher donation—evidently made to Lincoln Center, and not to the
Philharmonic—and the musicians rejecting that blame and asserting that their proposals
had been submitted long before there was an inkling of any such donation. During the
work stoppage, the musicians undertook a mission, which had never before been
attempted by any orchestra: to go on an international tour without the help of their
management. Eight concerts were scheduled in Portugal, Spain, and the Canary Islands,
to be played in a period of just nine days. Upon their return, the musicians received a
final contract proposal from the chairman of the New York Philharmonic and Lincoln
Center, Amyas Ames, offering them proportional increases in salary, pension, medical,
and dental benefits. Furthermore, a system of seating rotation (later adopted by many
other orchestras) was established for string players. Most notably, an artistic committee
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was created to benefit the musicians in gaining more involvement throughout the entire
organization.
This dissertation details the labor history of the New York Philharmonic from the
time it was founded in 1842 until the present day. It provides, as background to the strike,
an overview of some of the past labor disputes of major American orchestras, and it
presents a thorough recounting of events before, during, and immediately after the 1973
strike.
The key issues in this strike—scale of pay, terms of employment, health, welfare,
and personnel policy—are developed through examination of the considerable number of
source documents. These include letters, contract proposals, and the minutes of the
negotiations that were generously made available to me by current and former members
of the Philharmonic, and which, to some extent, are also publicly available in the New
York Philharmonic Archives. Most importantly, I conducted a series of written and live
interviews with members of the 1973 negotiating committee, musicians (both past and
present) of the Philharmonic, and members of its management. These interviews resulted
in a wealth of first-person documentation of the strike that is here presented for the first
time. I have also documented, throughout the course of the strike, how the musicians
persevered—often at great personal expense—to uphold and sustain the Philharmonic’s
long tradition of musical excellence. As a result of the strike, the Philharmonic musicians
earned a place in the Society’s artistic decision-making to which they were not previously
entitled, and relations between the musicians and the management have greatly improved.
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Chapter One: A History of Labor Relations at the New York Philharmonic
During the first part of the nineteenth century, opportunities for musicians to earn
income with their musical skills were limited mostly to playing parties, dances, or
funerals. It was usually necessary for musicians to supplant their income with nonmusical jobs in order to sustain themselves. Moreover, attempts by workers to start labor
movements at this time were viewed as criminal conspiracies.1 It was not until 1842,
when the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that the common-law doctrine of criminal
conspiracy no longer applied to labor unions,2 that it became possible to organize the first
musician’s unions.
As early as in 1840, New York City had become the most populous city in the
United States. Its thriving economy fostered a surge of interest in instrumental and
orchestral music,3 which led to the founding of the enduring Philharmonic Society of
New York in 1842. Howard Shanet, in Philharmonic - A History of New York’s
Orchestra, however, pointed out that two earlier Philharmonic Societies existed in New
York City prior to the year of 1842. The first was formed in 1799 when the St. Cecilia
Society and the Harmonical Society had amalgamated as a democratic institution –
The Philharmonic of 1799 was as lively as it was well organized. It gave more
concerts per year than the later Philharmonic (of 1842) would be able to give in
any of its first thirty seasons.4

1

George Seltzer, Music Matters: The Performer and the American Federation of Musicians (Metuchen,
NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1989), 12.
2
Julie Ayer, More than Meets the Ear: How Symphony Musicians Made Labor History (Minneapolis:
Syren Book Company, 2005).
3
John H. Mueller, The American Symphony Orchestra (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1951), 38.
4
Howard Shanet, Philharmonic: A History of New York’s Orchestra (New York: Doubleday, 1975), 46.
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The second Philharmonic was founded in 1824; although “not very democratic” in its
administration, it was at least benevolent: “the second Philharmonic was an important
force in New York’s musical life that [represented] great deal of excellent musicmaking.”5 Due to a great amount of competition from other musical institutions in New
York at that time, the second Philharmonic was not able to survive; it disbanded at the
end of 1827. For some fourteen years, New York City did not have a Philharmonic
Society, though Shanet described those years as ones of “ferment and transition”, which
helped prepare the third attempt to form new Philharmonic Society in 1842:
They were the years in which the musical orientation of the city began to shift
from English-American to continental, in which New York developed a corps of
experienced orchestra personnel equal to the demands of the nineteenth-century
repertory, and in which the social and economic foundation of the 1842
Philharmonic were laid.6

The Philharmonic Society of 1842 was established by a self-governing group of
elite instrumentalists as a cooperative venture. Its management structure was based on
democratic principles in which all members were to participate collectively. All
performing members shared the profit after the expenses of the season had been paid. At
the end of the first season, for example, each member had received the amount of $25
($8.33 per concert), which was well above the standard orchestral rates.7 Yet the Society
did not offer full-time employment to its members: it gave only three concerts in its
inaugural season, and that number only slowly increased to six, a level at which it
remained for decades. According to John H. Mueller “the Society seemed to many a
player at best a pleasant luxury and at worst a dubious venture, not worthy of causing

5

Shanet, A History, 50.
Ibid., 53.
7
Standard orchestral rates were only $5 or $6 per concert. (Shanet, A History, 92)
6
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interruption in his regular employment.”8 Most of its musicians were therefore obliged to
have other sources of income.9
In the 1850s, American musicians began to search for ways to improve their
economic status and professional lives, and musicians living in New York, Chicago,
Baltimore, and San Francisco began to organize what might be thought of as the
forebears of musical unions. These proto-unions, however, functioned more as mutual aid
societies—helping to provide sick leave, death benefits, and financial loan assistance—
than as organizations whose primary goal was the improvement of wages and the
conditions of employment.10 In 1860,11 a social organization based in New York City
called the Aschenbroedel Club was founded by a group of German-American
professional instrumentalists: “German musicians were at that time considerably
neglected socially by other musicians … as a consequence, [they] were thrown on their
own resources largely for social entertainment.”12 On 6 May 1863, about one hundred
and fifty musicians who played in New York’s theater orchestras held a meeting to form
a protective union, “aiming to advance the social and pecuniary interests of its
members.”13 Two months later, the same group of musicians met again to make the rules
and regulations of their union, to elect officers, and to issue a fixed scale of prices.14 The
set prices included $15 per person for the first operatic performance in the season (for
each subsequent performance, $3 in the city and $5 in Brooklyn), $12 per week in the
8

Mueller, The American, 41. 	
  
“Many of its members…also played in the Brooklyn Philharmonic, in Carl Bergmann’s orchestra…in the
many ‘sacred’ concerts.” See John Graziano, “Invisible Instruments: Theater Orchestras in New York,
1850-1900” in John Spitzer, American Orchestras in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 2012), 110.
10
Robert D. Leiter, The Musicians and Petrillo (New York: Bookman Associates, 1952), 13.
11
Vern Countryman, “The Organized Musicians: I” (The University of Chicago Law Review, 1948), 56.
12
“Years of Prosperity,” New York Times, 26 January 1896, 6.
13
“The larger number of them being of German birth”, New York Times, 7 May 1863, 8.
14
New York Clipper, 4 July 1863, 91.
9
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Broadway Theaters, $10 per week in the Bowery theatres and concert saloons, and $5 for
parties and balls.15 The organization was incorporated under the laws of New York State
in 1864,16 and was later renamed the Musical Mutual Protective Union (hereafter,
MMPU). The MMPU defined its purpose as “the cultivation of the art of music in all its
branches, and the promotion of good feeling and friendly intercourse among the members
of the profession and the relief of such of their member as shall be unfortunate.”17 The
organization became so important that most of the orchestral musicians in New York City
became members, including the musicians of the Philharmonic Society and the Theodore
Thomas Orchestra, and even the conductors Carl Bergmann and Theodore Thomas.18 The
success of the MMPU quickly influenced musicians in other American cities to form
their own unions: The Philadelphia Musical Association in 1863, the Chicago Musicians’
Protective Union in 1864, the Washington Musical Protective Union in 1865, and the
Boston Musicians’ Union before 1867.19 And by 1872, there were musicians’ unions in at
least eight different cities: the Local 1, New York (813 members); Local 2, Chicago (113
members); Local 3, Baltimore (158 members); Local 4, Boston (235 members); Local 5,
Philadelphia, (549 members); Local 6, Peoria, Illinois (17 members); Local 7,
Washington, D.C. (85 members); Local 8, Louisville, Kentucky (37 members).20
In 1878, the members of the MMPU realized their practical concerns over issues
of employment, and ratified an amendment to its charter that provided “the establishment
of a uniform rate of prices to be charged by members of said society, and the enforcement
15

New York Clipper, 4 July 1863, 91.
Leiter, The Musicians, 13.
17
Countryman, “The Organized,” 57.
18
It was common for the Philharmonic Society to hold its business meetings at the Aschenbroedel’s
clubhouse on East Fourth Street. (Shanet, A History, 437)	
  
19
John Spitzer, American Orchestras in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 2012), chapter I.3: 80.
20
Ibid., 81.
16
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of good faith and dealing between its members.”21 Over the next decade, labor
movements similar to that of the MMPU began to organize across the United States, and
as unionization among musicians became more common, local musicians’ unions began
to compete with one another. These locals also faced the problem of competition from
military bands and traveling musicians of both domestic and international origin. To deal
with this problem, the president of the Cincinnati local union gathered fifteen delegates
from different local unions in 1886 to form a national organization known as the National
League of Musicians (hereafter, NLM).22 Over the next decade, more than one hundred
locals joined its force.23
During this period, the NLM received numerous invitations to join the American
Federation of Labor (hereafter, the AFL) and the Knights of Labor. Owing to the
reluctance of certain locals in the NLM to view its members as “laborers,” however, these
invitations were never accepted.24 Over the next decade, the AFL was successful in
helping skilled workers to obtain better wages and working conditions, and many
musicians of the NLM expressed their interest in being affiliated with the AFL. In 1895,
the AFL offered the NLM a final chance to join its organization,25 but the offer was once
again rejected. The following year, the AFL called for a national convention of
musicians’ unions with the intention to form a national association whose purpose would
be to promote trade unionism for musicians. The result was the formation of the
American Federation of Musicians (hereafter, AFM). The AFM had a team of willing and
21

Countryman, “The Organized,” 57.
Seltzer, Music Matters, 5.
23
“Eastern locals believed their members were artists and avoided identification as laborers. The
Midwestern and western locals argued that an organization that functioned like a trade union, was a trade
union.” See Commons, 419.
24
Seltzer, Music Matters, 7.
25
Leiter, The Musicians, 16.	
  
22

8
aggressive leaders from the start, and was ready to combat the fundamental problems that
had been troubling the members of the NLM. As musicians throughout North America
began to see the benefits of belonging to the AFM, its ranks began to swell. By the end of
1903, all three remaining locals of the NLM (New York, Baltimore and Philadelphia) had
become part of the AFM, and within ten years of its formation, the AFM had organized
424 locals and represented 45,000 members in the United States and Canada.26
John Spitzer states that there are three important features in Nineteenth-Century
American musicians’ unions:
1. The closed shop. Every player in every orchestra—or in any other ensemble
that played for money—had to be a union member. Members were prohibited
from playing in an orchestra with nonmembers. The closed shop also excluded
musicians who belonged to a union in a different city, although exceptions were
frequent.
2. The price list. Each union published a schedule of rates for every sort of
musical engagement in its jurisdiction—playing in an opera, at a dance, at a
political rally, at a funeral, and so on. These were supposedly minimums;
employers could pay higher rates if they chose.
3. The leader system. Orchestra leaders—that is, the men who organized and
conducted bands or orchestras—were union members just like the players. In
fact, they were often leaders of the union as well as of their orchestras.27

To be welcomed into a union, a musician had to be recommended by a member,
to pass an easy audition procedure, and to pay an initiation fee. Spitzer said that the
initiation fee was low, dues were reasonable, and that the audition process was always “a
sham,” except in New York, where the initiation fee was raised to $100 in 1890s, and the
union also required a “six-month rule”.28 The reason the MMPU enacted a “six-month
rule,” which required all foreigners to reside in the United States for at least six months

26

John R. Commons, “Types of American Labor Unions” (The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1906),
421.
27
Spitzer, American Orchestras, 84.
28
Ibid., 86.
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before becoming eligible to obtain union membership and the right to employment,29 was
to respond to the problem of competition from foreign musicians; this problem was
especially difficult for New York’s musicians to cope with during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. Orchestra conductors seemed always to be in favor of
employing musicians from Europe—allegedly on account of their superior performing
skills.
The rule seems to have done little to stem the tide of European musicians seeking
work in the United States. Theodore Thomas, for instance, blatantly ignored it when in
1885 he hired the Belgian oboist, Felix Bour, to perform in his orchestra. Even though
both Thomas and Bour were fined for violating the union rule, Thomas was able to secure
“an injunction from a Judge Potter against the Musical Mutual Protective Union of New
York,”30 and to have all the charges lifted. In a related case in 1891, Walter Damrosch,
conductor of the New York Symphony Society, claimed that there was no candidate in
the United States who was able to fill the vacant position of concertmaster in his
orchestra. He successfully lobbied the union to waive the six-month rule so that he could
offer the renowned Russian violinist Adolf Brodsky the position.31
Local unions made numerous attempts to invoke the Alien Contract Labor Law,
which was passed by the Congress in 1885 to “prohibit the importation and migration of
foreigners and aliens under contract or agreement to perform labor in the United States.”
However, the Law provided an outline of exemptions that included “professional actors,

29

Mueller, The American, 343.	
  
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
30
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artists, lecturers, or singers.”32 It was not until 1932 that Congress finally amended
contract labor law, thereby recognizing musicians as workers. As music critic Henry E.
Krehbiel pointed out at the time:
The people of the United States have not learned to look upon the profession of
music as the Germans do, with whom it is not only an art or a pastime but also a
trade. Orchestra instruments like the oboe, clarinet, trombone, French horn, and
double bass, are no more studied in 1892 by the native population than they were
in 1792. For players upon them we are still dependent either on foreigners or the
children of naturalized citizens.33

The predominance of German musicians in American orchestras was particularly
acute in New York City. By 1892, only three of the one hundred musicians of the
Philharmonic Society were not German.34
In 1893 Walter Damrosch tried again to escape the six-month rule when he
appointed the Danish cellist Anton Hegner to lead the section of the New York
Symphony. This time, however, Damrosch was out of luck. On December 18, 1893, the
headline in the New York Times read:
Damrosch waved in vain – Not a man in his orchestra heeded the baton. … Mr.
Damrosch lifted his baton and waved it for the musicians to begin, but not a note
came in response. A few violinists instinctively lifted their violins to the
shoulder, but that was all. The fifty-three musicians would not play. … The
audience became excited and Mr. Damrosch nervous.35

Damrosch subsequently turned to the audience and delivered an apology:
I regret to say that my men refuse to play with my imported cellist, Mr. Hegner. I am
very sorry that this has happened. The audience will get back their money at the box
office.36

32

“Alien Contract Labor Law,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alien_Contract_Labor_Law. Accessed 7
August 2013.
33
Henry E. Krehbiel, The Philharmonic Society of New York (New York and London: Novello, 1892), 2728.
34
Shanet, A History, 142.	
  
35
“Damrosch waved in vain,” New York Times, 18 December 1893, 4.
36
Ibid.
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Damrosch’s apology was well received by the audience, and cheers were also
given for Hegner. A member of the musicians’ committee “rose to speak, but the light
was turned out and he remained silent.”37 As the New York Times described it “The
audience did not seem to want to hear him. More cheers were given for Mr. Damrosch.”38
Evidently, the members of the orchestra had performed with Hegner once before
and had been penalized for it. The first time a union member performed with a non-union
musician, a $10 fine was levied. The fine rose to $20 for a second offense, and for a third,
the offending member risked being expelled from the union. The musicians were
justifiably concerned about being expelled from the union, and about the effect this
would have on the orchestra itself. They had already raised the issue of Hegner’s noncompliance with Damrosch, and had asked him to prevent Hegner from performing with
the orchestra until such time as he was eligible to join the union, but Damrosch refused,
saying he was determined to fight the “obnoxious” union rule.
This incident has long been regarded as the first musicians’ strike in the history of
American symphony orchestras. Damrosch ultimately admitted his violation of the union
rules and paid his fines, adding that “his sympathies were with the union, and he deeply
regretted the trouble resulting from the affair.”39 This strike, which was a “critical step in
the establishment of the power of the union,”40 led to a resolution in which the musicians’
fines were remitted and Hegner was allowed to play with the orchestra as a soloist only,
until he was eligible to become a union member.41
*****
37

Mrs. A. Brodsky, Recollections of a Russion Home (London: Sherratt & Huges, 1914), 200.
“Damrosch waved in vain,” New York Times, 18 December 1893, 4.	
  
39
“Musical Union Fines Mr. Damrosch,” New York Times, 20 January 1894, 2.
40
Mueller, The American, 344.
41
“Victory for Mr. Damrosch,” New York Times, 23 December 1893, 12.
38
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Permanent, full-time orchestras began to be established in major American cities
in the late nineteenth century. Though it is important to note that Theodore Thomas
founded his full time orchestra in New York City in 1864:
[Thomas] employed his men full time, inculcated a furious discipline in his
ensemble, and infused imagination and variety into the repertoire, all of which
quickly outdistanced the loosely knit Philharmonic. … The lure of full
employment and the prestige of membership in the Thomas orchestra attracted
from the Philharmonic many of its important players.42

The Theodore Thomas Orchestra, however, disbanded in 1888, due to constant financial
setbacks.43
The first successful full-time orchestra was the Boston Symphony Orchestra,
founded by Henry Lee Higginson, a successful Boston businessman and philanthropist, in
1881. Higginson, who served as the orchestra’s sole financial benefactor for nearly four
decades,44 was a passionate lover of music, and his plan was to contract an orchestra of
first-rate musicians on a full-time, year-round basis, and to pay them a fixed salary. The
orchestra’s responsibility was to present concerts of “serious” classical music and some
lighter music throughout the year, and to tour as far as possible. Higginson also wanted to
keep ticket prices affordable so as to attract as broad an audience as possible.45 In so
doing, he “set the general pattern of financial support of all first class orchestras for the
next half a century.” Mueller notes that the “Boston Orchestra was the pioneer
‘permanent’ orchestra in the United States.”46
The one significant drawback to Higginson’s plan, however, was the prohibition
of union membership for its musicians. This prohibition led, eventually, to the disastrous
42

Mueller, The America, 44.
Ezra Schabas, Theodore Thomas (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 170.
44
Mueller, The America, 80.
45
M.A. De Wolfe Howe, The Boston Symphony Orchestra (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1931), 27.
46
Mueller, The American, 78.
43
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strike of 1920. It would take more than twenty years for every member of the Boston
Symphony to finally join the American Federation of Musicians.47
The second full-time American orchestra was formed by Theodore Thomas in
1891. Thomas, having been assured that there was sufficient interest, and having secured
the necessary financial guarantees, resigned his conducting post at the New York
Philharmonic and relocated to Chicago to assemble a new permanent orchestra for that
city. Thomas was able to recruit as many as sixty players from his now-defunct Theodore
Thomas Orchestra to go with him to Chicago, and he recruited only about twenty-four
local musicians.48 According to Thomas’s wife, the new Chicago Orchestra was modeled
after the Boston Symphony. Thomas planned to present two programs each week,
consisting of symphonic and popular genres for at least six months each year. And while
Chicago was not yet on a par, culturally, with New York or Boston, fifty of its most
prominent and wealthy individuals had agreed to be the guarantors of Thomas’ ambitious
and experimental venture for at least three consecutive years.49
The newly founded and financially healthy Boston and Chicago orchestras, both
of which visited New York on a regular basis, represented a fierce challenge to the
cooperative Philharmonic Society, which was not yet a full-time institution and which
lacked the kind of financial support that sustained the Boston and Chicago symphonies.
In 1903, the Philharmonic’s longtime rival, the New York Symphony Society, with its
plentiful private support, went through a reorganization to promote itself as the only
permanent orchestra in New York.50 Walter Damrosch was able to put his musicians on

47

Mueller, The American, 94.
Ibid., 103.
49
“Chicago’s Musical Wants,” New York Times, 19 December 1890, 1.	
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Mueller, The American, 73.
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fixed salaries, and was able to offer them more than forty concerts per year, plus frequent
tours outside of New York.
This fiercely competitive environment quickly led to serious internal problems in
the Philharmonic Society. The number of actual members performing fell sharply from
eighty-one in 1883 to a mere thirty-seven in 1908,51 causing the Philharmonic to have to
budget a significant amount of funds to hire substitute players. It eventually became clear
to the members of the Philharmonic that the orchestra in its current state of organization
and operations could no longer compete, and that in order to preserve their historic and
honorable institution, the members of the Philharmonic had to be taken over by a group
of assertive and wealthy New Yorkers and to be transformed entirely into a corporate
organization.
In 1909, under the keen leadership of Mrs. George R. Sheldon, wife of a
successful New York banker, along with other prominent figures in the city, a group
called the Guarantors of the Fund for the Permanent Orchestra of the Philharmonic
Society of New York was formed52. They quickly put in place a guaranty fund of $90,000
for the first three years of operations, starting in the fall of 1909.53 In a letter of
proposition sent by the guarantors to the members of the orchestra, it stated: The
proposed new Philharmonic Society would serve the purpose of performing:
The highest kind of music, under the exclusive and absolute direction of a
competent conductor, the members of which shall devote their time to its work
for a period of at least twenty-three weeks in each year.54

51

Shanet, A History, 444.
Ibid., 207.
53
Mueller, The American, 51.
54
“Mahler to conduct the Philharmonic,” New York Times, 16 February 1909, 9.	
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Gustav Mahler, being the chosen one with absolute control over artistic affairs,
replaced Wassily Safonoff and assumed the challenge of shaping up a new era for the
Philharmonic Society. As Shanet put it, the New York Philharmonic was a “symphonic
vehicle” for Mahler, which “he may have dreamed of, but had never realized, in
Europe.”55 In his post as conductor of the orchestra, Mahler was able to explore his
passion for symphonic literature free from operatic obligations. Under his direction, the
Philharmonic joined the rank of permanent orchestras. The number of concerts per season
was increased to forty-six in 1909 and sixty-five in 1910, a substantial change from the
eighteen concerts given in 1908.56 The guaranteed concert season became the principal
source of income for its musicians, and necessitated them to devote most of their time to
help revitalize their important cultural institution. In 1909, for the first time in the
Philharmonic’s history, the full orchestra went on a national tour under the baton of
Mahler, bringing its reinvigorated musical excellence to such cities as New Haven,
Springfield, Providence, and Boston.57
In these early decades of the twentieth century, the competition between the local
orchestras was fierce. By 1920, New York had three privately subsidized orchestras: The
Philharmonic Society of New York, the New York Symphony Society, and the National
Symphony (also known as the New Symphony Society).58 And while this was certainly a
boon to a public with an increasing appetite for orchestral music, the excess of riches that
were the combined offerings of these three institutions was financially unsustainable.
Yearly deficits were reported by all three orchestras, and despite the generosity of their
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philanthropists, none of the orchestras was able to make a profit under the circumstances.
Soon, the idea of consolidation was being broached at board meetings.
The first of these consolidations took place in 1921, when the Philharmonic
Society and the National Symphony combined their resources. Seven years later, the New
York Philharmonic and the New York Symphony publicly announced their
amalgamation. There were considerable misgivings regarding these two consolidations,
both before and after they took place. Olin Downes, music critic for the New York Times,
had written a year before the merger: “If only questions of management and expense
were involved in this matter the advantages of a single orchestra would be obvious.” Like
many others, he felt that there should be more than one orchestra in New York in order to
provide adequate opportunity for the growth of the local musical public. He added that,
with one orchestra in New York:
Music would become more and more a matter of quantity production and would
have a repressive influence on other organizations who tried to step out of its
shadow. It would diminish and not increase the numbers of the audiences for
symphonic performances.59

Jascha Heifetz was among the musicians who shared the same feeling of
disappointment. He appeared as the soloist in the final concert of the New York
Symphony before the amalgamation took place, and regarding it, said:
Certainly the greatest city in the world should be able to support two symphony
orchestras…combining the orchestras will not aid in development of real
music…it will be greatly regretted.60

Yet proposals for the two Societies to merge had been drafted as early as in 1910,
simply because the deficit problems for both orchestras were getting out of hand. The
plan of the 1928 consolidation was to present 103 concerts during the following season,
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consisting of a variety of programs for different groups of the general public.61 Local 802
was involved in the negotiations for the new pay agreement; its official revealed that the
weekly minimum pay was to be increased to $87 for 1929 and $90 for 1930 from $75.62
But many musicians were out of job, since only twenty musicians from the Symphony
Society were—reportedly—handpicked by Arturo Toscanini to be members of the newly
organized New York Philharmonic-Symphony Society.63
Though it was an economic necessity, the decision finally to combine orchestras
proved to be a crucial step both for the New York Philharmonic and for the concert-going
public of New York City. According to Shanet, the most noteworthy result of the mergers
was that the:
Philharmonic-Symphony Society became, for all practical purposes, the official
orchestra of the City of New York and the focus of the city’s orchestral
activity… accepting as inevitable the social and cultural responsibilities that
previously had been voluntary indulgences by one or another of the three or four
orchestras that co-existed in New York.”64

*****
From its founding in 1842, the Philharmonic’s enduring legacy has been the
promulgation of first-class symphonic music. Only a very few unfortunate occasions have
prevented the presentation of a scheduled concert. On 22 April 1865, the Philharmonic
postponed a concert to the following week because of the assassination of President
Abraham Lincoln. The first cancellation of concert in the Philharmonic’s history came
about when President Franklin D. Roosevelt passed away on 12 April 1945.65

61

“New Philharmonic Lists 103 Concerts,” New York Times, 9 May 1928, 21.
“Plans Under Way For New Orchestra,” New York Times, 28 Mar. 1928, 8.
63
Mueller, The American, 56.
64
Shanet, A History, 256.
65
“Philharmonic Cancels Second Concert in History,” New York Times, 13 April 1945, 8.	
  
62

18
But in 1957, at the start of the Philharmonic’s 116th season, the first two concerts
were called off because of unsuccessful contract negotiations on wage rates, retirement
pensions, and the length of the season. It was the very first time that contract disputes
between the musicians and their management had impacted the opening of the
Philharmonic’s new season. Union officials pointed out that the Boston Symphony’s
musicians played a guaranteed season of forty-eight weeks, while the Philharmonic was
far behind, with a season of just twenty-nine weeks.66 The members of the orchestra
voted to stall the negotiations after receiving an offer that was insufficient in their
opinion, though management had indicated it was their best and final offer. The
Philharmonic’s reason for the ultimatum was that it had been operating at a loss, and had
an operating deficit of $242,00067 from the end of the previous season, which made it
impossible to meet the musicians’ demands for substantial wage and season length
increases. Both sides came to an agreement a few days later, as the union accepted the
management’s revised offer.
Shortly after the Philharmonic’s 1961 season opened, negotiations for a new
contract broke down, despite an agreement between musicians and management to “play
and talk” while they were underway. The key issue was said to be the length of contract.
The Philharmonic management wanted a three-year contract with guaranteed seasons of
thirty-six, forty, and forty-two weeks, respectively. But because of the impending
relocation from Carnegie Hall to Lincoln Center at the end of the new season, the
musicians wanted a one-year contract with fifty-two weeks of guaranteed employment.68
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After the Philharmonic made its best and final offer, the musicians—against the
recommendation of the union—voted to strike. Evidently, the fact that they were never
directly involved in the bargaining process was an underlying reason for the musician’s
decision to strike.69 The work stoppage lasted for a week, and caused the cancellation of a
recording session for Columbia Records and all rehearsals and concerts for that week.
But once again the musicians, saying that they wanted to “keep the flow of the music to
the public uninterrupted,”70 voted to accept the contract they had just rejected.
*****
In the almost seven decades from its founding in 1842 until its conversion to a
corporate entity, the Philharmonic was governed democratically, with its members voting
on what repertoire to play, and on who would be their conductor. Considering that
musicians were generally thought of merely as servants a century ago, the autonomy of
the Philharmonic’s musicians stand as a remarkable example of enlightened selfgovernance. But as demands for economic growth increased, the musicians’ role was
gradually reduced from that of artist to—once again—a common laborer. And as a
consequence, their voices became less and less influential.
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Chapter Two: Leading Up to the 1973 Strike
Starting in the 1950s, there was an increase in labor unrest among orchestral
musicians1 that peaked in the 1970s when the United States entered a period of stagnant
economic growth and double digit inflation now known as the Great Inflation. For
symphony and opera musicians, it was a period of difficult contract negotiations. The
Chicago Symphony Orchestra, for example, whose three-year contract was to expire in
September 1973, began negotiations on a new contract in April 1973. Practically no
progress was made for five months. As the deadline approached, the musicians agreed to
continue playing without a contract so long as negotiations were progressing towards
one, but on 15 September, the day before the contract expired, management rejected the
musicians’ offer to play and talk, stating that the trustees of the Chicago Orchestral
Association had voted to lock out the orchestra and cancel the opening week of its eightythird season. The musicians—accompanied by TV reporters—nevertheless showed up on
stage at Orchestra Hall the next day ready to rehearse but were told, that since there was
no contract, there would be no work. “What would we pay you?”2 asked Stuart Ball,
President of the Orchestral Association. Evidently, the orchestra’s management feared
that the musicians would play only until music director Sir Georg Solti began to conduct
in mid-October, and then with the upcoming fall tour and scheduled recording dates to
use as leverage, go on strike.3
The musicians had little choice but to make their grievance public. Some 2000
leaflets were handed out at the Chicago Lyric Opera’s gala opening night concert, and
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with the ongoing help of the press and local television coverage, the orchestra’s
musicians were able to take their case to the general public, including many of the
Orchestral Association’s trustees and governing members.4 On 24 September, a Federal
mediator became involved in the negotiations, though he made no helpful impact. The
management then cancelled the second and third weeks of the new season. During the
lockout, musicians played free concerts in private homes and churches, and asked that
donations be made to an emergency fund. By so doing, they were also “winning the
public’s goodwill and filling the musical void created by the Orchestral Association.”5
Finally, during the all-night negotiations of 12 October, the management offered a new
three-year contract with a minimum weekly pay of $350 the first year, $360 the second
year, and $380 the third year, up from $320 a week in the previous contract.6 The
musicians accepted it, thus concluding a four-week work stoppage that had forced the
cancellation of many performances.
A second orchestra facing a lockout at this time was the Denver Symphony (now
the Colorado Symphony). On the evening of 18 September 1973, the musicians received
notice from their management that there would be no season opener without a new
contract. In response, the musicians reported for work at the first scheduled rehearsal of
the season with a crew of television reporters in tow to record the lockout. And like their
colleagues in Chicago, the Denver musicians took their grievances to the public, playing
a free concert, picketing eight hours a day in front of the Symphony offices, and
collecting some 6,000 signatures on a petition urging the Symphony Association to
resume the Fall ‘73 concert season while continuing to negotiate.
4
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From the perspective of the musicians, it looked as if the management intended to
lock the musicians out. “We were convinced that management had set up the first two or
three weeks of season with the thought that these were expendable weeks (for instance,
no name soloists on the series concerts).”7 The Denver Symphony Society was put on the
American Federation of Musicians’ national unfair list, and the local union filed an unfair
labor practice proceeding with the National Labor Relations Board against the Symphony
Society. This so infuriated the management that in one meeting the manager gave the
musicians’ committee an ultimatum, threatening that no settlement would be achieved
unless the union withdrew the charge. On 5 October, the two sides eventually came to an
agreement on a one-year contract which gave the musicians forty-two weeks of
employment (including two weeks of paid vacation), a $15 weekly increase, and
elimination of the musicians’ contribution to the retirement fund as well as a refund of all
previous contributions with interest.8
In May of 1973, the management of the New York City Opera offered their
musicians a one-year extension of their existing contract. It was to include a regular
season of twenty-one weeks plus a guaranteed eleven weeks of extra work for rehearsals,
tours, musical comedies, and other productions.9 When negotiations began on 22 August,
however, the management withdrew this offer and instead proposed a contract in which
the eleven-week extra pay guarantee was absent. The management noted that the opera
company had accrued a $2.4 million dollar deficit during the previous two years and was
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unwilling to discuss any issues in the contract unless the musicians first accepted a
reduction of the season.
According to the New York Times, the eleven extra weeks of pay originally
covered a summer of Gilbert and Sullivan and other light opera, but later “was often
merely pay for no work.”10 When the contract expired at midnight on 31 August, the
musicians took the advice of their union and committee members and went on strike,
forcing the cancellation of the following day’s performance at the New York State
Theater at Lincoln Center. When a week without progress in the negotiations had gone
by, Mayor Lindsay of New York City intervened, appointing a mediator in an effort to
ease the tension between the two sides. The musicians’ committee and the union
negotiators, however, thought that the mediator was somewhat “pro-management.”11
At the same time, the musicians of the Radio City Music Hall Orchestra were
fighting a management proposal to cut back on their work guarantees. Radio City had
reportedly suffered substantial losses owing to light attendance at movie showings, and to
offset the mounting deficits, the management wanted a new contract that would reduce
the fifty-two week guarantee to forty and then to thirty-six weeks to allow for greater
programming flexibility.12 The management even threatened to suspend operations if a
contract settlement was not reached in a timely manner.
Radio City’s attempt to reduce its season only made things more difficult for the
City Opera musicians. When, during the second week of their strike, it became known
that the Radio City musicians had agreed to a cut in their season, the City Opera
management immediately increased the pressure on its musicians to do the same. But
10
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when the Radio City contract was settled, their musicians had secured a better financial
package than the New York City Opera was offering: the new Radio City weekly base
salary was to increase from $285 to $350 over three years with the understanding that not
more than fourteen weeks would be eliminated in the 1975-76 season.13
The City Opera management then offered its musicians an alternative proposal
that would increase their minimum weekly salary by $45 over three years while reducing
the extra weeks to ten the first year, five weeks the second year, and three weeks the
third.14 The musicians immediately rejected this proposal, to which the City Opera
management responded by informing the press of an impending cancellation of the fall
and spring seasons due to the continuing labor dispute. It was not until the end of the
third week of the strike that the musicians asked Philip Sipser15 to take the place of
Mayor Lindsay’s “pro-management” mediator. “In a thirteen-hour bargaining session
which took place at the City Hall, … the issues were hammered out through the good
offices of Mr. Sipser.”16 On 24 September, the two sides reached agreement on a new
contract, which increased the musicians’ weekly base salary from $300 to $310, $325,
$340 over a three-year period while keeping the guaranteed eleven weeks of extra
employment.17 The musicians had also gained some improvements in their fringe
benefits.
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The musicians of the New Jersey Symphony also survived the possibility of
losing an entire season of work in 1973. When it became clear that the orchestra’s
sponsors had not raised the necessary funds to pay the musicians, its president, Alan V.
Lowenstein, issued a letter to Local 16 of AFM stating that the board of directors
intended to reduce the orchestra’s operating budget from $1.8 million to just $700,000 for
the upcoming season, a cut that would necessitate the elimination of at least fifteen of the
season’s thirty-four weeks.18 In a statement made by the orchestra’s board of directors,
“… acceptance of all necessary parties, including the union and members of the
orchestra, must be obtained … or the orchestra will have no funds with which to go
forward.”19 Afraid that the entire season might be lost, the musicians accepted
management’s ultimatum, which reduced their weekly base salary from $7,560 to $4,830.
A statement released by the orchestra committee was filled with dismay:
In addition to the proposed reduction, the management required a schedule
clause, which allows them to make schedule changes without notice. No nonmonetary concessions were made by management to allow musicians to find
additional outside employment in order to support themselves and their
families.20

*****
On 17 July 1973, the musicians’ negotiating committee of the New York
Philharmonic and their union representatives met with the Society’s management for the
first time to discuss the musicians’ contract that was about to expire on 21 September
1973. Max Aarons, the president of Local 802, opened the meeting by stating that the
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meeting was mainly for the purpose of submitting the union-committee proposals.21 He
then presented to the board of directors an initial proposal of one-year agreement. At the
top of their proposal list was the scale of pay, which suggested for an increase of $70 per
week across the board, longevity pay of $10 per week after each five years of service
(maximum $35), a seniority increment of $25 per week, as well as minimum overscale
for the revolving string players. In response, Carlos Moseley, the president of
Philharmonic Society, stated that the Society had no proposals to submit, and would
make a brief statement at the next meeting (scheduled for 23 July).22 He instead implied
that the Society’s proposals might prove to be in the reverse direction from the union
proposals on a good many points. It was the consensus that further discussion would be
delayed until the forthcoming meeting.
At the start of the second meeting, Moseley delivered a strong statement
concerning the overall financial situation of the Philharmonic.23 He informed the
committee that the Philharmonic was facing the most serious financial crisis of its history
and that it was in no position to offer any increase in pay during the first year of a new
contract. He then stated that a one-year contract would have a serious negative impact
upon planning and commitments, and that the Society simply could not operate in such a
way. He added that even if the Society were to agree to a one-year contract, it could only
maintain the status quo, and that it was too late to make the changes necessary to
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accommodate what the committee was asking for. The minutes of the meeting record
Moseley’s statement as follows:
The Philharmonic is in the most serious crisis of my memory. We are trying to
find our way out and we must find ways in which we can earn a higher amount.
We are not in a position to offer any increases in the first year of a contract. If the
Orchestra will enable the Society to increase earnings and effect economies, then
the Society can possibly offer modest increases in the second and third years.24

Also provided were two financial summary sheets: a comparison of minimum
player salaries during the seasons 1969-70 and 1972-73 (see figure 1), and an eight-year
comparison, 1964-65 vs.1972-73 (see figure 2).25 Though orchestra committee members
compared the Philharmonic to the Metropolitan Opera Orchestra and other symphonies,
and expressed that to live in New York City, the musicians had to have more income to
meet their bills.26 Moseley explained to the committee that, in the 1970 contract, the
Society had taken on many additional obligations and that some of the increased revenue
the Society was counting on did not materialize. Government funds had not come through
as they hoped, and the Endowment campaign had not reached the original goal of $10
million. Furthermore, ticket prices had been raised as high as the Society thought the
market would bear.
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Figure 1: Comparison of minimum player during the seasons 1969-70 and 1972-73
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Figure 2: Eight-year comparison of minimum player, 1964-65 vs.1972-73
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On the other side of the table, Aarons countered that this was typical of the way
the management began negotiations, and that the management’s offer would put the
musicians on a backwards course; that is, asking them to do more work for less money.
He noted that musicians playing a big wedding or even in a bar made $75 a night—more
than what the Philharmonic paid. And he said that it was of no use to be shown the
increase in pay since 1964-65 unless it was paired with the yearly increase in the cost of
living: “It’s the take-home pay that is important to us.”27
Moseley responded by saying that he had never before come to negotiations with
the Society in this kind of situation, and that he denied having said that the Society had
nothing to offer for the next year. He then asked the musicians to be reasonable:
Your package of requests simply would put us on a destructive course. How can
we irresponsibly go into something that will keep the Society on a downgrade
that could lead to closing down the Philharmonic? This we can’t do, and together
we must find a way out of the present difficult situation.28

He urged the committee to understand that the management had been making
every effort to raise more money, including advertising on the radio and running fullpage newspaper ads. The Society was also trying very hard to undertake other things that
would strengthen its support and earnings, but that there were a limited number of people
who were already giving substantial support to the arts. And once again, he reiterated that
unless the Society received some funding from other sources, such as the government,29 it
could not offer the musicians more.
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The committee argued that essential benefits such as health and welfare had not
been adequately covered, and that what the musicians were asking for was what they
needed six years ago. The committee also presented the Chicago Symphony’s string
rotation plan and brought it to the management’s attention that Chicago had been asking
for more string players while the Society was trying to reduce the size of the orchestra.
Concerned that were the Society to continue in such a fashion, it would not be possible to
sustain the orchestra’s standards, Lorin Bernsohn, chairman of the committee, stated that
“starting to reduce size of orchestra is the beginning of the end. The New York
Philharmonic would end up being something like the Kansas City Philharmonic.”30
Aarons also insisted that the union expected to negotiate a contract for 106 men
and opposed any reduction in the size of orchestra. The committee went on to say that,
even though the contract specified 100 musicians for many years, the orchestra had 106
or 105 members during those years. Moseley countered that for many years, the
Philharmonic maintained its position at the top under conditions outlined in the Society’s
proposals. The management used extra players when needed, including students, and it
proved to be quite successful. To which committee member Ranier DeIntinis
responded:31
And that’s one of the things we are trying to stop with our proposals—paying
student substitutes the same amount as regular members of the orchestra. That’s
one reason for the longevity payments.32
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Moseley then assured the committee that reduction (when it occurred) would be by
attrition, not by termination of present personnel.
The fourth meeting on 26 July was the longest yet; arguments flew non-stop back
and forth across the table. At some point during that meeting, Aarons presented a copy of
Metropolitan Opera Orchestra’s contract and asked the board, “if the Met can do it why
can’t the Philharmonic? If their board can raise the kind of money needed, why can’t the
Philharmonic?” He and the committee together felt that getting the additional money
required to meet the musicians’ needs should not be the duty of the orchestra members,
but should be the management’s duty. Moseley refused to be guided or bound by what
the Metropolitan Opera did. His argument was that they were in another class, and that it
should also be the duty of the orchestra members to find the additional money because it
would affect the future of the orchestra, its continuous existence, and their sustained
employment. He then unveiled a figure of $650,000 in Society’s total deficit to the
committee and said that costs such as advertising, and rentals had been going up;
foundations were not giving to organizations as much as to schools and educational
organizations.
Nonetheless, Aarons said, “Either we continue negotiating and you begin to offer
something, or we are negotiating in a vacuum.”33 The committee asked the Society to
provide a full proposal in writing by the following week, so that the orchestra could be
apprised of the state of the negotiations before they went on vacation.
At the fifth meeting on 31 July, Moseley presented a written explanation outlining
the Society's position with respect to the forthcoming contract. A significant point he
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raised was that in 1964 the Society was the first orchestra in the nation to offer fifty-two
weeks of annual employment to its members. In the intervening years, the Society had
been able to substantially increase the orchestra’s earnings and benefits, with the eightyear summary showing that a musician’s minimum scale base salary and guaranteed
income rose from $10,400 in 1964 to $18,160 in 1972. But Moseley noted that
compensation and operational costs were directly related:
In achieving the marked financial improvements for the orchestra, the Society
has supported one of the highest compensation levels and one of the highest
operating budgets of any symphony orchestra in the world.34

Accordingly, he noted that overall costs of operation had risen steeply from $3.2
million in 1964 to $5.3 million in 1972. Revenue from operations that in 1964 had
covered 75% of costs had by 1972 dropped to 57%, despite an all-time high inflow of
$2,617,100 from ticket sales. Moreover, the amounts the Society had to raise increased
from $800,000 in 1964 to $2.3 million in 1972. Moseley reminded the committee that the
Society had already raised ticket prices “to the point beyond which it would lose sales
and a valuable and worthy public.”35 He also noted that the Philharmonic did not have
certain resources and advantages that other symphony orchestras had: the seven weeks
underwritten by Robin Hood Dell Concerts and the four weeks at Saratoga that the
Philadelphia enjoyed, or the seven weeks in Ravinia that the Chicago Symphony had, as
well as the endowment that assured all its pension and health care plans.36 Finally,
Moseley reported on the Society’s efforts to establish its own endowment:
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In addition to bringing about a 142% increase in annual giving, the Society
undertook a major endowment drive for $10 million, of which it was able to raise
$7 million including the $1 million Ford Foundation grant.37

When the fifth meeting ended, a disappointed Aarons and committee returned to
the orchestra to inform them of the state of the negotiations and their present position.
*****
At the start of the sixth meeting on 2 August, Bernsohn reported to the
management the musicians’ reaction upon hearing Society’s position. He described it as
“Silence … to Incredulity … To Anger … To Defiance! The committee didn’t have to
stir them up!”38 The musicians had apparently agreed to only one item that the
management had proposed, which was the deferred payment of pension.39 Bernsohn also
raised the question as to why there was a difference in the deficit figures of $449,000 for
1970-71 versus $200,000 for 1971-72. Moseley’s response was that there were costs for
Philharmonic Hall in 1970-71 that did not appear as a recurring item in 1971-72. It was
expected initially that the Philharmonic would share the profits of operating Philharmonic
Hall, but because the hall had been operating at a deficit, the Philharmonic unavoidably
had to share the cost. In addition, Moseley told the committee that the Society was
required to meet the costs of various inflated expense items over which it had no control,
such as operating costs and advertising, to which Bernsohn replied, “In other words, you
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want to honor inflated costs of everything but orchestra salaries.”40 He added that if the
architects for Philharmonic Hall had not neglected the musicians’ suggestions, large
amounts of money could have been saved because they knew well that an acoustical
ceiling would be necessary over the stage. Moseley countered that the Philharmonic was
actually in a better situation than the other Lincoln Center constituents, who were entirely
responsible for operating and meeting the full deficits of their own halls.
The committee went on to express their concerns over the board of directors’ lack
of innovative ideas and unwillingness to explore different things that would have
improved the Society’s finances. The committee pointed out that the Philharmonic had
lost out on getting summer homes at Saratoga and Tanglewood; they also made the
decision to give up the opportunity to buy Carnegie Hall and were being one of the last
orchestras to set up an endowment. Moseley clarified that the orchestra’s purpose had
always been about serving the citizens of New York City, and that the Saratoga and
Tanglewood plans were not as practical as the summer parks concerts and other special
activities in New York. He also mentioned that it was difficult to come up with the
necessary funds for housing, per diem, and transportation for Tanglewood and Saratoga,
and that because the orchestra did not have an endowment in place at the time, it was
obliged to spend summers in New York City. (Tanglewood was thereafter offered to the
Boston Symphony Orchestra.) In response to the Carnegie Hall situation, Moseley said
only that when the Philharmonic had been offered Carnegie Hall in the past, it was not
advantageous to buy, and that later it became unavailable for sale.41 Aarons then
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reminded them that the meeting was getting sidetracked, and that the Society still had not
offered anything to offset the high cost of living in New York City, namely, more money
for the musicians. The committee also stated that the musicians would not consider the
Society’s proposal of an average of eight and one-quarter services per week throughout
the year, with a maximum of five concerts in any week except education weeks, and
urged the management to reevaluate its position. In reply, the management insisted that
there was nothing to reevaluate unless something could be done to increase Society’s
opportunity to earn through additional services.
Bernsohn brought to the management’s attention the Chicago Symphony’s plan of
a radio-tape syndication under which each musician would receive an additional $50 per
performance, and contrasted this with Society’s suggestion that the orchestra broadcast
for free, if necessary, simply because it would be good to have the Philharmonic on the
air again. Moseley then suggested the musicians form a committee to work with the
Society in search of potential radio contracts. The committee members, however, stated
that they would not have time to go out and stir up radio business, though they would
always be willing to consider proposals as well as work out agreements with Society.
Aarons once again drew the conversation back to the negotiations by asking the
management why the law firm of Proskauer, Rose, Goetz & Mendelssohn seemed to be
representing all of the performing arts groups in the city—the Radio City Music Hall
Orchestra, the New York City Opera, and the New York Philharmonic. He pointed out
that Proskauer’s approach seemed to be the same in all contract negotiations: no money;
the need for more services; and no raises. Moseley explained that all the arts groups had
been in the same situation of financial crisis, and all had been paying their employees
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more money for less services, and all “had gone below rock bottom point.” 42 Committee
members suggested that perhaps by bringing back an exciting conductor such as
Bernstein, the orchestra could generate more excitement, recordings, and tours. Bernsohn
said, “If you can come up with some ways you can use present services to greater
advantage, then we might have something to discuss.”43
Moseley replied that even though he might be able to reexamine the season
schedule to see if a better plan would be workable, the bottom line was that the
Philharmonic would still need more services. He warned the committee that the Society
had reduced services past the point where the organization would remain sustainable, and
also noted that they had operated in a way that made it possible for many people in the
orchestra to maintain a significant second income. The committee members were not
happy to hear this and immediately confronted Moseley with the fact that to the extent
such opportunities existed, they were available primarily to the principal players of the
orchestra and were not representative of the orchestra as a whole. Aarons added that the
Philharmonic musicians were among the best players in the profession, and performed
under significant tensions and pressures, and that even if these men were paid $500 a
week, they would still be underpaid.
Moseley reiterated that the Society had already reduced services beyond what it
could sustain, and was on a downward path. He offered in contrast the example of the
London Symphony Orchestra, which had over five hundred services per year with
musicians who earned only about a third of what the Philharmonic players were paid.
Aarons then used Moseley’s example to express his apprehension over the Society’s
42
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hiring of Harold Lawrence—the manager of the London Symphony—to succeed Helen
Thompson as manager of the New York Philharmonic at the beginning of September.
Both Aarons and the committee feared that Lawrence would make the Philharmonic do
five hundred twenty services a year. “The musicians want less services and more
money,” Aarons said in conclusion.44 Moseley repeated that the Society could consider a
modest increase only if they had more services.
The sixth meeting concluded with an agreement that there was an impasse and no
progress would be made by continuing to meet unless something changed. Meetings were
therefore suspended for four weeks during the orchestra’s vacation period.
Both parties returned to the negotiating table on 3 September 1972. They were
joined by attorney Martin Oppenheimer, representing the Philharmonic Society, and
Harold Lawrence, the new manager. Moseley opened the meeting by reporting to the
committee that he had discussed the revolving seating plan in the string sections with
music director, 45 Pierre Boulez, who had expressed a willingness to experiment with the
seating arrangement for one year. Moseley also noted that the decision to continue,
revise, or abandon the plan was to remain with Boulez. Aarons objected to the notion
that the music director had executive power over this matter and reminded everyone that
in the final analysis, the orchestra had the last word because it could decide whether or
not it would play. Oppenheimer pointed out that such a matter called for an artistic
decision, which the music director would naturally be entitled to make under the
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provisions of the contract. Moseley added that if the orchestra eventually stayed with the
revolving seating plan, it was to be understood that payments for the previous system of
chair prices (overscale for some string players) would be terminated, though the
musicians who were already employed would continue to receive their same salary
increments over the minimum scale.46
Bernsohn then stated that the musicians had requested the committee to present
the revolving seating plan together with the demand that all string players—save for the
first two stands in the first and second violins, and the first stands of all other string
sections who were non-revolving players—receive weekly $25 over scale. “The two parts
were inseparable in considering this proposal.”47 Oppenheimer responded by pointing out
that the weekly $25 increment for all strings would easily cause inequities in pay because
some string players who were already receiving payment for chair prices would have to
take a reduction from the increment, and that the management did not look at the
revolving seating idea as “merely a method of getting a pay increase”.48 Moseley
suggested to the committee the option of taking the total expenditure of the chair prices
and dividing it among the revolving string players, though he advised that it would still
cause unfairness to many players. Committee members then decided that they would take
the matter back to the orchestra because they were not authorized to separately consider
the issues of seating and money.
Oppenheimer proceeded to another area of concern: the size of the orchestra. He
said that the management understood everyone’s desire for an orchestra of one hundred
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and six players, but if the Society could not afford it, then cutback by attrition would be a
way to reduce costs without hurting any of the present players. Aarons objected strongly
and said that the contract they were looking for was the same as the Metropolitan Opera
Orchestra contract. Moseley again stated that the Philharmonic would not be guided by
the affairs of the Metropolitan Opera, and said there were signs that the Met was also
facing a critical financial situation. He said that despite Society’s reasonably successful
efforts to increase funds, costs continued to rise and so did the players’ salary. Larry
Steiner, also from management, added that the payment bill for substitute and extra
musicians had already exceeded six figures during the course of the year. Aarons advised
the management not to reduce the minimum salary of substitutes and extras, saying that
anyone who played with the Philharmonic should receive more than when playing with
other symphonic groups in New York. Oppenheimer countered that in trade unions it is
common for a temporary employee to be paid less than a regular employee, to which
Aarons replied that the amount saved from any change to the rate paid to substitute and
extra musicians would be “picayune.” Bernsohn added “You are putting us back where
we were a good many years ago.”49
Regarding the management’s constant request for increased services (to which
committee members were adamantly opposed), Moseley proposed a redistribution of
services he thought might be workable and which might be generating more box office
revenue. He offered, for example, that in X-number of weeks during the year, there might
be three rehearsals lasting three hours, one short student concert, and four regular
concerts; and in Y-number of weeks, there might be nine services with a maximum of
49
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four concerts and five rehearsals lasting two and one-half hours. He also added that these
increased service weeks would only apply to the subscription season, and not to tour and
park weeks.50 Negotiations then touched on other topics, such as tour costs, health and
pension provisions.
Bernsohn noted the amount of per diem that other symphonies were paying:
Chicago Symphony, $30; Boston Symphony, $27; Philadelphia, $30. Regarding health
and pension benefits, DeIntinis felt that Society might be able to offer the musicians
better coverage by seeking a package deal. He stated that he had been talking with a firm
about it and was expecting to have figures soon.
At the end of this seventh meeting, the management felt that no progress was
being made and that it would be of no use to proceed with the meetings scheduled for the
following day. It was then decided that negotiations would be suspended during the
orchestra’s eleven-day Southeastern tour, and the next meeting was scheduled for 17
September.
*****
Negotiations resumed on 17 September, though without the presence of either
Moseley or Aarons. Moseley had reportedly suffered a heart attack and was in the
hospital, and Aarons was at another meeting with the State Mediation board and the
Radio City stagehands in an effort to prevent a shutdown. Oppenheimer told the
committee that Moseley would not be available for negotiations for some time, and that
this would certainly cause difficulty for the Society. He suggested that the two sides
either postpone negotiations indefinitely, or settle quickly with a mutual agreement of
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minimal proposals from both sides. Victor Rabinowitz, the attorney representing the
union, responded that the musicians would prefer to continue negotiations as they were
being conducted and asked the Society to provide a consolidated financial statement that
would indicate administrative and operational costs. He indicated the players’ willingness
to accept a good three-year contract and asked the Society for a salary proposal. He stated
that the players would only accept as much as seven and one-half services, including no
more than four concerts per week, and would only consider the revolving seating if all
string players receive weekly $25 increase over minimum scale, with exception of the
first stands. He added that if the revolving seating plan remains, then work and pay
should be equalized accordingly.
Oppenheimer responded that the management was ready to produce a financial
statement and that this statement would clearly show Society’s expenditures to be greater
than its income. He said that the Society would not agree to the weekly $25 increase for
each string player, but would agree to the revolving seating of string players as an
experiment for one year so long as the power to decide its success or failure was the sole
prerogative of the music director. Moreover, if the music director declared the experiment
a failure, the decision regarding whether to try a different plan or to return to the original
seating system would again rest solely upon the shoulders of the music director.
Oppenheimer proposed that extra players and substitutes be paid in line with what
other non-Philharmonic engagements pay rather than the Philharmonic minimum scale,
and indicated it would save the Society approximately $10,000 out of total yearly
expenditure of $100,000.51 He further asserted that this savings would help the
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management meet the cost of salary increases that might be offered. He then laid out a
proposal for a weekly increase in salary to $340, $355, and $365 a week during years
one, two, and three, respectively. This, he said, was the Society’s final offer.52
On the other side of the table, the union maintained its insistence that extra and
substitute players be paid the Philharmonic scale, and its opposition to the Society’s plan
for a reduction of the orchestra’s guaranteed size to a hundred players. Although the
Society had stated that this reduction would only occur through attrition, the
Philharmonic musicians feared it would overwhelmingly affect the string sections and
would result in the remaining string players having to do additional work.
The meetings continued on 18 September, but little or no bargaining took place at
the table, and overall, very little progress had been made toward an agreement on any
part of the new contract. Oppenheimer had reportedly used abusive and insulting
language at this meeting.53 He told the committee members that the New York
Philharmonic was the highest paid orchestra in the United States with the smallest
number of players on minimum scale, and that it was not imperative that the
Philharmonic maintain this position as long as it remained in the mainstream.54
Rabinowitz responded to the management that its wage offer was below acceptable and
would most likely be rejected by the players.
Despite the unsettled nature of the contract negotiations, the Philharmonic opened
its 1973-74 season on the evening of 18 September with a gala Pension Fund Benefit
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Concert. Both parties understood that the present contract would expire at midnight on 20
September, and in hopes of reaching a new agreement, two more meetings were
scheduled for the 19th and 20th.
Negotiations began again on 19 September with the committee members asking
the management to consider having three, three-hour rehearsals a week to save on the hall
rental and to experiment with sectional rehearsal of strings in the morning, and rehearsal
for the winds and brass sections in the afternoon. Rehearsal time for each musician as an
individual would thus be reduced, but would remain the same for the orchestra as a
whole. The committee also stated their concern over the management’s proposed fifth
concert a week, noting that it could easily result in extreme fatigue and tension.
Oppenheimer refused to negotiate anything having to do with performances or
services; he reiterated that there was no negotiating for less services. Although he did not
say that more services would be instituted, he did mention that the fifth weekly concert
might be student concert only, in order to lessen the physical strain on the orchestra
players. Rabinowitz brought up comparisons with Chicago and other orchestras, and
suggested the management to give the players a weekly increase of $25, $15, and $10
over three years. Oppenheimer held firmly to the figures of $10, $15, and $10 over three
years, and said that the Philharmonic was among the leading orchestras of the world, if
not the leading orchestra. He said that the Philharmonic did not have minimum scales
below the other big five orchestras and was not compelled to pay more than the others.
He believed that the management’s proposed salary increase would put the Philharmonic
at the top, and that the proposal was manageable given the Philharmonic’s financial
problems as well as in line with what had been offered in other cities. Rabinowitz
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countered that if the Philharmonic musicians settled for the management’s proposal of
$10, $15, and $10, it would adversely affect the Chicago Symphony, whose musicians
had been locked out since 15 September.55 Rabinowitz also took the chance to bring up a
rumor that had been circulating, namely, that the pioneer manufacturer of high-fidelity
phonograph and radio equipment, Avery Fisher, had made an enormous donation to
Philharmonic Hall and to the New York Philharmonic Society.56 Even though the
committee knew that the gift was real, they were not sure what its conditions might be,
and more importantly, they did not want to disrupt the negotiations with more
uncertainty. Oppenheimer’s response was that it was a fund to underwrite the cost of
maintaining Philharmonic Hall, and that it would eventually help the Philharmonic and
other constituents.
Moseley had revealed at the sixth meeting back in July 1973 that because of the
contract with Lincoln Center, it had always been customary that the Society shared the
deficit of Philharmonic Hall with Lincoln Center. Since the management had been
declaring financial hardship, Avery Fisher’s gift would be a blessing to both sides.
However, due to the timing of its arrival, it had inevitably added more ambiguity to the
already gloomy negotiations.
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Chapter Three: Avery Fisher Gift and the Philharmonic Management’s Turmoil
Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts, New York City’s cultural hub, had
reportedly operated at a total deficit of $17.9 million during the 1972-1973 season; this
total included deficits of $7.8 million at the Metropolitan Opera; $4.3 million at the City
Center of Music and Drama (the New York State Theater); and $1.9 million at the
Philharmonic Symphony Orchestra. Alice Tully Hall, the Film Society, the Juilliard
School, and a few others constituents were also running deficits. Despite philanthropic
donations totaling $14.2 million, Lincoln Center was still short by $3.7 million.
Furthermore, the management estimated that the amount of deficit would be twice as
much for the following 1973-1974 season—approximately $6.9 million.1 The causes for
such a financial predicament were believed to be high costs, rising inflation, and lack of
government subsidies. Amyas Ames, chairman of the board of Lincoln Center and of the
New York Philharmonic, stated that Lincoln Center was in urgent need for more
endowments to continue operations:
Government on all levels must realize that ‘it is absolute stupidity’ not to support
the performing arts massively.
Without continuing and extensive support by the city, state and Federal
governments and long-range private support, we’ll begin to make second-best
decisions.2

One example he mentioned was the Metropolitan Opera, which apparently had to cancel
a scheduled new production of Mozart’s “Don Giovanni” and summer parks concerts due
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to an increasing deficit.3 John Mazzola, the management director of Lincoln Center, Inc.
added:
Subsidies ought to be as direct as possible. The city could pick up the services
here that it picks up at the Metropolitan Museum, in the libraries. It could do
what Los Angeles does and what Atlanta does.4

Fortunately, on 10 May 1973,5 Lincoln Center’s management had a breakthrough
in the field of arts patronage, when Avery Fisher expressed his wish to do what Alice
Tully had done in making contributions in support of the hall that bears her name. His
representative was then taken on a tour of the entire Lincoln Center complex and was told
about the undertakings in the Juilliard Theater, the Drama Workshop, and the Film
Forum. The representative was also shown Philharmonic Hall; all of the activities in the
hall as well as the relationship between Lincoln Center and the Philharmonic Society
were described.
Fisher was born into a family to whom music was a very important part of leisure
activities. His father, Charles Fisher, was a successful real estate professional who owned
one of the largest collections of acoustic horn gramophones, and had given him the
opportunity to study the violin from a very young age.6 In an interview, Fisher talked
about how his love of music stemmed from his parents:
She played the violin, which in Russia in those times was never done. A girl
might play the piano, not the violin. It was very avant-garde for that place at that
time.
I had such admiration for my Dad. We didn’t have all that much money in the
house, but with the first $100 he could put aside he went out and bought a piano.
3
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His feeling was that every one of his kids had to have two things: a college
degree, and be able to play music.7

Young Fisher studied biology and English and eventually graduated with a
science degree from New York University in 1929.8 His early career was in publishing,
during which he worked as a book designer for Dodd, Mead and Company.9 He had
always been a passionate music lover throughout his life—as an amateur violinist,10 the
New York Times described him as a “chamber-music fanatic.”11 He often hosted chamber
music concerts at his New York apartment at 96th Street and Park Avenue, and played
first or second violin part, depending on the music and his performing partners.
When it came to audio sound quality, Fisher said that he became a “hi-fi bug” in
1931, a few years after the arrival of sound movies:
I would snap up all the excellent old Photophone amplifiers from the movie
theaters when the invention of the Sound Gate – sound directly on film – made
the Photophones obsolete.12

He was constantly dissatisfied with home radio equipment during the 1930s, and
therefore began to experiment with high fidelity audio design as his hobby, so he could
listen to recorded music played at its best in his home. He later told the New York Times:
Concurrently, I was developing my hobby in hi-fi, and a number of friends asked
me to make for them the kind of equipment I was constructing for my own home,
the sort of thing that was not commercially available, the type of thing found in
radio stations or movie theaters.
7
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And so I started constructing for this small group of people and before I knew it.
I had the beginning of a business.13

In 1937, he was able to quit his publishing job to focus on the pursuit of his interest in
making high fidelity equipment, which quickly led to the founding of the Philharmonic
Radio Corporation.14 When the Second World War started, Fisher sold his company to a
larger corporation and remained on board to lead the production of electronic
mechanisms for war. After the war ended in 1945, he went on to create his second audio
company, The Fisher Radio Corporation,15 which manufactured high fidelity components
in a factory that was actually located at the site of today’s Lincoln Center. Fisher’s
products were known for their exceptional sound as well as the quality of their
construction.16
In 1969 when high fidelity audio industry began its shift towards mass production,
Fisher decided to sell his company and thus the Emerson Electric Company of St. Louis
bought Fisher Radio for almost $31 million.17 From that point on, Fisher began to think
about how he would utilize such large amount of money. To him, such assets were far
beyond his personal needs and those of his family: “I started thinking in terms of where I
could do a little good with that money,” he said. It became clear to him that music had
been the main contributor to his wealth, and even to his life:
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I kept coming back to the realization that I owed something to music … It all
came out of the world of music and some of it should go back as a repayment of
a personal debt, you might say, but also as a civic responsibility.18

In June 1973, Fisher and his representative met with Ames for the first time to
convey his purpose: that he wanted to make a substantial gift to Lincoln Center in the
form of an endowment.19
On 7 September 1973, Fisher issued an official offering letter to the Lincoln
Center Executive Committee for approval. In the letter he stated clearly that the gifts
were to be known as the Avery Fisher Fund, and should be held, invested, reinvested and
managed by Lincoln Center as an endowment fund in perpetuity.20 Particularly, he
wanted the income to be used for two distinct purposes:
(A) One-fifth of such income shall be available annually to support the Avery
Fisher Fellowship Awards Program, which will be established by the Center.
The purpose of this program will be to provide an opportunity for gifted
young musicians, selected by the Center and/or The New York Philharmonic
Symphony Society and designated as Avery Fisher Fellows, to perform at the
Center either individually or as soloists with the New York Philharmonic
Orchestra or at other regular or special concerts. Funds provided under the
Program could be used to provide financial awards or scholarships for such
musicians, to pay all or a portion of the costs of special concerts at which
such musicians perform to pay the travel expenses of conductors invited to
attend concerts at which such musicians perform, and for other similar
purposes.
(B) Four-fifths of such income shall be available annually toward the cost of
maintaining, operating and improving the Center’s concert hall, which is now
known as Philharmonic Hall and to be renamed, in perpetuity, Avery Fisher
Hall. A major objective of mine in providing this financial support for the
concert hall is to continue to enable the Center to make this hall available for
concerts of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra and other musical
18
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organizations at charges which, taking into account rising costs, will make it
feasible to price tickets within the reach of broad segments of the public,
including students. I understand that with the name change, “Avery Fisher
Hall” will appear on tickets, brochures, program announcements and
advertisements and the like, and I consent in perpetuity to such use.21

Fisher was different from other philanthropists in that he believed that the future
of music lay in the hands of young artists, and it was this belief that led him to stipulate
that twenty percent of his donation to Lincoln Center was to be used exclusively for
cultivating and nourishing the careers of young American professional instrumental
artists from around the country. He had the idea that the New York Philharmonic and
Lincoln Center together could assist these exceptional performers in various ways to
bring them before the public, conductors, orchestras, and professional managements from
all parts of the country.
While the mission of the Avery Fisher Fellowship Program was to scour the
country for talented young artists and help bring them into public view and appreciation,
Fisher also expressed concerns over competitions and thus planned to avoid it:
In the sense that no one will be required to run the gauntlet of “contests,” with
glory for the winner and ‘second place’ scars for others who might very well be
equally fine musicians. These kinds of risks are poison to a sensitive young artist
and we propose to eliminate them.22

Fisher planned to fulfill at least half of his entire pledge by 30 June 1974, and the
remainder by 30 June 1979.23 On 18 September 1973 the Lincoln Center Executive
Committee unanimously voted to approve the terms of Fisher’s offering letter and sent
out a letter advising the New York Philharmonic’s board of directors of the action they
21
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had taken; they offered to use eighty percent of the income from the Fisher gift to reduce
the total Philharmonic Hall deficit before division of the balance between the
Philharmonic-Symphony Society and Lincoln Center in accordance with the existing
contract between the two organizations. Moreover, Lincoln Center requested that the
Society provide an official approval letter in regards to changing the name of the hall to
Avery Fisher Hall, in honor of Fisher and in appreciation of his generosity.
After some careful discussions of the subject and on a motion duly made and
seconded, the Society board unanimously approved Lincoln Center’s action in accepting
Fisher’s offer. Furthermore on a second motion duly made and seconded, the board
accepted Lincoln Center’s proposal to use eighty percent of the income of the donation to
reduce Philharmonic Hall’s deficit and specifically approved the change of the name of
the hall to Avery Fisher Hall.24
On 20 September 1973, a news conference was held in the lobby of the 2,836seat, newly renamed Avery Fisher Hall. When asked why he had chosen Philharmonic
Hall to be the beneficiary of his millions of dollars, Fisher stated that his main objective
in providing the financial support for the concert hall was to allow more performances by
the New York Philharmonic, as well as other musical organizations, at a reasonable rate
despite rising costs, and hopefully to encourage the presentation of more music in New
York City. Fisher added that his interest in music, both as an instrumentalist and as a
concert-attendee, had been life-long, and that his donation to Lincoln Center was
repayment in part of his personal debt to those who make music for the pleasure of the
general public: “I owe it all to live music and live musicians. They made everything
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possible for me.” 25 According to Fisher, his decision to establish an endowment for
Lincoln Center had the full support of his immediately family: “They found it
mindboggling. They all flipped. They were stunned, overwhelmed, and proud.”26 Though
he felt that the major gift did not mean as much to him as he expected it to mean to his
family, especially his son (“I want him to have something to chin on in his career”),27 he
stated, simply: “I have always been a musician at heart, not a manufacturer. My heart has
been with live music. That’s the source, the fountain, of music.”28
In response to Fisher’s statement, Ames said that since he entered the arts
business, he had seen the rise of extreme crises, and understood that the existing threat of
rising inflation might reduce the finest art organizations to mediocrity:
In order to give full recognition to the importance of his gift, let me point out
that, in place of this happy announcement might have come disclosures of forced
cutbacks, of higher rentals and less music in the city. We have dramatic
testimony to the unbearable burdens being placed on the arts at Lincoln Center in
the dangerous financial troubles of the constituents and in the cutbacks of park
concerts by the Metropolitan Opera. Avery Fisher’s gift, lifting a part of the
heavy cost burdens at Avery Fisher Hall, places fresh emphasis on the
importance of private support for the arts and I deeply hope that his leadership
will cause others to come forward to help the arts companies of Lincoln Center
and of the State.29

Although the size of Fisher’s gift was kept undisclosed, Ames said that about $500,000
would be used to support the hall’s annual operational expenses: window washing,
security, electricity, etc.30 According to Ames, the New York Philharmonic shared about
forty percent of the deficit of the hall based on its proportional use of the hall, and that
25
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the income from the gift would also help the Philharmonic by substantially decreasing its
share of deficit.
What Ames did not—and perhaps did not want to—mention was that the hall had
a long history of acoustical troubles and necessary renovations since opening in 1962,
and that quite possibly some or even most of Fisher’s donation would have to be spent
towards additional hall renovations. When the New York Philharmonic first moved to
Lincoln Center from Carnegie Hall, Philharmonic Hall had been promoted as a venue
with not only plenty of comfort and amenities, but also immaculate sound. But at the
hall’s opening gala concert, which featured the New York Philharmonic under the baton
of Leonard Bernstein, it immediately became clear that the hall was less than acceptable
acoustically. One of the critical issues was the sound on the stage itself: the musicians
constantly complained about not having enough bass and clarity, and more importantly,
about not being able to hear each other well enough on stage. Conductors were hesitant to
commend on the tonal quality of the hall, and audience’s perception was that the distance
between performers and audience was too far apart, which then weakened the impact of
the music. George Szell, who was present at the hall’s tuning week in 1962, even said:
“Tear it down and start over.”31
The management of Lincoln Center was well aware of the acoustical problems,
and subsequently spent a total of about $2 million in attempts to correct the acoustical
deficiencies of the hall during the summers of 1963, 1964, 1965, and 1969.32 None of
these attempts did much to correct the problems, and the sense of disappointment within
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the organization grew larger with each successive attempt. The Philharmonic’s
management, on the other hand, expressed a different attitude towards the hall: they felt
that the overall negativity concerning the acoustics of the hall could very well be an
exaggeration: “insisting on perfection when in all truth Fisher Hall is a perfectly adequate
installation.”33 When Fisher revealed that as he proposed to give large funding to the hall,
he was invited by Lincoln Center to join a committee to restudy the acoustical problems
of the hall. And he echoed the Philharmonic management’s opinion:
Many of the comments about the hall made today are unjustified, ... much of the
chitchat is like the stories about U.F.O.’s mass hysteria, almost. It’s like athlete’s
foot, the way it spreads from toe to toe, from cocktail party to cocktail party, and
gets all out of proportion.
No one has to apologize for the present state of the hall, … though it might be
made better—we’ll be looking into that—it is a very fine hall now. What needs
to be done, if anything, can be done easily, and I’ve met nobody associated with
the place who isn’t flexible about that.34

Fisher was of course known for his genius in making improvements to high quality
sound: it had been his career and his passion. And even though the hall that now bore his
name was frequently being criticized by the musicians who played in it, Fisher seemed to
remain optimistic about and even somewhat content about the hall’s acoustical condition.
The New York Times had reported evidence showing that musicians with highly
trained ears were not necessarily the best for judging sound. They tended to listen with
their brains instead of their ears: “They know the music so well that listening often
becomes an intellectual rather than an aural experience.”35 Even though the Philharmonic
management consulted the musicians each time there was a plan to acoustically renovate
the hall, the Philharmonic musicians felt that their recommendations were always
33
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neglected. For them, to spend such large amounts of money on acoustical alterations and
experiments without addressing their concerns, was a travesty.
What the musicians of the Philharmonic found absurd during the fall of 1973 was
that while they were in the midst of extremely challenging contract negotiations—and as
their management was repeatedly declaring financial hardship—an unusually large
donation that would directly alleviate the Society’s financial situation was publicly
announced, and on the very same day as their contract expired. To make the matter
worse, Amyas Ames, who served as chairman of the board of both the Lincoln Center
and the Philharmonic Society, left on vacation to Italy within hours of the orchestra’s
decision to continue playing and negotiating, once its contract had expired. In so doing,
Ames left the orchestra in a state of complete puzzlement and anguish.
Ames was an investment banker who loved the arts and devoted much of his time
to performing arts management. His association with the orchestra began in 1955 when
he was elected board member of the Philharmonic; he became president of the board
eight years later, and in 1970 became chairman of the board, a post of which he held for
sixteen years. At the same time, he succeeded John D. Rockefeller III as chairman of the
board of the Lincoln Center Corporation, taking the reins of Lincoln Center at a time
when there were desperate crises in the management of arts organizations to be dealt
with. He told the New York Times on the occasion of his Lincoln Center appointment: “I
didn’t want to follow the straight-business route. I wanted to phase out early.” He went
on to explain that he wanted to try to help “tie the performing arts into political
developments, into the fight to improve the quality of life, the quality of the environment
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in our cities.36 As soon as he took office at Lincoln Center, he encouraged all the
constituents of Lincoln Center to take part in offering concerts with low-cost tickets in
order to attract and develop a new audience. He believed that to create new concert
audiences, it was crucial to shift the emphasis from sciences to the humanities in
American schools.
Even before he took on additional responsibilities at Lincoln Center, Ames was
already concerned about the loss of interest in classical music, not only in New York City
but in the rest of the country, and he became actively involved in advocating the
importance of governmental subsidies for the nation’s symphony orchestras. In “The
Silent Spring of Our Symphonies,” he stated:
We can kill music by starving our orchestras, leaving our cities dreary places
indeed. We can surround our cities with great traffic interchanges that cost $25 to
$50 million apiece and not realize until it is too late that, for a fraction of that
cost of a small one of these, we are depriving our people committing them to
lives without music.37

In November 1969,38 when 137 presidents, board chairmen, and managers from
seventy-seven principal orchestras across the United States were invited by the nation’s
“Big Five” orchestras39 to Philharmonic Hall in New York City for a two-day conference
to discuss their common dilemma, Ames was chosen as chairman of the group
“Committee-of-the-Whole.”40 Together, they carefully examined their operating
problems and created a statement to present to the Congress. For the first time in
American history, a request was made to the Federal Government to come to the aid of
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the nation’s orchestras in meeting their deficits. In their statement, they emphasized the
significance of American symphony orchestras, which consisted of approximately
fourteen hundred different organizations serving a total audience of more than twenty
million men, women, and children, who attended on average more than eleven thousand
concerts per year.41 They pointed out that the American orchestras had greatly expanded
their efforts in public and educational services throughout their communities despite the
lack of financial support.42 They also provided operating figures of the ninety orchestras,
showing that the anticipated total expenses increased from $28,820,500 in 1963 to
$87,090,000 in 1972 with a cash loss of from $169,800 in 1963 to $13,222,000 in 1972.43
Ames said that inflation was evident in these dramatic figures:
Corporations can and do raise prices as wage rise; the government increases taxes
to pay the inflating costs for everything it buys. Orchestras cannot raise prices
and find the very foundation of their support –the generous giving of individuals
–undermined by the effect of rising taxes and prices.44

While Ames had clearly shown his devotion to the performing arts, and more
specifically, to the nation’s symphony orchestras as a whole, the musicians of the
Philharmonic had conflicted feelings about him. They felt that Ames was just not able to
empathize with a musician’s struggle to make a living, or even to dedicate himself
entirely to the day-to-day running of the orchestra. Perhaps it was because of his dual
leadership in two major institutions that had been always so tightly associated with one
another—the Philharmonic and Lincoln Center—that kept him separate from the
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musicians. To the musicians of the orchestra, Ames was neither reachable nor interested
in their problems and needs.
When Ames became chairman of the board in 1970, the Philharmonic underwent
a series of administrative changes, the most important of which was the appointment of
Carlos Moseley as President. Moseley, who had been the managing director since 1961,
would succeed Ames as President and became the first salaried professional full time
president of any American orchestra. His position was described by Ames as “an
administrative necessity,” shifting Moseley’s focus from administrative obligations to the
long-term development of the New York Philharmonic: “its musical functions, its
activity, its widening relationship in the community, its growing financial needs, its
appeal for government support.”45
Moseley was a native of South Carolina who first came to the Philharmonic in
1955 as director of press and public relations. He was himself a musician who had
performed four concerts with the Philharmonic as one of the three soloists in Bach’s C
major concerto for three pianos in December 1959,46 sharing the stage with two other
pianists, Leonard Bernstein and David M. Keiser (former chairman and president of the
Philharmonic).47 Since 1961, Moseley had played a significant role in various
developments in the Philharmonic. Under his supervision, the Philharmonic increased its
musicians’ contract from thirty-six to fifty-two weeks, relocated from Carnegie Hall to
Lincoln Center, started giving free summer park concerts throughout parks in the city,
renovated Philharmonic Hall a number of times, and formed the Philharmonic radio
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network. While Moseley was always a tough negotiator and evidently thought that
musicians’ salaries should be kept low, he truly believed that having a fifty-two week
season was better for the lives of the musicians in the orchestra than a thirty-six week
season. He had good relationships with the players of the orchestra and was, in fact, the
only person the musicians trusted. He was liked and was often thought of as a gentleman
who had a charming Southern manner. Orin O’Brien,48 for instance, has described him as
soft-spoken and non-confrontational, and has indicated that he seemed to want to do
“best” for the orchestra and for the organization. She added that Moseley was always
cordial and polite when meeting with the members of the orchestra: “He chaired the
meetings with dignity, and never used harsh words or gave out negative vibe.”49
The board also appointed Helen M. Thompson, the chief executive of the
American Symphony Orchestra league, as its new managing director, making Thompson
the first woman ever to manage a major American orchestra.50 Before coming to the
Philharmonic, Thompson held a position as manager of the Charleston Symphony
Orchestra in 1940, and then moved on to become chief staff executive of the American
Symphony Orchestra League in 1950. For twenty years, she helped to build the league in
size and influence while American orchestras were expanding and improving in quality.
The New York Times once called her “one of the foremost arts lobbyists in the country”.51
In 1970, she became manager of the Philharmonic, though she stayed at the post
for only three years. She was criticized for being unsuitable to head an organization of the
size and type of the New York Philharmonic, given that she had never managed a major
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American orchestra. It was believed that Carlos Moseley chose her to succeed him partly
because she was a good friend of Catherine Filene Shouse, donor of Wolf Trap Farm
National Park for the Performing Arts in the Washington D.C. area, in hopes that Mrs.
Shouse would donate money to the New York Philharmonic. In September 1973, the
manager of the London Symphony, Harold Lawrence, 52 succeeded Thompson in the
middle of the contract negotiations.
On 17 September 1973, when the musicians were first told that Moseley had had
a heart attack and was unable to continue participating in the negotiations, they were not
sure whether to believe the news, and tried to contact him, though without success. The
general sentiment among the musicians was that Moseley was the only figure in the
management they could—at the very least—relate to and that Ames was difficult even to
talk to, much less negotiate with. And indeed, the negotiations without Moseley were
noticeably more challenging. The musicians did not trust their management, and the two
sides grew further and further apart.
At the eleventh negotiation meeting on 24 September 1973 the Society’s lawyer,
Martin Oppenheimer started out by urging the committee to accept their proposal and
stated that the Fisher gift did not change the Philharmonic’s situation and that it only
reduced the expenses of the hall. He told the committee that he was aware that they want
to be the best, but they could not be the best for every single benefit, because the
lingering deficits would affect the Philharmonic’s long-term financial situation. The
union’s lawyer, Victor Rabinowitz, requested that the management provide further
information on the gift; he agreed that the details would not be published. He pointed out
52
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that the Philharmonic’s share of the hall’s deficit was $223,000, almost twice the amount
of the total cost of fringe benefits.53 The chairman of the orchestra committee, Lorin
Bernsohn, mentioned that the Chicago Symphony’s welfare was endowed, so with the
Fisher gift relieving the hall deficits, the Philharmonic should be able to pay for their
welfare. He also suspected that the $8 to10 million mentioned by the New York Times
was not enough to change the name of the hall, and that the amount of the gift must have
been greater than that sum. Rabinowitz told the management that with the public notice
of the Fisher gift, the orchestra thought it was good time to strike. Oppenheimer, on the
other hand, said that they did not want a fight in the press and would release information
showing that their offer was fair.
A list was provided by the management of what New York Philharmonic
musicians were paid in comparison to what the players of other major orchestras were
paid during the 1972-73 season: for a weekly minimum scale that ranged from $285 to
$330, the Philharmonic paid $330; for per diem that ranged from $25 to $30, the
Philharmonic paid $28; for extra services that ranged from $26 to $32, the Philharmonic
paid $30; for concerts that ranged from $35 to $66, the Philharmonic paid $66; for
overtime per 15 minutes that ranged from $3.25 to $5.33, the Philharmonic paid $5.54 The
meeting ended with no progress; both sides held firmly to their positions.
Negotiations continued on 25 September. Rabinowitz delivered the Orchestra’s
position on string sections’ revolving seating plan:55 they proposed that all string players
except title chairs be rotated and given a $15 raise the first year and $25 for second. The
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committee suggested that if the system failed after the first year, no one would drop back
to minimum pay, and that the monies allocated for the second year should be applied to
raises for the title chairs.56 Oppenheimer countered that the management would only offer
the title chairs a $10 raise; all other rotating string players would remain at the status quo
for the first year. If the rotation system was successful, they would give all rotating
players a $10 raise the second year while title chairs remained without an increase in
salary. He also mentioned that they would only pay union scale rather than Philharmonic
scale to substitute players unless they auditioned successfully.
The committee then left the meeting to play a concert. At its conclusion, a
meeting with orchestra members was immediately held, with the recommendation that
the orchestra strike. The musicians then voted unanimously to strike. Thereafter, all
committees began to prepare for the strike, and the union endorsed and recommended the
committee’s recommendation.
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Chapter Four: The Strike Begins
On the evening of 25 September 1973, shortly after that evening’s performance,
the one hundred and six musicians of the New York Philharmonic went on strike. It was
apparent to them that negotiations between the Philharmonic-Society and Local 802 of
the American Federation of Musicians had broken down and that no progress was being
made. At noon the following day, when the musicians of the Philharmonic would
ordinarily have been rehearsing on stage, they were instead forming picket lines outside
Avery Fisher Hall.
In response to the strike, a representative of the Philharmonic Society announced
that there was no choice but to cancel all performances until further notice. And because
stagehands and other employees at Avery Fisher Hall had expressed a reluctance to cross
the musicians’ picket lines, there was the possibility that other events at the Hall might
also have to be canceled as a result of the strike.
The Philharmonic musicians had last struck in 1961 when fighting for a
year-round contract and for more involvement in the process of negotiating their
contracts. That strike lasted one week. Twelve years later, they again found themselves
on the picket line. The flyers they offered to any interested person explained why the
decision to walk out was their only option:
The Society has deliberately provoked this strike by making a farce out of our
efforts to play while talking. They really did not want a contract and they really
did not want concerts.
The Society through its management has told the Orchestra that being the BEST
is no longer important to them – and from this unprecedented shift in attitude and
policy has flowed the stream of difficulties; i.e.: the unsupported pleas of
poverty, the studied indifference to our needs.1
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The musicians feared that the integrity of the Orchestra—its standards of
excellence; and the competitiveness of its membership—would be lost if the Society
would or could not improve upon the terms of the contract that had expired. Sol
Greitzer,2 who was the principal violist at the time, said that the strike had something to
do with dignity:
I guess what we’re doing has a lot to do with dignity; dignity as an artist and
dignity as a man. We all love the Philharmonic. After all, it’s our life, our
livelihood, and it’s a part of us.”3

The musicians felt that the board of directors did not really understand what it
took to be a member of the Orchestra, that, for the very few musicians fortunate enough
to have the talent and ability needed to play in a world-class orchestra, a lifetime of study
and countless hours of practice were necessary in order to be able to compete for—much
less occupy—a seat in an orchestra like the New York Philharmonic. And primary among
the reasons those few musicians who had both the talent and the drive to be members of
the Philharmonic, and not some other orchestra, was the fact that they considered the
New York Philharmonic to be the best orchestra in the nation.
They asked their music-loving public for support and loyalty, and to understand
that the musician’s goal was to keep the New York Philharmonic among the ranks of the
world’s best orchestras. They emphasized that with skyrocketing inflation and the
management persistently trying to enforce a regressive and inadequate contract on its
musicians, it would be impossible to do this, especially in a city like New York, where
the cost of living was prohibitively high. Said one player: “the dollar simply buys less
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here than anywhere else.”4 And they expressed the belief that the Society’s latest offer
looked to be one that was designed to be rejected by the orchestra and its union:
What self-respecting individual or union could consider a 3% increase let alone
one that was coupled with an increase in workload? The Society’s wage offer is
truly a cut in pay.5

The musicians pointed out that Philharmonic’s work schedule had always been one of the
most demanding—perhaps the most demanding in the symphonic world—yet the
management wanted to expand it: “they are offering us three percent and taking away six
percent,” a representative from the union said.6
The orchestra’s committee revealed that during the contract that ran from 1970 to
1973, and which expired on 20 September 1973, they worked at least seventeen more
rehearsals and five more concerts each year than the Chicago Symphony Orchestra. And
when the Society offered them a matching minimum salary to that which the locked-out
musicians of the Chicago Symphony had rejected, it included an additional four concerts
with no additional payment. The musician’s union estimated that the value of the
additional services would be more than $20 per week for each musician.
The musicians tried to bring to the attention of their board of directors that the
management had not even investigated requests that the musicians had proven relevant
and necessary to their work, such as disability insurance, on the grounds that the
management was not prepared to offer them anyway. And other requests of improved
benefits were treated in the same fashion. The president of Local 802, Max Aarons,
summed up the management’s negotiators at meetings in the following manner: “It
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doesn’t require much labor statesmanship to sit at a bargaining table and say ‘no’ to every
item up for negotiation.”7
While the public seemed sympathetic to the musicians’ point of view, the New
York Times, in an editorial of 28 September, questioned the musicians’ motivation and
their ultimate goal:
“The 3 per cent prestrike pay offer by the Philharmonic is clearly less than its
musicians have a right to demand, both on the basis of comparability and of
skyrocketing living costs. But if they push their settlement price into the
stratosphere simply because Mr. Fisher’s generosity has inflated their
expectations, the sole effect will be to discourage other public-spirited citizens
from coming to the aid of the arts.8

Lorin Bernsohn, chairman of the orchestra committee, immediately sent a letter to
the editor, saying that the Times had been “duped into playing the Society’s game,” and
had falsely implied that the musicians were motivated by greed, which he described as “a
gross distortion and a grave injustice to the 106 artists whose only desire is to continue
performing without interruption for its devoted audience.”9
The musician’s argument was that the committee had submitted their proposal to
the Society in mid-June, long before there was any inkling of such a major donation, and
that their proposal was reasonably based upon their needs, working conditions, and
benefits deserved. They also pointed out that the New York Times had not mentioned the
management’s demand for a heavier performance schedule, its proposals of actual cuts in
several fringe areas, as well as its refusal to offer improvements in its inadequate health,
welfare, and pension programs. They believed that the orchestra was therefore obligated
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to lead a more progressive stand and to come forth with more realistic terms for their
consideration.
To help the general public better understand the difficult situation behind the
work stoppage, the musicians raised a number of key questions of the Society’s
management: They asked several questions: why didn’t the New York Philharmonic
Society tell them how much money it raises and what its sources are? Why didn’t the
Society give them detailed information concerning its assets and expenditures? How
could the Society expect them to believe its pleas of poverty while telling them that the
answers to the above questions are none of their business? Why had the Society chosen to
announce the Avery Fisher gift the day their contract expired? Why were details of the
amount and distribution of the Avery Fisher gift kept from them and what did the Society
have to hide? And what board chairman would leave on a vacation to Italy within hours
of his orchestra’s decision to continue playing and negotiating, after its contract had
expired?10
According to the musicians, the first hint of the Fisher donation came about the
week before their contract expired, and was communicated by their personnel manager at
the time, James Chambers.11 He told them that there was some speculation about a large
donation by someone to the orchestra, and that it would solve some of the financial
problems, so the musicians did not have to worry. He said that the new contract would be
better: improved health care, pension, and probably salary as well.
The musicians, however, were soon to be shocked by Amyas Ames’ speech
during the announcement of Fisher’s gift:
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Mr. Fisher’s grant, which one observer of the fund-raising scene termed “a pretty
sophisticated kind of gift,” would help the hall pay for such mundane expenses as
window washing, security, electricity, and the like.12

As the musicians understood it, Ames had said that not one penny of the Fisher
gift would go to them. Understandably, their reaction was shock and outrage. Even Time
magazine commented upon the situation:
The bequest was announced at the most critical stage of the New York
Philharmonic’s labor talks, and since none of the money was for wages, it

must have struck many a fiddler or trumpeter as a colossal case of bad
timing.13
Orin O’Brien, a member of the orchestra since 1966, has described the changes
that began to occur almost immediately following the announcement: “Already the name
‘Philharmonic Hall’ was being scraped off of the doors and other areas of the Hall.”14
Players from the orchestra who had played chamber music with Fisher in his home found
the sudden change from “Philharmonic” to “Avery Fisher” Hall especially hard to
believe: to them, he had always seemed to be a very modest man.15
Fisher himself, however, told the New York Post in an interview that it was a big
surprise that Lincoln Center had changed the name of the hall for him; he explicitly said
that the idea to rename the hall was not his: “I will be very honest with you, I did not
want the name. The idea was theirs.”16
Meanwhile, the musicians took it as a direct insult that Ames was scheduled to
leave for a lengthy vacation to Italy just hours after the orchestra’s last contract had
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expired: “He did not seem to care about the effect of his pronouncement on the orchestra
on the eve of negotiations for the new contract,” said O’Brien.17
The musicians viewed Ames’ departure to Italy as an act of hubris, one that
typified the arrogance of the Society’s management. And their conclusion was that if
Ames did not care that their contract was up and would not stay to negotiate, then
perhaps a work stoppage was indeed desired by the management. The management,
moreover, clearly understood that a strike was likely: they were informed on 21
September 1973, that the musicians had voted 97 to 0 to strike.18 They decided to
continue negotiations and to perform under the threat of a strike vote.
As soon as the strike began, New York City mayor John V. Lindsay expressed his
concern and asked Vincent D. McDonnell, chairman of the State Mediation board, to
enter the dispute. McDonnell immediately set up meetings to confer with negotiators
from both sides in an effort to end the strike. During a meeting at the State Mediation
Office on 27 September 1973 members of the committee defended their position by
giving a lengthy presentation pointing out areas in which they were equal and inferior to
the Chicago Symphony Orchestra. For example, the Society’s proposal contained no
provision for seniority pay while the expired Chicago contract included such a provision
at an average of $6.70 per musician per week. And while the expired Chicago contract
provided $25,000 of life insurance at no cost to each of its musicians, the Society
provided only $11,000 of insurance, to which each musician had to contribute $5000. The
Chicago Symphony Orchestra Association provided for a comprehensive medical and
17
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dental insurance program featuring a maximum Major Medical Insurance benefit of
$50,000 while the Philharmonic Society’s inferior program provided only $10,000 of that
benefit, and lacked a dental insurance program, which had been terminated in the middle
of the 1972-1973 season because it was insufficiently funded. Moreover, while the
Chicago contract provided specially designed disability insurance, suitable for a musician
who could be vulnerable to the kind of accident or illness that was not disabling to the
average person, but severe enough to shorten his or her career, the Philharmonic had
overlooked this important need. According to the committee, the total difference in cost
between the Chicago Symphony’s health and welfare plan and the Philharmonic’s plan
was about $40,000 every year, or just under $7.50 per musician per week. They went on
to mention that the musicians of the Chicago Symphony had already rejected a pension
proposal that was far more substantial than theirs.
The management’s lawyer, Martin Oppenheimer, responded that the committee
had cited the Chicago contract too often, that the conditions between the two cities were
not the same, and that the Chicago Symphony Orchestra should be compared in the
context of the five major orchestras.19 He added that because New York was a major
musical city, the musicians of the Philharmonic had opportunities, such as teaching,
additional television appearances, recording fees, and other musical activities. He then
noted that each Philharmonic musician had $1000 in recording and television guarantee
pay each year, while the musicians of the Chicago and Cleveland Orchestras had none,
and those of the Philadelphia Orchestra were guaranteed $2000 each.20 He added that,
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notwithstanding Fisher’s gift, financial difficulties would continue to plague the Society
in the coming years, but that its economic position would not keep it from giving a wage
increase despite deficits.
The mediation session, unfortunately, but not surprisingly, did not bring the two
sides closer. It did, however, result in one agreement that was to the musician’s benefit:
on behalf of Mayor Lindsay, McDonnell brought up the opening night gala of the New
York Film Festival, scheduled for the following day—28 September. He said that the
annual event had proven to be a very important fundraising opportunity for the Film
Society of Lincoln Center, and that since the City and Lincoln Center both sponsored the
festival, he requested the musicians to temporarily withdraw their picket lines in the spirit
of cooperation on this auspicious occasion.21
The committee voted on the matter and agreed to suspend picketing so that the
event might take place without interruption. For their willingness to do so, however, they
placed the following demands upon the sponsors: that there would be no live music
during the event; that leaflets would be handed out at the doors; that a spoken
announcement would be made at the start of the evening’s festivities; and that if possible,
an insert explaining the musicians’ position would be included in the program. 22
Almost every able Philharmonic musician actively participated in picket duty
around Avery Fisher Hall. Each musician was assigned a three-hour shift every three
days, and there were twelve musicians for each round of duty. Each day, the picket lines
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stayed active from 10 A.M. to 10 P.M.23 Certain members of the orchestra who lived
closer to the Hall volunteered to picket on a more frequent basis; some people apparently
were there every single day. When asked about the general morale on the picket lines,
O’Brien recalled that people passing by were generally understanding of the musician’s
circumstances, though unsurprisingly, there were also people that were discouraging and
did not think the musicians deserve anything more than they already had. O’Brien (see
figure 3) said that several times people asked her: “Why do you want to be paid? You
love your work, that should be enough!” Certainly, the musicians were shocked by the
incomprehension of people who apparently loved music but could not understand that a
musician also needed to make a living. Eventually she came up with a response:
Well, I do love my work, but since Con Edison does not accept my playing the
Koussevitzky Concerto to pay my bill, I do need to be paid actual money. If they
would accept my playing as payment, then I would not need money. But they
don’t!24

On 1 October 1973, there was an episode in which the renowned Greek composer,
Miki Theodorakis25 crossed the picket lines and entered Avery Fisher Hall for a press
conference regarding his performance that night. Theodorakis stated that he was in
solidarity with the Philharmonic musicians, and that he had arranged to have Bernsohn
appear on stage with him at the start of the evening’s concert to confirm that there were
no union members in Theodorakis’s ensemble. Bernsohn did so, and wished him well. Of
the Philharmonic’s strike, Theodorakis commented with a shrug, “I have been trying for
years to perform in America. Now the first time I am here there is a strike. I must play. It
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is what I must do.” He said that he would not let his determination to freely perform his
works be weakened either by the junta or the striking musicians: “In Greece, the picket
line is forbidden.”26

Figure 3: Philharmonic bassist Orin O’Brien and Philharmonic fourth horn Aubrey
Facenda picketing outside Avery Fisher Hall at Lincoln Center.

A week into the strike, the two sides were growing even further apart, despite the
ongoing mediation sessions. At a State Mediation meeting chaired by James McFadden
on 2 October 1973,27 Oppenheimer summarized the Philharmonic board’s point of view,
26
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and stated that the Trustees and Directors did not want to compare the New York
Philharmonic with the Chicago Symphony Orchestra, simply because the two orchestras
had very different circumstances. The Chicago Symphony Orchestra
Association rented its orchestra out for the summer weeks; the Hall costs in
Chicago were $200,000 less than Avery Fisher Hall, not to mention that the Philharmonic
had been sharing the Hall’s deficit with Lincoln Center on top of the regular rental costs;
Chicago had far less cultural competition (top price seat was $12 in Chicago and $9 in the
Philharmonic); Chicago had $2.5 million of welfare endowment; and there was better
fundraising in Chicago because of less cultural competition (i.e., fewer organizations
asking for money).28 Oppenheimer said that the board had indicated very strongly that
they would rather not have concerts than sign a contract that was financially
irresponsible.
Victor Rabinowitz, the union’s lawyer, responded by saying that the board should
resign. It seemed to the musicians that the board was incapable of running the
organization, and that the Society should get new board that could fulfill its public
service. He also added: “We want to have full disclosure of the Philharmonic costs and
the Fisher bequest.”29 Oppenheimer quickly responded that the orchestra should resign,
and let the Philharmonic hire other players. He said that the Trustees did not get paid, and
that their public responsibility was not to simply give the orchestra the demands it made,
especially if those demands were financially irresponsible.
Bernsohn turned the topic to the Fisher bequest and said that the orchestra
questioned why the building was more important than the musicians in it—in other
28
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words—why the money went to the landlord, Lincoln Center, and not to the
Philharmonic. He said that the orchestra considered Ames’ loyalties to be divided
between the New York Philharmonic, Lincoln Center, and other arts partnerships. He
added that they would find out if Fisher really meant the gift to go to Lincoln Center
instead of the Philharmonic, saying: “We feel we have been left out.”30
At this point, McFadden asked the representatives of the to break temporarily so
that he could speak with the union and the committee in private. When they were alone,
he pointed to the considerable—and still widening gap—between the two parties, and
warned that both parties must not be so damaged and injured that they could no longer
live together. It was then agreed that no future meetings would be scheduled until both
parties could draft new and constructive measures with the intent of reaching an
agreement.
When approached by the press, McDonnell said that he foresaw a long strike,
noting that the union continued to have a multitude of demands, and the management had
refused to make a counter-offer because the union’s demands had not been reduced:
“They are worlds apart, and it looks like a long strike, … I see no prospect of an
agreement.”31
Immediately following the meeting of 2 October 1973, the Philharmonic
Society’s management sent a letter to its subscribers explaining its position. The letter
stated that the Society had been able to increase the musicians’ salaries and benefits
considerably since 1964, when the New York Philharmonic became the first orchestra in
the United States to engage its musicians for a 52-week season every year: the minimum
30
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scale player’s total earnings and benefits through the Society rose from $14,004 in 1964
to $23,481 in 1973; and more specifically, between 1970 and 1973 alone, the minimum
scale player’s earnings and fringe benefits rose from $18,872 to $23,481. Management
added that in order to increase the musicians’ paid vacations and to reduce their workload
under the contract that expired on 20 September 1973, the Society had twenty-eight fewer
rehearsals and twelve fewer concerts per year than in 1964.32
The letter also addressed the dispute over the gift from Avery Fisher. It said that
the gift had been widely misunderstood, and stated that the gift was made to Lincoln
Center, not to the Philharmonic.
None of this fund can be used by the New York Philharmonic for its regular
operating expenses. If it were certain that costs to operate and maintain the hall
over the next decade would remain at existing levels, the Philharmonic would
receive some benefits from the gift since it shares in the deficit of Avery Fisher
Hall. But since the gift may not be completed for some years, any advantage to
the Philharmonic might only be at a distant date.33

The purpose of the letter was to inform subscribers that the Philharmonic was in a
serious financial crisis. Despite earned income, income from investments, contributions,
special gifts and grants, the combined net deficit for the 1971-72 and 1972-73 seasons
was reported to exceed $550,000, which had forced the Society to use the last of its
available reserve for operating expenses: “This is a new and dangerous financial
situation and if continued would put the Philharmonic out of business.”34
The Society also explained that the union’s demands for a reduced workweek, an
increase in salary, and additional fringe benefits, would drive up operating costs by more
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than $1.7 million over the three years (1973-76),35 and that it was impossible to agree to
such demands. The Society nevertheless said they would make every possible effort to
reach an agreement with the union, in accordance with the Philharmonic’s financial
responsibility.
Two days later (4 October 1973), the Local 802 held a press conference in its
headquarters to apprise the news media of the state of the negotiations with the Society.
Rabinowitz reported that the mediation sessions had broken down and no further
meetings had been scheduled, though they had assured the mediators of their willingness
to meet at anytime that they felt talks would be fruitful. He said that while the Society’s
demands would result in an overall net loss for the musicians, the union had cut down its
demands to “an all-inclusive package of wage and fringe benefit improvements that fall
well within the federal guidelines.”36 Of the speculation about the impact of the Avery
Fisher gift on the negotiations, he said that it appeared to them that “the channeling of the
Avery Fisher funds to Lincoln Center was primarily a bookkeeping device,” because of
the tight connection and joint leadership of the Philharmonic Society and Lincoln Center:
It seems incredible, in the light of the Society’s pleas of poverty, that these
monies, given by a gentleman who is a live music enthusiast, whose first
commercial product was named Philharmonic Radio, would be directed to the
landlord rather than to the Orchestra.37

Rabinowitz added that the Chicago and Denver Symphonies had been locked out,
that the New York City Opera had just resumed operations after a lengthy strike, and that
the Metropolitan Opera had revealed wide-ranging reductions. He said the timing of these
crises seemed less of a coincidence, and more part of a well organized scheme:
35
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To forcefully seek increased private and governmental aid is necessary and
certainly legitimate. However, to dramatize the symphony associations’ plight at
the expense of the music-loving public and its artists is unconscionable,
irresponsible and patently immoral.38

When approached by the New York Times regarding the union’s statement, Harold
Lawrence, the new manager of the Philharmonic Society, said that they had not been told
of any revised union demands, and that certainly those demands now on the table did not
fall within the Federal guidelines. He also said that the Society’s offer was much more
substantial than as described by the union at its press conference.39 On 9 October 1973,
following a week without any negotiations, McFadden met with the two parties again in
the hope the dispute could be settled in time for the Philharmonic’s school concert,
scheduled to take place on 15 October. According to committee member Newton
Mansfield,40 the five-member committee had gradually split in two as the strike
continued: three members (Lorin Bernsohn, Ranier DeIntinis and Newton Mansfield)
were leaning more towards making concessions in order to reach an agreement while two
other members (Jon Deak and Gino Sambuco) insisted that the management agree on the
Chicago deal or there would be no deal. For this meeting only, Bernsohn, DeIntinis, and
Mansfield41 asked their former lawyer, I. Philip Sipser, 42 to join them in the hopes that he
could find some way forward through these difficult negotiations. Sipser, a lawyer who
had been a longtime negotiator for symphony and opera musicians in New York, and
who had effectively negotiated for the Philharmonic musicians during the two previous
contracts, was reluctant to take the reins from Rabinowitz (who was an associate and a
38
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friend of his), and told the committee that he would only work with the musicians
unofficially. At the end of the meeting, yet again, no progress was made and no future
meeting was scheduled.
On 14 October 1973, the musicians of the Chicago Symphony Orchestra ended a
four-week strike when they agreed to a new three-year contract which included a $60
weekly raise over three years that would pay a minimum weekly scale of $380 in the
third year, plus improvements to fringe benefits. The following day, the two sides in the
New York Philharmonic negotiations returned to the bargaining table with their
mediators. Management started out by putting an offer on the table that included a $35
weekly raise over three years, plus some increases in pension and welfare, but with no
dollar amount attached in proportion to salary. They said that they could not offer the
wage increase and additional benefits that the Chicago Symphony Association had given
to its musicians.
The musician’s committee immediately rejected the offer, saying that it was
inferior the Chicago settlement. The musicians insisted that their contract should at least
match those won by the members of the Chicago Symphony Orchestra, and that the
higher cost of living in New York justified maintaining such differential. The meeting
ended, and the strike, which was now into its third week, continued.
According to the New York Times, Ames called the musicians’ demand for parity
as “a travesty of logic.” And Oppenheimer firmly believed that the Society must not
allow the Philharmonic’s contract to be dictated by that of another orchestra. “The
Chicago orchestra is one of only two major musical organizations in that city.”43
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Sipser, on the other hand, had suspicions that the Society was in league with other
American orchestras:
I think they and officials of the Chicago Symphony and the Denver Symphony
[where another lockout had occurred] contracted in blood to each other to show
the union that they must fight for every nickel. Maybe I’m getting paranoid, but
I don’t think so.”

And Philharmonic violist Ralph Mendelson44 echoed Sipser’s suspicions:
We’re absolutely convinced the management wanted a strike here, and wanted
those lockouts, to dramatize the Orchestra’s failure to get government funds.
[Their goal was] to beat the Philharmonic down, the way they did the Cleveland
Orchestra four years ago. It would be a feather in Amyas Ames’s cap with the
orchestra board chairmen around the country.45

The Society dismissed these accusations as nonsense. Ames, while
acknowledging that he and other symphony officials did carry on an exchange regarding
their mutual managerial difficulties, noted the musicians had done precisely the same by
talking about contract strategy and goals on a regular basis with the ICSOM.
Oppenheimer described the theory of intercity conspiracy as “totally absurd and totally
unfounded,” and pointed to the Chicago contract, in which the Orchestra had settled for a
substantial increase in minimum salaries, as clearly exploding what he called “the
conspiracy doctrine.”46 And Lawrence, pointing to the National Endowment for the Arts,
which was withholding a grant to the Philharmonic pending resolution of the strike, said
that that should counter the union’s argument about the strike being a scheme to lure
money out of the government.
While both sides stood firm on the issue of Chicago, there remained the issue of
the Fisher bequest. The musicians felt that the management had never clearly responded
44
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to their questions as to why the money had gone to Lincoln Center, rather than to the
Philharmonic, and why the Philharmonic had agreed to a contract in the first place that
made the Philharmonic pay Lincoln Center $200,000 of the hall’s annual deficit. The
musicians also questioned why the Philharmonic had been paying $211,000 every year to
amortize the series of acoustical renovations that had been done on Avery Fisher Hall
when it did not own the hall. Oppenheimer’s answer was that the $211,000 annual
expenditure was an obligation under the original lease with Lincoln Center. Regarding
the Fisher gift, he said it was Fisher’s decision to make the gift to Lincoln Center, and
Fisher’s decision also to keep its terms confidential.47 This did little to assuage the
musicians’ skepticism. And the fact that Ames was chair of both the Philharmonic and of
Lincoln Center was central to their feelings of mistrust.
Some of the musicians openly expressed their feelings that if Carlos Moseley had
not been incapacitated by illness48 and had been able to oversee the contract negotiations,
the current crisis would not have been allowed to develop. One player told the New York
Times:
Carlos Moseley is an honest man whom you can trust and a musician himself. …
This trust between us took years to build up and now it’s gone, … our contract
under Moseley was one of the thinnest in the country — only four pages — but I
can guarantee you that the next one will be as thick as the telephone book.”49

On 22 October 1973, as the strike entered its fourth week, Ames sent out a letter
to the Philharmonic’s subscribers, contributors, and members of the Orchestra, informing
each that the Society had agreed to accept the New York State Mediation board’s
recommendation to submit the terms and conditions of its new contract with the orchestra
47
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to binding arbitration, and said that he hoped the union would also agree with the
mediator’s recommendation:
In accepting arbitration of the differences which have resulted in the present
strike by Orchestra musicians, the strike would be immediately ended,
performances would be resumed, and both sides would agree to be bound by the
determination of an impartial third party.50

In the letter, Ames also gave a thorough explanation of the Society’s situation and the
factors behind its managerial decisions. He reiterated that the Philharmonic Society had
supported one of the highest compensation levels and had one of the highest operating
budgets of any symphony orchestra in the world, which the Society believed was right
and proper for a great musical city such as New York. He then pointed to the two main
factors that had been preventing the Society from agreeing to more than moderate
increases and from agreeing to restrictive clauses in the contract: the first was that the
orchestra was more dependent than ever before on the Society’s fund raising, due to the
fact that earned income from activities of the orchestra, which paid for 75% of the
Philharmonic’s operating costs in 1965, only paid for 57% of costs in 1973, increasing
the amount the Society had to raise to support the orchestra from $800,000 per year in
1965 to $2.3 million in 1973; the second was that there was an ongoing crisis in the
funding of the arts: “Across the country, the limits of private giving are being reached, …
adequate government support of the arts has not yet evolved.”51 He assured his readers
that the Society understood very well its great responsibility to sustain high standards of
employment for its orchestra, but that without bearing in mind these two crucial factors,
the quality or the earning power of the orchestra would be jeopardized. He went on to say
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that it would be wrong for the Society to approve the union’s demand for a weekly salary
that was higher than that of any other symphony orchestra in the world, as well as its
demands to match or surpass each of the highest levels of any other orchestra in pensions,
welfare, vacation and so forth, without considering its own circumstances. In conclusion,
he said that the letter was prepared in the hope that it would speed a reconciliation of
differences:
The Philharmonic Society is intent on increasing the funds raised annually. We
accept the challenge of our time, and we know New York will help us meet it.
But if we are to succeed we must go to the community of supporters with a fair
and reasonable operating budget. There is nothing that could dry up the source of
support faster than agreeing upon a cost package substantially beyond our means,
out of funds we do not have. The best interests of the Orchestra will be served
only by the prompt negotiation of a fair contract. It cannot embody excessive
demands without hurting the future of the Orchestra itself.52

Upon receipt of the letter, Sipser immediately denounced the proposal to accept
binding arbitration and said that the musicians had not been consulted, nor would they
agree to it:
This is a public relations gimmick by the management, … Nobody on this side
was contacted directly by the mediation board, and there has not been any
agreement or serious discuss of arbitration.53

Bernsohn seconded Sipser, saying he had not heard a word about any negotiations for
arbitration, and that the management’s one-sided statement of its position was “unethical
and baffling.” Sipser noted that his firm had been counsel to the musicians of thirty-two
orchestras and that they had never once accepted arbitration of terms and conditions in a
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contract, adding: “We do not intend to substitute arbitration for negotiation this time,
either.”54
To the musicians of the Philharmonic, it was clear that their management had
decided upon an aggressive and intransigent position even before the start of the
negotiations in the summer of 1973. They were very upset that management had
proposed the cancellation of their health insurance upon commencement of the strike.
And during the second week of the strike, Lawrence sent a letter notifying them of the
necessity to discontinue their access to Avery Fisher Hall on account of the Philharmonic
Society’s and Lincoln Center’s shared concern about security and maintenance costs at
the hall during the labor dispute.55
At a meeting with the entire orchestra musicians on 4 October 1973, the union
informed the musicians that Lincoln Center had filed charges with the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) in an attempt to halt their picketing, which the union regarded
as a secondary boycott.56 The union said that the NLRB would probably be slow to
respond, but that the lawyers of Local 802 still had to sign a consent order in which it
agreed not to stop musicians other than those of the Philharmonic from crossing the
picket lines and from penalizing—or attempting to penalize—anyone who did.57 At the
end of the meeting, the musicians came to an agreement that the committee did not have
the authority to withdraw picket lines without permission from them.
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To their comfort, the musicians received a great amount of support from
colleagues around the country. On 8 October 1973, the Philadelphia Orchestra announced
that it was canceling the first of its scheduled series of ten concerts at Avery Fisher Hall
because its musicians would not cross the Philharmonic musicians’ picket lines. And on
28 October 1973, just as the National Symphony Orchestra was about to open its annual
New York series at Avery Fisher Hall, it announced that the first concert would instead
be held at Carnegie Hall out of respect for the Philharmonic musicians’ picket lines. The
musicians of the National Symphony even distributed their own leaflets to the audience
in which they endorsed their striking New York Philharmonic colleagues, and pledged to
donate their salaries from that evening’s concert to the Philharmonic musicians’ strike
fund:
As a matter of principle we do not wish to play a concert, or at least to put money
in our pockets for playing a concert in a city where the resident orchestra is on
strike. We also believe that the musicians of the New York Philharmonic, the
principal orchestra of our greatest city, should receive salaries and fringe benefits
58
which are second to no other orchestra’s.

The Boston Symphony also relocated two of its concerts—10 and 12 October
1973—from Avery Fisher Hall to Carnegie Hall in order not to cross the Philharmonic
musicians’ picket lines.59 In addition, the Boston players donated their fees from a
concert in Boston to the Philharmonic musicians.60
Such efforts by the musicians of other orchestras in support of the Philharmonic
musicians, however, were not universally regarded as a good thing. The New York Times,
for example, published an article saying the refusal of the Philadelphia Orchestra to cross
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the Philharmonic musicians’ picket lines caused “utterly needless confusion” and
deprived the Philadelphians’ loyal subscribers.61
And for a variety of reasons, some musicians were not willing or able to honor the
strike. On the afternoon of 21 October 1973, the musicians of the Symphony of the New
World—who also belonged to the same union (the Local 802)—crossed the picket lines
to play a concert at Avery Fisher Hall. The New World musicians had gotten into
arguments with the picketing musicians during rehearsals for the concert. They indicated
they were not employed by the New York Philharmonic Society, and that it seemed
ironic that they should be asked to go bankrupt to support the Philharmonic Musicians’
demand for better salaries and improved working conditions. They said that the union
was aware of their situation and did not order them to observe the picket lines. And they
added that no other union members at Avery Fisher Hall were observing the picket lines:
“The Stage Hands Union is on the job, the Electricians Union, the Ushers Union, the
Treasurers (box office) Union, are all on the job.”62 They did, however, express their
support for the Philharmonic musicians in their fight for better working conditions and
salaries.
As the strike wore on, the loss of income put many of the striking musicians in
financial jeopardy. Hanna Lachert,63 for example, having just joined the orchestra the
year before (i.e., 1972), and still in her 20s, had no savings; she had immediately taken a
loan from the Philharmonic Society to purchase a violin because she did not own a
instrument of suitable quality. Moreover, she was renting an apartment in Manhattan by
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herself, which cost half of her monthly Philharmonic salary. When the strike began, she
managed to pay the first month’s rent, but in the second month, she had to borrow from
the union.64
And for most of the musicians, in the absence of a regular paycheck, there were
only very limited sources of organized financial relief. The union set up a loan
department, and also assumed responsibility for insurance premiums, and the ICSOM had
a strike fund in place for them. Most of the musicians played concerts to raise money for
their strike fund, and there were reports of some Philharmonic musicians helping others.65
The strike forced the Philharmonic musicians to develop what might be called a
“backup” administration. The strike had separated them from their usual means of
governance, and in its absence, the musicians needed to develop ways to collectively
make decisions and arrangements for themselves. They were, in fact, something like the
musicians of the nineteenth century Philharmonic when it was first established as a
cooperative institution in 1842, save for the fact that the musicians in 1973 were
attempting to resolve a strike, rather than coordinate a concert schedule.
Committees were created to fill every need: telephone contact,66 public relations,
picketing, political contacts, finances, secretarial pool, benefits and free concerts,
contacting performing groups, etc. (see figure 4) Most of the musicians were actively
involved in musical activities; they said that there were a number of heart-warming
incidents during the strike, particularly when the performance committee was looking to
secure different venues for benefit concerts around New York City, and many individuals
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came forward to show their support. Among them, for instance, were the actor Paul
Newman and his wife, Joanne Woodward, who offered their Manhattan apartment
multiple times to the Philharmonic musicians as a venue for benefit chamber music
concerts.67
Violinist Gabriel Banat,68 who served as chairman of the performance committee,
recounted the difficulty of his task to organize a large fundraising concert for the entire
orchestra to play in Carnegie Hall. He said that during the first meeting of the
performance committee, he had delegated the Philharmonic bassoonist, Lenny Hindell,69
to call Carnegie Hall, though Hindell was promptly told that the hall was fully booked.
Nevertheless, Banat did not give up, and immediately contacted the legendary violinist
Isaac Stern, who had been the leading force in saving the Carnegie Hall from demolition
in 1960.70 Stern agreed to help the Philharmonic’s musicians to secure Carnegie Hall for
their concert and said that an anonymous donor would pay the rental fee of $3000.71
Banat said he suspected the anonymous donor was Stern himself. Banat writes that when
the strike concert was first announced, it made some members of the Philharmonic board
so angry that a number of nasty calls were placed to Stern: “With Isaac Stern away on
tour, his wife, Vera had to endure some angry phone calls. One confused board-lady even
called her husband a ‘strikebreaker’.”72
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Figure 4: Various committees created by the Philharmonic musicians during the strike.
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Once Carnegie Hall had been secured, the Orchestra needed to find a conductor to
lead them, who was willing to do so for no pay. Banat recalled that he had gotten
approval from the orchestra to ask music director Pierre Boulez if he would volunteer. To
their surprise, Boulez offered his commitment to the concert right away, though he said
that he would have to inform the Society’s board of directors of his intention to do so: “I
would be doing this as a fellow musician, not your music director.”73 Not surprisingly,
when Boulez informed the board, they denied him permission to conduct the benefit
concert. When asked by the press regarding Boulez’s intention to conduct the musicians’
strike concert, Ames said that Boulez “was right to accept,” though Ames also said that
he understood why the board did not “take kindly to the idea.”74 Banat, on the other hand,
said that Boulez described the chairman’s reaction in far less polite terms: “if you do this,
your contract isn’t worth toilet paper.”75 Newton Mansfield described Boulez as
“tearfully” withdrawing from the event, and then writing a check for $1000 in support of
the Carnegie benefit.76
The Philharmonic musicians approached some forty capable and well respected
soloists and conductors,77 but none would agree to be involved in the concert. The
musicians concluded that the management had threatened some of them with negative
consequences if they accepted. Eventually, the Belgian-born, American conductor and
former member of the New York Philharmonic, Leon Barzin accepted the musicians’
73
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invitation to conduct the Carnegie Hall concert on 29 October 1973.78 He had told Banat
that since his mother-in-law, Marjorie Merriweather Post, had just given $55 million to
endow his orchestra, the National Orchestral Association, he did not care about offending
the management of the New York Philharmonic.79
Leon Barzin became a member of the New York Philharmonic in 1921 when his
former employer, the National Symphony, merged with the New York Philharmonic
Society, and he was among the fortunate few musicians chosen to join the Philharmonic.
He was a section violist at first; was appointed principal violist (by Mengelberg and
Furtwängler) in 1925, and remained in that position in until 1929, when—with the
encouragement of Arturo Toscanini—he began to establish himself as an orchestral
conductor. Barzin helped to create the National Orchestral Association in 1930, became
its first Music Director, and remained active in that post until his death in 1999.80 In
addition to conducting the National Orchestral Association, he also served as the first
Music Director of the New York City Ballet, and guest conducted many orchestras,
including the New York Philharmonic. In 1973 he was named conductor of the New
England Conservatory Orchestra as well as the chairman of the department of orchestral
conducting.81
The Carnegie Hall concert, which the striking musicians titled “A Special
Emergency Strike Fund Concert in Carnegie Hall,” marked the first time the full

78

The concert was originally scheduled for 15 October 1973, but had to be postponed because the
musicians had not found a willing conductor in time. See Donal Henahan, “Why Philharmonic Strike Drags
On,” New York Times, 24 October 1973, 42.
79
Gabriel Banat, “Memoirs”, unpublished manuscript, 5 July 2014.
80
The National Orchestral Association under Leon Barzin had trained generations of musicians to get jobs
in professional orchestras across the United States and foreign countries, including many members of the
New York Philharmonic. http://www.nationalorchestral.org/.
81
Jacques Cornelis Voois, “Leon Barzin, America’s Pioneer Orchestra Trainer.” DMA diss., Peabody
Conservatory of Music, 1986.

93
orchestra had performed together since 25 September 1973, the evening the strike began.
According to their press release:
Notwithstanding the pressures and exigencies of the continuing strike, the
Orchestra members are looking forward with both pleasure and nostalgia to their
“homecoming” in the warm and friendly ambience of Carnegie Hall.82

The concert also marked the first time since migrating to Lincoln Center eleven
years earlier that the New York Philharmonic was back in their long-time home. The
evening’s program (see figure 5) featured three of the Philharmonic’s principal players:
Julius Baker in Telemann’s Suite in A minor for Flute and Strings, John Cerminaro in
Strauss’s Concerto for Waldhorn in E-flat major, and Lorne Munroe in Tchaikovsky’s
Variations on a Rococo Theme for Cello and Orchestra, opus 33. The musicians also
played the Overture to Benvenuto Cellini by Berlioz at the beginning, and finished the
performance with Ravel’s La Valse.
The concert was well attended and well received, despite a severe rainstorm that
evening. Danal Henahan from the New York Times observed that when the first chords of
Berlioz sounded, “older members of the audience turned and smiled at one another.”
While he indicated there was some “evidence of [the] Orchestra’s rustiness” in the
Berlioz—perhaps on account of the limited rehearsal time—he went on to praise the
orchestra, saying that its sound was “robust” in the winds and “unusually silky” in the
strings.
Of the entire evening’s program, La Valse proved to be the favorite: “It was
Ravel, played by the Philharmonic, in Carnegie Hall, and everyone present seemed happy
about the success of the homecoming party.” The reviewer credited Barzin with showing
great sensitivity and for abandoning his “professorial approach.” He also noted that
82
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Barzin, in “leaping straight up off the podium,” was reminiscent of Leonard Bernstein.
And as for the three soloists, he offered the following review:
The Telemann found everyone in good form, with Mr. Baker’s liquid-toned flute
performing wonders of nuanced articulation. Mr. Cerminaro, using the usual
French horn instead of the unkeyed instrument Strauss wrote for in this early
work, played with more precision and beauty of tone than imagination, and Mr.
Munroe in the Tchaikovsky reversed that formula in an ardent but wiry toned
performance.83

According to Banat, the benefit concert raised $10,000 for the musicians’ strike
fund, and the experience of being back in Carnegie Hall, plus the outpouring of support
from the public, gave a much needed boost to the morale of the musicians.84 Furthermore,
the event had effectively united all the musicians as they prepared for a greater and more
challenging undertaking: an international tour to Europe without the governance of the
Philharmonic Society’s management.
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Figure 5: Concert Program, 29 October 1973 - A Special Emergency Strike Fund Concert
in Carnegie Hall.
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Chapter Five: The Striking Musicians’ Iberian Tour
While marching around carrying a board, a minor member of the management
came up and held out his hand to me. Pleasantly surprised, I extended mine, but
instead of shaking it he dropped a nickel in my palm.1

The Philharmonic violinist Gabriel Banat recounted this unexpected incident that
occurred while he was on picket duty, and which prompted him to lead his orchestra on a
mission that no one would have thought possible: a tour of Spain, Portugal, and the
Canary Islands without the assistance of the management. Banat first met the Spanish
concert manager, Alfonso Aijon, in August 1973. Aijon—founder and director of
Ibermusica in Madrid2—expressed interest in organizing the first New York
Philharmonic tour of Spain. He asked Banat for his help in establishing a connection with
the officials of the Philharmonic Society. When Aijon told him that Ibermusica’s concert
season normally starts at the end of September or the beginning of October, following the
beginning of the Philharmonic’s subscription season, Banat suggested Aijon contact
Carlos Moseley, the then president of the New York Philharmonic.3
On 31 August 1973, a few days after the meeting with Banat, Aijon sent a letter to
Moseley exploring the possibility of a tour of Spain; he also sent a copy of the letter to
Banat, who was then on a domestic tour with the Orchestra. The letter stated that
Ibermusica was interested in offering the New York Philharmonic a tour of six concerts
in Spain during the last week of September 1975, immediately following the
Philharmonic’s tentative tour to Europe: “If you would not have the necessary free dates
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for this number of concerts, we would of course organize as many as you would be able
to give.”4 He mentioned that Ibermusica would offer up to $20,000 for each Philharmonic
concert.
Aijon did not receive a response until 2 November 1973, when Harold Lawrence,
replied. He acknowledged receipt of Aijon’s letter, and indicated that Moseley had been
ill and was recuperating at home. Regarding the possibility of a Spanish tour, Lawrence
indicated the Philharmonic was already committed to a European tour in 1975, and that it
was not possible to include Spain in their itinerary. But Lawrence said that the
Philharmonic was always interested in coming to Europe, and that he would write to
Aijon again at some future point.5
Aijon, while awaiting a reply to his offer, was not aware that the musicians of the
orchestra had gone on strike shortly thereafter. In mid-October, Aijon received a phone
call from New York: “Are you still interested in managing a tour of the New York
Philharmonic?” It was Banat calling Aijon to tell him about the agonizing situation in
which the Philharmonic had found itself. Would it be possible, he asked, for Aijon to
arrange a tour for the striking musicians? There followed a catch: “... if we go, it has to be
soon, within ten days.”6
Aijon, who had established Ibermusica just two years earlier, was in shock to
learn that “an orchestra that had been conducted by Mahler, and [which] had premiered
Dvorak’s ‘New World Symphony’ could be in danger of disappearing.”7 He also knew
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that organizing the tour Banat was suggesting on such short notice would involve great
risk. Nevertheless, he was possessed by the idea of “saving” the New York Philharmonic.
Aijon told Banat to wait while he consulted with his friend, the Minister of Culture of
Spain.
While Banat was waiting to hear back from Aijon, he brought the idea to his
colleagues in the negotiating committee. “My colleagues on the committee were ecstatic,
I was the man of the hour! They urged me to go ahead and make it happen.”8 Soon after,
Aijon got his approval from the Minister of Culture and the planning began straightaway.
Aijon’s agreement with the musicians was that he would match what he had proposed to
Moseley earlier: to pay up to $20,000 for each concert, which was to include
transportation, lodging, per diem, and the fees for the conductor and the musicians. The
fees for the musicians were to be paid in advance to an escrow account in New York and
released—via telex—after each performance.9
Banat recalls the intense pressure he was under to put the Iberian tour together in
such short period of time, working both day and night—on account of the time difference
between New York and Madrid, and corresponding with Ibermusica on the details of the
tour via the telephone and telex, both of which were expensive:10
Concert dates, programs, finding conductors and accommodations had to be
arranged via my home telephone operating due to the time lag with Europe late at
night, until dawn. ... At first I tried to communicate with Ibermusica on July
Baker’s ham radio set via a friendly operator in Madrid. But found that
exchanging messages via the telex machine at Truvynil, Rosette’s [Banat’s wife]
employer’s factory in Brooklyn, worked much better. A clerk there would collect
the messages received overnight and read them back to me first thing in the
8
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morning. I would then telex back or else phone Madrid if the message was
urgent. I was [also] concerned about the numbness of two fingers of my left
hand, essential for a violinist, until I realized that it was due to the compression
of the nerves of my elbow while talking [on] the phone for too many hours.11

Banat recounts a story regarding a problem that arose during the planning of their first
concert of the tour in Lisbon. For unknown reasons, the booking of the venue there was
held up for days. Concerned about losing the first two concerts, and perhaps even the
entire tour, Banat called Julius Bloom, the manager of Carnegie Hall, and who was able
to put him in contact with a leading music critic in Lisbon. Banat immediately phoned the
critic and discovered that the stumbling block was related to the matter of programming:
The gentleman answered my phone call with a tirade against our having
programmed a Mozart flute concerto with its small orchestral complement on the
first visit to Lisbon of the great New York Philharmonic.12

Banat promised to exchange the Mozart concerto for Stravinsky’s Firebird Suite, a
“blockbuster” work that utilized every single instrument in the orchestra. The critic was
thrilled, and the scheduling of the two concerts in Lisbon proceded without further delay.
*****
In New York, as the strike entered its fifth week, the two sides were no closer to
an agreement, despite continuing efforts by State mediators to help negotiate a contract.
Given the stalemate, on 28 October 1973, the committee members decided to announce
to the public their plan to go to Spain for a series of concerts on their own. According to
Newton Mansfield, the committee had already sent a telegram to Ibermusica making
explicit that that the committee was using the prospect of the Spanish tour as leverage in
its contract negotiations, and that settlement of the strike prior to departure for Spain
11
12

Gabriel Banat, “Memoirs”, unpublished manuscript, July 5, 2014.
Ibid.

100
would automatically negate any and all agreements with Ibermusica. Mansfield clearly
remembers that while Aijon was aware of the risk of the entire tour being cancelled, “he
was determined to hire the striking musicians.”13
When Banat found out that the orchestra committee was considering a
cancellation of the tour if an agreement was reached with the management before
departure for Spain, he countered that the tour planning had reached a point of no return,
and that the Orchestra had no right to betray Aijon by using the Spanish tour as a
bargaining chip:
Ibermusica had sent us the money for our airfare, but we had no right to take it
while our own committee proceeded to negotiate away the ten days’ period
needed for our tour. In a whisper I call the notion of betraying their confidence
unthinkable, ... Had we already paid for our airline tickets, Ibermusica would
have lost $25,000—a sum large enough to ruin it.14

Banat promptly called for a full orchestra meeting. This meeting took place at the Good
Shepherd-Faith Presbyterian Church on West 66th Street. When the orchestra was
assembled, Banat asked his colleagues to vote for one of two propositions: a) reserve the
ten-day period needed for the tour; or b) instruct him to call off the tour.
According to Banat, eighty-one members of the orchestra and union officials
attended the meeting; eighty members voted in favor of the tour with one abstention. “At
that point our union, impressed by the vote, offered to represent us by signing our
contract with Ibermusica.”15
On 30 October 1973, Victor Rabinowitz, the union’s lawyer, at the start of a
mediation meeting, described the specifics of the Spanish tour and announced that the
musicians had voted to go on the ten-day Spanish tour while keeping some of its
13
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negotiating committee members in New York for further negotiations, a gesture of their
willingness to keep negotiating towards an agreement. Oppenheimer said that the
management had discovered the musicians were planning to use the name “New York
Philharmonic”—Filarmonicos de Nueva York—on their tour: “We have the right and
obligation to protect our name, … We will not keep you from going over, but we will not
give our name.” Furthermore, the management had sent a telegram to Ibermusica:
We understand you are negotiating tour [with the] striking members of [the] New
York Philharmonic [for] this November. Please be advised that only the
Philharmonic Symphony Society of New York, Inc. can authorize use of the
name of New York Philharmonic Orchestra and does not authorize its use in
connection with this proposed tour. Unauthorized use of the name New York
Philharmonic will subject you to legal action.16

Oppenheimer went on to say that the board of directors had been scheduled to meet the
following day, and that he anticipated that there would be a cancellation of all
performances for the following four weeks: “We are not going out of business, there will
be a Philharmonic in the future, we are not going to negotiate with threats.”17
Rabinowitz argued that if the musicians cancelled the tour as a result of the
management’s position, it would only result in further stiffening of the orchestra’s
position. Finally, after a fruitless six-hour meeting with several failed attempts to get the
two sides to at least nail down a wage settlement, Vincent D. McDonnell, chairman of the
State Mediation board, declared an impasse and stated that no further meetings would be
scheduled until someone had something new to offer.
The following day, 31 October 1973, Ames sent out a letter to apprise the
members of the orchestra, contributors and subscribers of the strike situation. He said that
16
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the Society, having been concerned about the pointless prolongation of the contract
dispute “to the detriment of the orchestra and the city it serves,”18 had had full intention
to reach an agreement during their prior mediation session, by being prepared to make a
substantial move on wages and to resolve the differences on other aspects of the contract,
if only the union would agree to respond with a meaningful counteroffer. He pointed out
that because of the Fisher bequest and the Chicago Symphony Orchestra’s latest
settlement, the union had suddenly increased its wage demand by $10 since negotiations
started—making the weekly salary increase to $60 over three years—and had also
indicated unwillingness to negotiate on other provisions, forcing the negotiations into an
impasse. When approached by a reporter from The Daily News, however, Max Aarons,
President of Local 802, denied receiving any improved offer from the management:
They are still talking in circles, dealing in ifs, ... if they put a concrete offer on
the table, then we can bring it to our members and they can vote on it.19

Regarding the musicians’ right to use the name “New York Philharmonic” during
their ten-day trip to Spain, Ames insisted that only the New York Philharmonic Society
could use the name, because it was supported by copyright law:
For 132 years, the Society has stood behind that name, and we believe it to be in
the interest of the orchestra members themselves that we do so. At the same time
that we take no position concerning this tour, we are concerned that it would
deprive New York of a full month of music, and it seems regrettable that the
members of the orchestra should be subjected to the financial loss of such a
prolonged strike.20
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At the same time, Ames revealed that the Society had just learned of the
termination of a long-term grant that had generated $284,000 in the previous year. As a
result, the Society would have to raise $500,000 more the following year than the last—
and without regard to the Fisher bequest. He added that the union’s demands, “so far
arbitrary in nature,” would force the Society to raise an additional $600,000 over the
three years of the contract. He again suggested that the two sides should be bound by
arbitration: “prompt reconciliation of differences would be a service to the whole cause
of the arts and to the evolving vitality of the arts in our Society.”21
On 1 November 1973, following the meeting of the Philharmonic’s board of
directors the previous evening, Lawrence held a press conference to announce “a total
breakdown” in the negotiations, and also to present the positions of the Society and the
union. In a two-page press release, it was pointed out that the Society did not operate its
orchestra for a profit and that the only losers in this strike were the subscribers, the
public, and the members of the orchestra themselves. He therefore urged the union to
agree to one of the three alternative suggestions:
(1) Agree to final and binding arbitration before an impartial arbitrator
designated in any generally accepted manner;
(2) In the alternative, resume work and agree to an impartial fact finding hearing
before impartial fact finders, with non-binding recommendations of
settlement;
(3) Return to the bargaining table with negotiable proposals so that a fair and
reasonable contract can be agreed upon consistent with the economic realities
of the Society and consistent with the wages and working conditions being
paid by other orchestras of similar stature.22
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Meanwhile, Lawrence also told the press that Aarons had sent telegrams to Mayor John
Lindsay, Governor Nelson Rockefeller, as well as to the Philharmonic Society, saying
that:
Despite current rumors to the contrary, musicians of the New York Philharmonic
are ready, willing and able to meet with Philharmonic representatives and are
prepared to return to work forthwith if an equitable settlement can be reached.23

By sending the telegrams, Aarons had indicated that the musicians’ plan to leave
for Spain, Portugal, and the Canary Islands had not yet been finalized. Though when
approached by the media, he said, “We don’t have a contract with the Philharmonic so
there’s no reason we couldn’t book a foreign tour.” The chairman of the orchestra
committee, Lorin Bernsohn, also confirmed that the tour plan had not been settled, but a
contract was on the verge of being signed. Regarding the signing of the tour contract,
Aarons said, “The only thing holding up the signing is cash on the barrelhead.”24
Lawrence, on the other hand, said that if the musicians ended up signing the contract, it
would create a great conflict between the two sides: “It would be a tragedy for the city of
New York because such a tour would result in the Philharmonic’s cancellation of the next
four weeks of its season.”25
The next day, 2 November 1973, a negotiation meeting was put together hurriedly
at Sipser’s office, in which the management made its final offer to the Orchestra: a wage
increase of $50 per week over three years; an improved pension plan with a $10,000
pension after 30 years of service at age 65; health and welfare benefits increase to
$20,000 in the first year, $30,000 in the second year, and $35,000 in the third year of the
23
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contract; and an increase for the per diem of $34 for the first two years and $36 for the
third year.26 According to the Philharmonic’s press release on 3 November 1973, the
union promptly rejected the offer. Ames stated that he was shocked by the rejection of the
management’s enhanced new proposal:
This offer would make the orchestra the best paid orchestra in the world with
pension and welfare benefits equal to any. This is as far as we can go, ... I was
very much disturbed that despite this generous offer, the orchestra has decided to
go abroad.27

The management said that the cost to the Philharmonic of its final offer would exceed
$800,000 over the three-year period of the contract and would require the Philharmonic
to raise $2 million in order to meet its operating deficit in 1973. Ames suspected that the
union’s quick refusal and its new set of demands seemed to indicate that it had no
intention to negotiate, perhaps due to the fact that the musicians’ plans to go to Spain
were already too far along.
While this was unfolding, Ibermusica’s representative, Hel Bruno,28 arrived in
New York with a check for the musicians’ airfare, and was waiting to sign a contract with
the musicians.29 According to Banat, after sensing that there had been no change in
management’s attitude, two committee members (Jon Deak and Gino Sambuco) left the
negotiation meeting at Sipser’s office in order to attend a second meeting that Banat had
called for 5 p.m. that afternoon. Local 802, having apparently been advised by its counsel
to do so, had suddenly withdrawn its offer to represent the musicians in signing the tour
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contract with Ibermusica.30 Banat had managed to borrow a meeting space and to obtain
new counsel,31 for the orchestra committee to be the first to sign the tour contract with
Ibermusica,32 despite that he was not happy about some (Bernsohn, Mansfield, and De
Intinis) of the committee members using the Spanish tour as leverage for the contract
negotiations.
Mansfield, however, recalled that as soon as Sipser found out that part of the
committee had left the meeting to sign the contract with Ibermusica, he furiously told the
rest of the committee that, “the actions of the two committee members and [the] failure to
stop them [from leaving]”33 had befouled the whole negotiating process. According to
Mansfield, the negotiations, under the threat of the proposed tour, had reached a point
where “fresh money” was on the table. Of course, the moment Ames became aware that a
portion of the committee had gone off to sign the tour contract, he immediately instructed
that all offers be withdrawn. Mansfield said that at that point, the rest of the committee
found itself with no choice but to join their colleagues and sign the Spanish tour
contract.34 After all the committee members had signed the contract,35 the full orchestra
was given the confirmation of the tour.
At 1 a.m. on 5 November 1973, ninety-five members crowded into the
headquarters of Local 802, lining up to sign the three-page contract.36 The musicians
came to an agreement that Bernsohn and Mansfield were to remain in New York in the
30
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event contract discussions were to be resumed on short notice. The union and some of the
families of the Philharmonic’s musicians had also agreed to continue picketing activities
for the musicians at the hall while the orchestra members were in Europe.37 Banat
explained that the very late meeting was the last possible opportunity to assemble all
ninety-five members of the orchestra. Once the contract had been signed by all, Banat
could pay the airfare to Iberia Airlines the next day. If he had had to wait any longer, they
would have lost their group fare.
Banat had originally negotiated a group fare for $26,335 with Trans World
Airlines (hereafter TWA) with the stipulation that the full amount had to be paid not later
than fourteen days in advance.38 Delays in the signing of the tour contract, however, had
caused them to forfeit the TWA deal.39 Having been left with no other solutions, Banat
turned to Iberia Airlines, at a much higher cost of $35,000. “Missing the deadline for the
cheaper fare cost Ibermusica, and eventually us, [approximately] ten thousand dollars.”40
Upon signing the contract, the musicians agreed to seven concerts: two in Lisbon on 12
and 13 November; two in Madrid on 14 and 15 November; one in Barcelona on
November 16; and two in Canary Islands on 19 and 20 November. The contract
mentioned that an additional concert could be added on any date between 12 and 20
November, provided that Ibermusica notified the musicians of such additional concerts
on or before 15 November; in fact, a concert in Barcelona was added on 18 November.
Ibermusica agreed to pay a fee of $8333.33 for each of the first six concerts, and a
37
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minimum of $6600 for each additional concert; certified checks were made payable to an
escrow agent, to be delivered to Rabinowitz or his designee:
Escrow Agent shall deliver the checks to the New York Philharmonic Musicians’
Emergency Strike Fund as follows: a check for $8333.33 at noon (New York
time) of the second day following each of the first six concert dates. ... a check
for $6600 at noon of the second day following the seventh concert, ... and another
check for $6600 at noon on November 22, 1973.41

In addition to paying for all transportation for the musicians and their baggage to
and from the New York airport and throughout the tour, including charges for excessively
heavy or bulky baggage, Ibermusica also agreed to pay to each musician a per diem
expense allowance of $36 for each full day of the tour; the day of departure from New
York and the day of return were to be counted as half days:
Of the $36 total, $25 shall be paid directly to the musicians follows – (i) On
November 9, 1973, $125 (5 days at $25 per day) shall be paid in U.S. Dollars for
each musician who has signed this contract. (ii) On November 15, 1973, the
balance should be paid in Spanish pesetas equaling $25 (at the official rate of
exchange of the previous day) for each remaining day of the tour for each
musician who has signed this contract and is present on that date.42

The remaining $11 of the total of $36 per diem for each musician was to be added
to their concert payment. Orin O’Brien, who had helped type up the tour contract,
recalled that the musicians were grateful to receive the extra per diem and pointedly
noted that it was two dollars per day more than the Philharmonic Society was willing to
offer.
Even as travel plans and tour conditions were being finalized, the orchestra had
not yet found a conductor who was suitable, available, and—of crucial importance—
willing to lead them. According to Banat, “Fear of being blacklisted caused some of the
41
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twenty-five-odd maestros I approached to decline.”43 Among the famous conductors,
Herbert von Karajan was said to be ill, and Carlo Maria Giulini, Claudio Abbado,
Riccardo Muti, Daniel Barenboim, Colin Davis, Igor Markevitch, and many others, were
all unavailable. “Others, like 93-year-old Leopold Stokowski, who was recording in
London, were otherwise engaged.”44 Moreover, the presenter in Lisbon was not interested
in lesser known conductors, and even proposed that the ideal conductor for the concerts
in Lisbon should be at the same level as Colin Davis. “We regret but [Leon] Barzin
unfortunately not accepted in Lisbon.”45
After exhausting all his resources, Banat suggested that unless Ibermusica was
able to secure a suitable conductor, the two concerts in Lisbon should be cancelled and
the tour reduced to those venues in Spain and Canary Islands. Remarkably, Aijon—who
was determined to have the Philharmonic musicians play as many concerts as possible,
found them the Soviet-born Israeli conductor, Yuri Ahronovitch. Ahronovitch had
suddenly become available,46 and had accepted Aijon’s invitation to conduct the striking
musicians.
Before immigrating to Israel in 1972, Ahronovitch had served as music director of
the Yaroslavl Philharmonic Orchestra from 1957 to 1964, and was appointed music
director of the Symphony Orchestra of All-Union Radio and Television (also known as
the USSR Ministry of Culture Symphony Orchestra) in 1964, where he stayed until 1971.
During his time in Soviet Union, he was said to have suffered from strict travel
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restrictions,47 and every concert engagement from abroad was reportedly denied by his
government. It was not until he arrived in Israel that he began to receive invitations to
guest conduct western orchestras. According to Banat, Ahronovitch conducted mostly in
Western Europe, therefore, none of the Philharmonic musicians had ever heard of him.
And when Banat went to pick up the maestro at the airport in New York, his reaction
was:
His battered suitcase and shabby corduroy cloak did not fill me with confidence.
Neither did his request that I get him a baton, the longest I could find, allay my
doubts.48

At a rehearsal in Carnegie Hall the next morning, the musicians, according to
Banat, were skeptical, too:
[As] my colleagues scrutinized our scruffy looking pig-in-the-poke maestro with even
more than their usual skepticism, the thought of being lynched by my peers should he fail
the test crossed my mind.49

When Ahronovitch (see figure 6) took the podium, however, things started to
settle down:
The little Russian raised his long stick and I heard the first chords of
Tchaikovsky’s Fourth [Symphony] ring out, firm yet mellow as they used to
sound in that great old hall, I knew that we found us a real conductor. Overcome
by relief, I had to leave the stage and hide [my] sobbing in the men’s room until I
regained control and could return to the stage.50
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Figure 6: Soviet-born Israeli conductor, Yuri Ahronovitch.

*****
The Philharmonic Society grew increasingly concerned about the likelihood of
Ibermusica using the name “New York Philharmonic” in promoting, advertising, and
publicizing the tour in Spain and in Portugal. In an office memorandum, the management
discussed steps to be taken to prevent Ibermusica from using the name: to have a Madridbased law office write a letter to Ibermusica; to take ads in Madrid newspapers to inform
the public of the situation; to ask the United States Ambassador to intervene with the
Spanish Government; and to let Princess Sophia (through personal contact) know that the
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concerts by the striking members of the New York Philharmonic in Spain could generate
unpleasant publicity, which might cause “possible embarrassment” to her.51
In fact, two formal letters representing the New York Philharmonic were sent to
Ibermusica from two separate law firms—one each in New York and Madrid. The first,
dated 8 November 1973, was delivered by hand to Ragna Bruno, Ibermusica’s New York
representative.52 The second, dated 9 November 1973, was delivered to Ibermusica’s
Madrid office.53 Both letters stated that the abbreviated name “New York Philharmonic,”
which is known worldwide, is the exclusive property of the New York PhilharmonicSymphony Society, Inc., and that neither Ibermusica nor the striking musicians of the
Society’s orchestra, either individually or collectively, have the right under any
circumstances to use the name in any way:
Any infringement by Ibermusica of the rights of the Society in this regard will
result in immediate legal action seeking injunctive relief and damages. Our client
has retained counsel in Madrid, should appropriate legal action in Spain be
required.54

As a result, the musicians renamed themselves “Members of the New York
Philharmonic” (see figure 7) and “Professors of the New York Philharmonic.” (see figure
8) Both names were accepted by Spain and by Portugal as the official title of the striking
musicians on tour. Moreover, the Madrid Radio Symphony had agreed to be official host
during the tour of Spain. In a note sent to the musicians by Banat, he assured his
colleagues that while the management was attempting to thwart the tour, the committee
had been in constant contact with the Spanish government via its Counsel General in
51
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New York regarding the state of the negotiations, and that the government of Spain was
sympathetic to the musician’s cause. He added that the Spanish government had accepted
the musicians while on strike and that they would welcome any move on the
management’s part against their tour in Spain: “They feel it will add to our publicity and
success.”55
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Figure 7: Philharmonic musicians renamed themselves “Members of the New York
Philharmonic.”
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Figure 8: Philharmonic musicians renamed themselves “Professors of the New York
Philharmonic.”
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On 7 November 1973, the two sides went back to the bargaining table.
Rabinowitz began by saying that during their last meeting (Sipser’s office, 2 November
1973), the whole situation was very upsetting and that several items in the management’s
final offer were confusing and unclear. He said, for example, that it was not clear whether
the string revolving system was to be dropped or not; that the management tended to
favor seniority as opposed to the revolving system; that while the Society’s final offer of
a $10,000 pension at age 65 with thirty years of service seemed generous, somehow the
pensions for those with fewer than thirty years of service would not be proportionately
less but significantly reduced. When Oppenheimer did not show up, Rabinowitz
terminated the meeting.
That same day, Ames sent a letter to the members of the orchestra, enumerating
four points from the perspective of the Philharmonic Society that he hoped would clear
up the lingering misunderstandings between the two sides.56 Ames’s first point addressed
the musicians’ persistent question as to why the Society paid $200,000 (i.e., 40%) of the
Hall’s annual deficit on top of its rental. His response was that the Philharmonic’s rental
contract with Lincoln Center was negotiated in 1959 by David Keiser (the former
President of the Philharmonic Society), at which time Ames was not directly concerned
involved in contract matters. Ames explained that the rental contract stipulated that the
Philharmonic was to pay 40% of the total costs of the Hall, which he characterized as “a
simple method of determining our fair share of the total cost.”57 He also stated that the
contract had proven to be “unusually” favorable to the Philharmonic, given that other
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constituents in Lincoln Center had to bear the full costs of their own halls. He stressed
that everyone in the Philharmonic was indebted to David Keiser for the contribution he
had made to the Society in negotiating this deal.
Ames’ second point addressed the musicians’ complaint as to why the
Philharmonic had to pay $211,000 per year for the acoustical renovation of Avery Fisher
Hall when it did not own it. Again, Ames cited an agreement in the 1959 rental contract.
But he urged the musicians to understand that Lincoln Center itself had paid for a major
part of the acoustical adjustments: “The important part of the money came from the
income from extra seats in the Hall, and from separate funds which would otherwise not
have been available to us.”58 He went on to say that each time a decision was made to
renovate the Hall, it was based on the advice of the musicians, noting that the board of
directors would agree to the changes, not only on the basis of the advice of the musicians,
but for “practical business reasons, [i.e.,] that improved acoustics would attract large
audiences and make for a more successful Hall.”59 Ames’ third point, which was
addressed to criticism of his dual position as chairman of the Philharmonic and of
Lincoln Center, was the following:
Let me only say that, in 1969 when John Rockefeller asked me if I would be
chairman of the Executive Committee and later chairman of Lincoln Center, I
took the position that I would do so only on the condition that it was understood
by everybody that my first loyalty was to the New York Philharmonic. It has
been my unfailing principle to refer any matters that concern both organizations
to others, either on the Philharmonic Board or the Lincoln Center Board.60
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Ames’ fourth point addressed the accusation made by Philharmonic violist Ralph
Mendelson: that the Philharmonic management had fomented the strike. Ames stated that
Mendelson’s accusation was incorrect, and that the musicians’ management had agreed to
be bound by compulsory arbitration.
Ames urged the immediate resumption of performances, stating that the
Philharmonic Society did not believe a continuing strike was in the best interests of the
musicians. Ames added that he felt strongly that the standard disputes between labor and
management have no place in non-profit art organizations in the United States: “I believe
that our State should pass legislation [that] would bring about compulsory arbitration in
every non-profit organization negotiation if the parties could not reach agreement without
it.”61 Lastly, he urged everyone in the Orchestra to come to an agreement for the sake of
the arts.
On 8 November 1973, a meeting was held for the Philharmonic’s executive
committee. Ames told the executive committee that the musicians’ decision to go on tour
resulted in four more weeks of strike, of which only one week was offset by tour income:
It is because, with our final offer on the table, the loss to the musicians is greater
than anything the Union could have hoped to gain that we believe emotion may
have overcome practical realities.62

Ames laid out the figures, explaining that for each additional week of strike, the
orchestra as a whole would lose $45,000 of salary, welfare, and other benefits; the
Philharmonic Society would lose $10,000 of income; Lincoln Center, Inc. would suffer
an income loss on the hall of $23,000; and that there would be 11,200 disappointed ticket
61
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holders. He added that the loss for Lincoln Center was a loss for the arts of New York
City: “The audience loss translates into heavy losses for restaurants, etc. in the
neighborhood, … so obviously the Orchestra player is the real loser.”63
Ames also pointed out that he had made sure the orchestra committee understood
that the management’s last offer could not be improved upon because any greater offer
would swamp the Society’s ability to raise funds. Ames also said that he believed that
there were misunderstandings and a lack of communication between the orchestra
committee and the musicians, and perhaps even between the board and the musicians,
which he said was against the best interests of the players:
We are told that some musicians are ‘infuriated’ that our first offer was so low
and that our final offer came so late. Apparently, the moves and the firm
indications we made to the Orchestra committee and the mediator were not
disclosed to the Orchestra. This lack of communication may have been
intentional to make us look unreasonable.

Ames went on to say that:
We seemed to be facing with a major power play which goes beyond the direct
interests of our Orchestra. It also seems that militants on the committee may have
fanned emotion to the point of losing control.64

Ames urged the Philharmonic’s executive committee to recognize the ongoing
problems resulting from the strike, which he said were detrimental to the well being of
the organization, and noted that something must be done to ensure the best interests of the
players. He suggested three ideas: a) that the executive committee should use the time
while the orchestra was away in Europe to prepare a “statement of reconciliation” in
which was analyzed each of the differences between the positions of the musicians and

63

Notes of Amyas Ames for the Executive Committee Meeting, 8 November 1973, New York
Philharmonic Archives, Orchestra Committee Files, box 912-01.
64
Ibid.

120
the management, and which would be presented to the musicians upon their return; b)
that certain members of the board should adopt particular points of view regarding the
strike, and with the analytical assistance of staff, write a short memo of
recommendation—or opinion—to the players; and c) that the Society should draft a
3000-word report detailing just how strong was the management’s final offer was,65 one
that would make the Philharmonic the best paid orchestra in the world. Ames indicated
that the report should: a) break down the pension, welfare, and insurance provisions (i.e.,
the quality of the coverage and how each works); b) that it should fully explain the Fisher
gift and its true purpose, including why it does no more than reduce hall overhead, and
why the Philharmonic must still raise additional $500,000 even if the gift were to be
given in its entirety by 1974;66 c) that it should propose a meeting between the players
and the members of the Executive Committee for the purpose of encouraging an
exchange of ideas, and also for the development of an understanding by both sides; d)
that the report should thoroughly analyze the problem of raising $2 million each year, as
well as the reasons why the Philharmonic cannot go beyond the highest payments of
other orchestras without exceeding its fund raising capabilities and therefore jeopardizing
the Orchestra; e) that it should include the letter from Carlos Moseley advising the
players to return to the stage and play music while their differences with the management
are being resolved; f) that there be a plan for the termination of the strike upon return of
the orchestra from Europe, and that this document should clearly explain why the loss of
each week’s pay exceeds any benefits that might be gained from a longer strike; and
lastly, g) that it should include a statement clarifying Ames’ dual leadership of the
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Philharmonic and Lincoln Center, explaining that he had no dual loyalties, but that he
nevertheless suspected the musician’s union of a mounting a “carefully planned attack”
on the central authority of the Society.67
*****
On that same day, the two sides met again. Oppenheimer reiterated that the
management’s last proposal was final, and stated that there would be no further offer,
despite the fact that Bernsohn told him that the orchestra had voted to reject it. Before the
two parties went their separate ways, Oppenheimer announced that because the musicians
had not been employed by the Philharmonic for weeks, their benefits would not be
continued, and that the health insurance and welfare were to be cut off as of midnight on
9 November 1973. He also explained in details of the cost of the health and welfare
coverage and said that either the musicians or the union would have the option to pay for
their ongoing costs.
On 9 November 1973, a letter from the Society on behalf of Ames was sent to the
subscribers of—and contributors to—the Philharmonic Society. Its purpose was to keep
both abreast of the Society’s continuing efforts to resolve the strike, and in particular, to
emphasize the Society’s distress over the rejection of its final proposal by the members of
the orchestra, as well as their departure on a European tour versus the resumption of
concerts in Avery Fisher Hall.
At its conclusion, the letter indicated that subscribers: a) could return their tickets
for the cancelled concerts to the Society as a tax deductible contribution (as the full value
of the tickets would be acknowledged for tax records); or b) they could return their
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tickets for a refund. According to an office memorandum sent to Lawrence, Ames’ letter
triggered a series of phone calls from confused subscribers. A number of tickets were
returned with a copy of Ames’ letter—the last paragraph encircled and notes to the effect,
“as per your request.” Increasingly, the subscribers, both in person and on the phone,
were said to have become increasingly hostile.68 According to Philharmonic violinist
Matitiahu Braun, who was a member of the performance committee, the management had
sent letters to the spouses of the musicians urging them to dissuade their spouses from
going abroad to perform, and had done everything possible to prevent the musicians from
accepting other paying venues.69
*****
On 10 November 1973, the day of their departure for Spain, the musicians, after
having studied the Society’s press release (issued 3 November 1973), sent an open letter
to Ames which read: “We are chagrined at the manipulation of facts and the use of halftruths to influence public opinion. The time is long overdue that we answer your charges
point by point.” The musicians contended that while the management’s $50 weekly raise
over three years appeared to be adequate, it failed to inform the public that it was tied to
an increase in services:
In terms of real income, Mr. Ames, your offer amounts to a 4.5% increase during
the first year. The Chicago Symphony was recently granted an increase of almost
10% in the first contract year and for fewer services than we are expected to
perform. Thus, your assertion that our increase would make us ‘the best paid
orchestra in the world’ is untrue.70
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The letter went on to discuss pension and welfare, and said that the management’s
proposals were still inferior to those of many other orchestras, and certainly were not
“equal to any,” as Ames had asserted. The musicians said that they had been in an
“intolerable” situation, in which they did not have a disability insurance plan beyond
Social Security, and their dental plan had collapsed in the middle of the season during the
prior year. They also criticized Ames for taking away their medical and hospital
insurance as an attempt of intimidation:
It is you, Mr. Ames, challenging us and the welfare of our families, who would
have this magnificent instrument decline to the rank of a second-class ensemble
or lie fallow and dormant for these months on end.71

Regarding Ames’ statement that the musicians’ European tour would deprive
New York audiences of weeks of music, the musicians contended that the tour was
agreed upon only after Ames and the Philharmonic Society had denied their public six
weeks of music making via their deliberately retrogressive proposals:
We will not be starved into an unfair contract by your false concern for concertgoers, nor will we be intimidated by your threats of lawsuits to whoever employs
us or performs with us. We have already demonstrated our readiness to play and
our own organizational skill to perform at Carnegie Hall or anywhere in the
world under our own auspices. ... We leave for Europe with great regret. We
prefer to perform for our own public in our own city, and we prefer that the
Philharmonic management arranges our business matters. We prefer to play
music rather than plan travel arrangements, draw up contracts, and attend to the
multitude of details necessary to move 100 musicians and instruments to
Europe.72

The musicians said that because their preferences could not be fulfilled, they had no
choice but to seek other alternatives in order to continue to perform. The letter concluded
with an expression of hope that upon their return from Europe, the two parties could
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agree to working as a true “partnership of the arts”—“A partnership based on an
equitable contract fully cognizant of today’s needs, a partnership that will return the New
York Philharmonic to the people of New York, to whom this great orchestra belongs.”73
O’Brien said that there was always a strong feeling among the musicians that having selfbooked an international tour demonstrated the musicians could do better than the
management and the board of directors. To this day, she continues to reminisce about the
tour preparations with other members of the orchestra who were also on the same tour,
and everyone agrees that morale in the orchestra had never been higher. She said that
everyone was helping everyone else along the process. For example, people who were
taller and stronger—in particular, Philharmonic bassist Walter Botti,74 whom the
musicians called “the baggage master”—volunteered to lift heavy instruments and to help
with loading luggage. O’Brien herself had offered her living room to Philharmonic
bassist and acting personnel manager on the tour, John Schaeffer,75 and Philharmonic
horn player and orchestra committee member, De Intinis, to lay out all the manifests of
instruments, including insurance forms and custom declarations. According to O’Brien,
only ten members did not join the tour: “We had a few substitute players, and most of
those who did not go declined for health reasons.”76
On the afternoon of 10 November 1973, immediately before buses took the
striking musicians from Avery Fisher Hall to the airport, the musicians’ union gave them
a very special sendoff. As described by Banat: “The union, perhaps to expiate its timidity,
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sent us off in style with a great brass band, the best New York could offer, playing
marches and with little red bows tied to [their] instruments.”77
Another major difference in going on tour without the assistance of the
Philharmonic’s management was the absence of tour wardrobes and instrument trunks
such as they had when the management organized the tour. O’Brien remembered that
most players had to carry a large suitcase plus their instrument. The only exceptions were
those players of very large instruments. These instruments: ten cellos, eight basses (and
bass stools), contra bassoon, percussion (timpani, xylophone, celeste, etc.), tuba, harp,
plus the music library (a large container holding all the instrumental parts),78 were known
as the “unaccompanied baggage.”
When the musicians arrived at the airport, they were greeted by some unwelcome
news: the airline (Iberia) had mistakenly assigned the airplane which was to take them
and instruments to another group. Fortunately, the airline was able to quickly arrange
another airplane for them, but after everyone had boarded, yet another problem arose: the
baggage compartment doors on the replacement Boeing 707 were too narrow to
accommodate the large instruments. The airline said that there was no choice but to put
the large instruments on a separate flight. Fearing still more of the unexpected, Banat
went to the flight deck and spoke to the captain, asking him to hold the plane while
Schaeffer rushed the other gate to make sure that all instruments had gotten on the other
flight smoothly. As the musicians finally departed for their independent European tour
adventure, they realized what a miracle it had been to accomplish all the bookings, travel,
and logistical arrangements within a period of two weeks, and to have done it with an
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“amateur managerial team,” which is what they called themselves. In a letter of statement
to Ames and the members of the Philharmonic’s board of directors, Bernsohn said that:
It was not a vacation bound, light hearted group that departed from Kennedy
airport on Saturday evening. Our orchestra, to the last man and woman, would
much prefer to perform in our own hall for our own audiences. We have been
compelled to cross oceans to seek physical and artistic sustenance because the
wide gap still separating us from the Society’s negotiators has not yet been
bridged.79

Bernsohn urged the Society to understand that the musicians had reduced their
demands to a point where “further trimming would be almost impossible,” and that their
desire to maintain the $10 differential in salary demand between themselves and the
Chicago Symphony was not based upon “arrogance or greed,” but rather upon the cost of
living differential and the workload each week. He further pointed out that the Chicago
Symphony had been paying its musicians the seniority increments for years while the
Society had not done the same to recognize its musicians’ years of service and experience
as the “value of a musician’s contribution.”80 In terms of the ongoing differences between
the Society and its musicians, the letter stated:
Unfortunately the relationship between management and the Orchestra has
deteriorated markedly during the past several weeks. The Society’s recent
decision to suspend health and welfare payments and its threats to enjoin and
otherwise disrupt our Iberian concerts have not been moves conducive to early
settlement. A contract cannot be consummated on the basis of threats and
intimidation.81

He asked the Society to “seriously reexamine” its positions, so that by the time the
orchestra returned home, there would be a welcoming contract agreement.
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*****
Once the musicians and their instruments had all safely arrived in Lisbon, they
played their first two scheduled performances at the Teatro Imperio. O’Brien’s mother,
who was living in Lisbon at the time, had tried to help with the booking of the Opera
House (the largest concert hall in Lisbon), but it was already fully booked. The solution
Ibermusica arranged was to have the musicians play at the Teatro, which turned out to be
one of the largest movie theaters in Lisbon.82 At the first performance, the front page of
the printed programs specifically mentioned that the performance was being given by the
Members of the New York Philharmonic, though, it was said that the local concertgoers
were happy to ignore the legality and to assume that it was the New York Philharmonic
making its first appearance in Portugal.83 In fact, the Diário de Notícias, one of the best
known Portuguese newspapers, had described the event as a “big hit” cultural
presentation by the New York Philharmonic.84 The musicians’ first concert program,
which was dedicated to the late Pablo Casals, the legendary cellist who had passed away
only a few weeks prior to the concert,85 featured the Philharmonic’s principal cellist,
Lorne Munroe, in Dvorak’s cello concerto. Munroe’s performance received a rousing
standing ovation, which led him to offer the audience one of Casals’s own compositions,
“Cançao Triste,” as an encore. The rest of the program included the Roman Carnival
Overture by Berlioz, Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 4, as well as an orchestral encore, the
march from “The Damnation of Faust” by Berlioz. The concert was a huge success.
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For the second Lisbon concert—also a huge success—the musicians played Mozart’s
Symphony No. 38, (the “Prague” Symphony), Stravinsky’s Firebird Suite, 1919 version
(the concert suite for orchestra No. 2), and the Shostakovich Symphony No. 5.
On 14 November 1973, as the musicians were preparing to depart Lisbon for
Madrid at 5:50 p.m., Banat, Philharmonic violinist Don Whyte, and Aijon’s wife,
Kristina, set off by automobile for Madrid at 5:00 a.m. It is routine for the management
of an orchestra on tour that some member of the staff to travel ahead of the musicians and
to ensure that everything is in order before the orchestra arrives. Since there were no
management personnel on the 1973 strike tour, the musicians themselves had to assume
this responsibility. And as it turned out, it was fortunate that Banat had left early for
Madrid. Upon arriving at the hotel, they discovered that: “Instead of first names, the list
of the musicians given to the hotel [had] only initials [and] they had some of our women
rooming with a guy.”86
But after getting the Concierge to correct his error, they encountered a much worse
problem: the cargo doors of the Boeing 737 that was to fly the orchestra to Madrid were
similarly unable to accommodate the large instruments. As Ibermusica desperately
searched for an alternative way to fly out both the musicians and all of their instruments,
Aijon’s brother-in-law, who was chief commander of Barajas Airport (Madrid’s main
international airport), was at the last minute able to secure the only available aircraft, a
Boeing 747, to make the trip from Madrid to Lisbon, pick the musicians and their
instruments, and immediately return to Madrid. Banat said that that 747 saved their day,
although the cost was an unfortunate “$10,000 or more.”87
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Concerts in Spain tend to start at a later than in the United States—usually around
10:30 p.m. But because the musicians arrived in Madrid one hour later than originally
planned, they kept their eager audience waiting in the Palacio de Congressos for almost
another hour. After quickly donning their concert attire and setting up the stage, they
began the taped concert (to be later televised), at around 11:20 p.m.88
It had been decided to use the concert to benefit the victims of the disastrous floods
that struck Southeastern Spain the previous month,89 and many of the government
cabinet-ministers as well as a large number of political figures were present at the gala
concert. The cover of the elegantly printed program reads: “The Grand Gala Concert,
Sponsored by Her Excellency Mrs. Doña Carmen Polo de Franco,90 Presented by the
Professors of the New York Philharmonic.” Banat commented that, “the resulting
combination was a veritable paradox: an orchestra on strike touring Spain under the
auspices of the wife of its Fascist dictator.”91 But the musicians, despite their exhausting
day of travel, played brilliantly and Munroe gave yet another exceptional performance of
the Dvorak cello concerto. The following day, the ABC. Viernes, Madrid’s newspaper,
wrote in the headline of the music section, “Triumphant performance by the New York
Philharmonic”; the reviewer raved about the musicians: “truly remarkable and
admirable,” despite not having the glorious name “New York Philharmonic.” He said that
the orchestra had proven a most sensitive instrument from which Ahronovitch coaxed a
round and beautiful sound, that the two together possessed cohesion and brilliance
88
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throughout the program, and that they had made a significant impact on the members of
the audience.92
Ahronovitch, who had conducted in Spain prior to the tour, had some familiarity
with the audience in Madrid, and his interpretations on the two programs in Madrid were
both very well received. Following the second of the two Madrid concerts, a critic in a
local newspaper wrote: “The Triumphant Goodbye of the New York Philharmonic ...
Great, magnificent orchestra, ... powerful but not harsh, finely nuanced, ... capable of
impressive fortissimos and the best pianissimos whenever the conductor’s baton so
demands.”93
After the successful visit to Madrid, the musicians then traveled to Barcelona,
where they were initially to perform only one concert. Because the concert sold out soon
after its announcement, however, it was decided to present a second concert on 18
November 1973, on what was originally to be the musician’s scheduled free day. Both
concerts took place at the beautiful Palau de la Música Catalana (see figure 9),94 and the
highlight of first concert was Munroe’s rendition of a traditional Catalan song, “El aant
dels ocells” (“The Song of the Birds”), one of Casals’ own arrangements, which Munroe
(see figure 10) dedicated to the memory of Casals. Banat said that the audience, “rose to
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its feet and, roaring its approval” made Munroe repeat it again, and after that the
musicians had “sixteen curtain calls!”95

Figure 9: Philharmonic musicians performing at the Palau de la Música Catalana in
Barcelona.
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Figure 10: Philharmonic principal cellist, Lorne Munroe, performing “El aant dels
ocells” (“The Song of the Birds”) in Barcelona.

On 19 November 1973, the musicians traveled to their last destination of the tour,
the Canary Islands, to play their final two concerts on tour: one at the Teatro Perez
Galdos in Las Palmas, and one at the Teatro Guimera in Santa Cruz de Tenerife. Once
again, the concerts were highly praised; the Las Palmas’ local newspaper even called the
musical event, “a dream come true” for the local concertgoers.96
After the last concert of the tour, O’Brien said that Ahronovitch was kind enough
to take the entire orchestra out to dinner, to celebrate the fruitful and unforgettable
touring experience. Many musicians who were on the 1973 strike tour have said that the
96
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independent tour was the highlight of their career, and that it was a real morale booster
for the orchestra. Not only that it had given the musicians some much needed financial
support, it had also brought everyone in the orchestra closer during a very difficult period
of time. One of the musicians who wished to remain nameless shared that he regards the
orchestra’s strike tour as one of his most enjoyable times in the orchestra. He said that the
musicians played passionately at each of the concerts, and most of them went out to
dinner every night after the performance, and then stayed up until dawn! Banat described
strike tour as having the opportunity to experience “the spirit of self-reliance,” and added
that while a regular tour would have cost the Philharmonic’s sponsors close to one
million dollars, theirs earned $80,000 net: “Especially welcome for those of us with
overdue rent or mortgages.”97
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Chapter Six: Aftermath of the Tour
The Philharmonic musicians’ tour of Portugal and Spain won them a great amount
of admiration, and eager newspaper reporters were waiting to greet them upon their
return to New York. The New York Times called their eleven-day tour “highly
successful”;1 the New York Intelligencer reported that the ninety-five Philharmonic
musicians, representing “the Ensemble of New York,” had drawn “huge crowds in a
country that doesn’t have much in the way of good, home-grown symphony orchestras.”
It went on to note that the musicians were “weighing further offers from South American
and Swiss promoters [and] for more pay-per-concert than they would get in New York
even if their current demands are met.”2
Gabriel Banat, the person most responsible for bringing the Iberian tour to
fruition, recalled that almost immediately, he was contacted by the committee chairmen
of all five major American orchestras wanting to know how to organize a tour such as the
Philharmonic musicians had just completed. Perhaps surprisingly, Banat’s answer was
that it was no longer possible: “After the problems we caused Ibermusica, no European
manager would consider engaging an American orchestra on strike.”3
The musicians were also greeted upon their return with a six-page ultimatum in
the form of a letter, dated 19 November 1973, from Amyas Ames, the chairman of the
board of the Philharmonic Society. Ames’ letter began: “On November 2nd, the New
York Philharmonic-Symphony Society made an offer which, because we wished to end
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the strike, was our best and final one.”4 It continued that argument and misunderstandings
are inevitable in a strike, but that the musicians must understand that “the time for
argument is past.”5 He summarized the major elements of the Society’s final proposal,
and under each, he provided comparisons with the best paid orchestras of the country. He
concluded with the hope that the musicians would then draw their own conclusions.
The first issue Ames addressed was wages. He made no new offer, but instead
continued to promote the same salary package the musicians had rejected before they left
on tour. That offer was for a minimum wage of $350 a week during the first year, $360
during the second, and $380 during the third, representing a combined increase of $50 per
week over the life of the agreement. He went on to note that under this offer, the
Society’s wages would be in line with the highest wages paid by any symphony orchestra
in the country—and in fact, in the world. To make this assertion specific, he noted that:
[The Society’s offer is] equal to the wages called for under the new Chicago
agreement, $10 per week higher than those paid under the Philadelphia contract,
and $20 per week higher than those in Boston.6

Ames emphasized that the wage proposal would prove even more advantageous to the
Philharmonic musicians because the Society was also offering increased overscale for all
revolving string players; every playing member in the Philharmonic would then end up
getting at least $15 over the minimum scale, which other orchestras’ musicians did not
have.

4

Letter of Amyas Ames, 19 November 1973, New York Philharmonic Archives, Orchestra Committee
Files, box 912-01.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.

136
Regarding the pension plan, to which the Society had proposed to increase its
contribution by $270 per year for each year of service, and which would result in a
minimum pension of $10,000 per year for players who retire with at least thirty years of
service at age sixty-five, Ames said that the Society’s pension would be far better than
that of any other orchestra, and would provide a retiring musician with approximately
$2,000 more per year than what his or her colleague in Chicago or Boston would receive,
and $3,500 more per year than any colleague in Philadelphia. Ames added that while the
Boston and Chicago orchestras let their musicians retire at age sixty, rather than sixtyfive, their pensions had strict limitations on the benefits payable to employees—
limitations which were absent in the Philharmonic’s pension program—and that they
therefore provided considerably fewer benefits to their musicians upon retirement.
Regarding welfare benefits, Ames pointed out that the Society was offering to
increase welfare contributions by $35,000 over the three years of the agreement, with an
increase of $20,000 in the first year, $10,000 in the second year, and $5,000 in the third
year—for a total of $144,000 per year. This would offer the musicians a “substantially
improved major medical plan, substantially increased life insurance, an improved dental
insurance plan, and increased instrument insurance.”7
Regarding the comparison with other orchestras, Ames said that given the special
endowment that underwrites the benefits of the Chicago Symphony, the Society was
simply not able to make a matching offer. Yet its proposed offer was far better than those
of Philadelphia and Boston. Ames pointed to the provision of $2,500 of instrument
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insurance and $2,000 of life insurance—benefits that would continue following
retirement and explicitly noted that: “No other orchestra has either of these benefits.”8
Regarding the increased chair prices for string sections, Ames confirmed that the
revolving string system was to be implemented for one year to determine whether it can
prove to be artistically satisfactory:
Compensation will be made during the first year to those members of the string
section who are asked to play one of the front desks. If this works, as we assume
it will, all members of the string section, in the second year, will receive a
payment of $15 over scale, and those string players who are presently receiving
over scale payment in excess of $15 will continue to receive such payment.9

Ames went on to stress that the Philharmonic would be the only orchestra to pay
contractual over-scale payments to its string section.
He also noted that the Society’s final proposal offered substantial increases in per
diem allowance during tours: $34 for the first two years and $36 for the third year. He
noted that this was “generally” equivalent to that of the Chicago Symphony, but was
significantly higher than that of Philadelphia, Boston, or Cleveland. In terms of the
musicians’ additional workload, Ames said that during four weeks of the subscription
season, the Society would like to have the option of scheduling three, three-hour
rehearsals and a one-hour student concert, “with the understanding that this student
concert will not include the Young People’s Concerts or any concert which has
previously resulted in income for the musicians.”10 Ames noted that while it would
permit the Society to increase its student concert program, it would not result in a greater
workload for the musicians.
8
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At the letter’s conclusion, Ames referred to the musician’s suspicion that the
management had in fact wanted this strike to occur. He countered that once the strike
began, the Society made great efforts to quickly end it, and as evidence of their good
faith, cited their willingness to submit the matter to binding arbitration. Ames reiterated
that the strike was costing the Society approximately $5,000 a week and the Orchestra
$45,000 a week in salaries, and that their final offer would compel the Society to raise
another $2 million in donations at a time when “national energy and financial crises, have
certainly made the fund raising burden more difficult than ever.”11
He concluded by saying to the musicians that under the circumstances, he
believed they had already achieved—via the Society’s last offer—“a major victory ... you
have before you a contract which equals or betters that of any symphony orchestra in the
world.”12
*****
On 25 November 1973, the entire orchestra met to discuss Ames’ letter. Their
instruction to the negotiating committee was to “fill in the gaps” in the management’s
final offer.13 On 27 November, negotiators from both sides met at the bargaining table for
a day-long session in which both sides struggled to reach an agreement. On the following
day, the Philharmonic’s musicians were informed of a “modified contract offer” that
represented—probably—the last chance from either perspective to salvage a concert
season. The orchestra members were then faced with a choice between accepting the
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“modified” package, of which they were not fully apprised, or face another four-to-six
weeks on the picket lines.
Committee member Newton Mansfield recalled that if the musicians were to keep
the strike going past the Christmas and New Years season, they would essentially be
doing the management a favor, given that for one of the weeks the musicians were on
vacation, and the others were among the least audience-producing weeks of the season.
On the evening of 28 November 1973, the striking musicians gathered at the headquarters
of Local 802 for a ratification meeting. Each was handed a six-page points- of-agreement
supplement to the trade agreement covering the period 21 September 1973 to 20
September 1976.
The first item dealt with the issue of salary increase: the management had made
no change to their offer, and it remained at $50 over the three years of the proposed
contract ($20; $10; $20). The second item dealt with tour arrangements: the management
stated that it would continue to consult the orchestra committee in the same manner as in
the past contract. The third item dealt with the Society’s general policy on the
engagement of personnel:
Choosing the performing personnel is considered an important function of the
Music Director, and the Society has vested complete authority for final decision
regarding the choice of personnel in the Music Director ... It is recognized,
however, ... in some instance ... the best interests of the Orchestra may not be
served by requiring auditions of every prospective new solo player. In such
instances the Music Director and Management will use their best judgment
regarding the auditions…14

Under the agreement, any prospective new member had to be interviewed by the
management before they were engaged, and was required to pass a physical examination
14
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which was to be conducted by a medical doctor. Following successful completion of the
probationary period, the new player was then required to undergo a second physical
examination before tenure could be conferred.
The fourth item discussed the details the Society’s general policy regarding
strings’ rotation system and chair prices:
During the first year of the Agreement, the seating of all members of the string
sections other than the first two stands of the first violin section and the first
stands of the other string sections shall be on a periodically revolving basis
throughout the year. Members in revolving seats shall be listed in alphabetical
order.15

The agreement also pointed out that if the revolving system proved to be
satisfactory, each member of the string section would then receive $15 over-scale in the
second year of the agreement, and $20 over-scale in the third year of the agreement.
The fifth through seventh items dealt with the Orchestra’s “day off” in each week;
the Society said that it would try to arrange two consecutive days off for the musicians
whenever possible.
The eighth item was a promise that the Society made to the second players in the
woodwind, horn and trumpet sections. For some years, the players in those sections had
been complaining that due to the nature of standard orchestration, their workload was
greater than the rest of their respective sections. In the eighth item, the Society had finally
agreed to provide them with an occasional relief week, though under the condition that
other members of the section will make their services available so that such relief weeks
could be afforded.
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The ninth item was an agreement by the Society to grant leaves of absence
without pay for a twelve-month period under the following circumstances: a) the Society
must be able to engage a substitute whom it deems acceptable; b) no more than three
members of the entire Orchestra, and not more than one player within any one
instrumental section are to be on leave at the same time; c) priority will be given to
requests for leave based on seniority; and d) that requests for a leave of absence may be
made only once every seven continuous years of service.
The tenth item dealt with the Society’s proposal on health and welfare benefits.
Through New England Mutual Life Insurance Company, the Society would provide the
musicians with group life insurance, dental expense benefits, basic medical benefits,
major medical benefits, and long term disability benefits. The Society also proposed an
increase in musical instrument insurance provided at its expense from $750 to $2,500.
According to Mansfield, Philharmonic cellist Evangeline Benedetti had met an
insurance broker and introduced him to the orchestra committee. When the orchestra was
in Spain, Mansfield and Lorin Bernsohn met with this broker and were told that the
Society had been buying a health insurance plan (Blue Cross) from one of the
Philharmonic’s board members “as a favor.”16 They were then told that the Philharmonic
could purchase a better plan at a much lower price from New England Mutual Life
Insurance Company. Bernsohn and Mansfield immediately proposed making this change
to the management.
The management agreed to make the change, and the savings in cost that it would
generate over the span of the new contract would leave the Philharmonic Society with a
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considerable amount of unexpected, and therefore, unbudgeted funds. They agreed not to
hold this sum in reserve, but instead agreed to use it to fund the string rotation system.
The eleventh item addressed the pension fund and retirement program. The
Society agreed to increase its annual contribution of $209,000 to the pension fund to
$219,000 the first year; $229,000 the second year; and $234,000 the third. As for the age
of retirement, the Society proposed that:
The retirement date for Orchestra members shall continue to be the end of the
season following their 65th birthday. After consultation with the Orchestra
Committee, however, the Society may, in its sole discretion and when special
circumstances obtain, invite an Orchestra member to remain with the Society
after that age on a year-to-year basis, but in no event past the end of the season
following the 68th birthday. The Society will give maximum consideration to the
request of each Orchestra member who asks to remain past the normal retirement
date.17

This last item was to fulfill the orchestra’s request to have an artistic committee,
comprised of six elected musicians from the orchestra, to meet with the management. The
Society’s agreement was that the management would designate a committee to meet with
the orchestra’s artistic committee not less than four times each year to discuss artistic
policies such as choice of conductor, use of rehearsal time, and anything else that
affected—or might affect—the orchestra’s functioning and its musical future.
•

****

After reviewing the document, the orchestra committee was bitterly divided over
whether to ratify the contract. The orchestra as a whole, moreover, was similarly divided,
with sixty percent for ratification, and forty percent against it.18 Philharmonic bassist,
Orin O’Brien, who had stayed in Europe following the Iberian tour, and who had given
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her proxy vote to one of her colleagues, was told that at the ratification meeting a
member of the orchestra wanted to raise an objection to one of the proposals. In response,
Sipser was said to have impolitely prevented him from doing so. Although
recommendations were not given to the musicians by the orchestra committee, Sipser
appeared inclined towards a quick settlement with no arguments.
At midnight, the orchestra, by a vote of 69 to 35, ratified a new three-year
contract and ended their ten-week strike.19 In so doing, the musicians gave up the fight to
win the $10 differential in minimum weekly pay between themselves and their Chicago
colleagues. But as a result of the strike, they gained on issues such as pension, life
insurance, instrument insurance, rehearsal pay, the string rotation system that would pay
each rotating string player an additional $20 above the minimum in the third year of the
contract, and most importantly, more involvement in the artistic decision making process.
According to Ralph Mendelson, Philharmonic violist and chairman of the
negotiating committee:
The negotiating committee’s lack of recommendation and the large number of
dissenting votes to ratification must be directly attributed to the Society’s refusal
to either improve the Orchestra’s service and working condition provisions or to
compensate for its heavy work schedule and high cost of living in New York.20

O’Brien echoed Mendelson, saying that given the absence of movement on the
management’s side and the apparent absence of any effort on the management’s part to
negotiate or compromise, the orchestra was thoroughly discouraged. Mansfield added
that while the vote had brought the strike to an end, there were bitter feelings towards the
management and a sense of mistrust that lingered for many years.
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On 4 December 1973, the orchestra resumed their rehearsal schedule at Fisher
Hall; their first performance following the strike was 6 December 1973. Daniel
Barenboim, who was scheduled to conduct a program of Russian music that week, had
cancelled his engagement due to the illness of his wife, Jacqueline du Pré.21 He was
replaced by the Polish conductor, Georg Semkov, in a program of Moussorgsky,
Tchaikovsky, and Scriabin. Vladimir Ashkenazy was the soloist.
*****
The Philharmonic’s ten-week work stoppage resulted in the loss of forty-six
concerts, including thirty-five subscription concerts, two “Prospective Encounters” events
in Greenwich Village, six educational concerts, one special program on Long Island, one
Young People’s Concert, and one concert conducted by Andre Kostelanetz. Donal
Henahan of the New York Times, following the musicians’ ratification of the new contract
wrote:
Musically, the casualty rate has been serious but hardly fatal ... the losses have
22
been, by luck or otherwise, surprisingly light.

Not quite six months later, however, Harold Schonberg of the New York Times observed:
All [ten] weeks of programs had to be scratched; all the soloists were unheard.
There must have been bitter tears; many of them were making their first
appearances with the Philharmonic, and a Philharmonic date still carries a great
deal of clout.23

Moreover, a clause in the contract between the Philharmonic and its guest conductors and
soloists stipulated that the honorarium for any guest appearance with the Philharmonic
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that was cancelled due to a strike would not be paid.24 Among those whose engagements
during the strike were cancelled and who lost income from it were André Watts, JeanBernard Pommier, Zino Francescatti, Rafael Druian, Pinchas Zukerman, Pierre Fournier,
Erich Leinsdorf, Julius Baker, and John Cerminaro.
*****
In the aftermath of the strike, both the Philharmonic Society and Lincoln Center
conducted thorough evaluations of its cost—and potential future costs—to them. The
Philharmonic reported that the strike would most likely produce an adverse effect on
subscription renewals for the 1974-75 season. According to Ames, 74,412 tickets were
sold to the subscribers during the strike period; this meant that the Philharmonic’s
liability for advance ticket sales would be $513,000.25 Season ticket holders were
informed of their options throughout the strike, including an option to donate their
subscription to the Philharmonic Society, but as of 18 January 1974, the number of
tickets donated amounted to only about $85,000. Moreover, according to the Society,
many people expressed an unwillingness to continue supporting the pension benefit
concerts. Lincoln Center informed the Philharmonic Society that, due to the loss of
revenue from the strike, the operating deficit of Avery Fisher Hall (before income from
the Avery Fisher Trust Fund) increased by approximately $133,000, and when added to
the ongoing deficit of $562,000, brought the total operating deficit to $695,000.26
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Orchestra’s music director, Pierre Boulez, however, was still to be paid by the season.	
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During the 1972-73 season, the Philharmonic shared about 35% of the hall’s
operational deficit—a percentage based proportionately on its use of the hall.27 But
according to a Force Majeure clause in the Memorandum of Understanding (dated 14
June 1961) and the Final Agreement between Lincoln Center and the Philharmonic (dated
1 July 1966), the Philharmonic was not responsible for paying the base rent of $1,500 per
performance if a performance had to be cancelled.28 After factoring in the cancelled
performances due to the strike, therefore, the Philharmonic’s obligation to Lincoln Center
for its share of the deficit of Avery Fisher Hall dropped from 35% to 30%, and the cost of
the strike to Lincoln Center rose from $93,000 to $121,000.29 In response, Lincoln Center
petitioned the Philharmonic to pay its normal proportion of the hall’s deficit (approx.
35%), without regard to the language of the Lease Agreement. Their rationale was as
follows:
(a) in the spirit of partnership, and as a matter of equity, Lincoln Center should
not bear the full brunt of the financial effects of the strike which was against
Philharmonic;
(b) Lincoln Center’s exposure was completely unforeseen at the time of the
earlier agreement between the parties;
(c) [a] “rough” estimate by Lincoln Center [was] that [the] Philharmonic saved
$70,000 during the strike; the Center’s strike burden is $121,000.30
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David Keiser, the former president and chairman of the Philharmonic Society, and
the person who led the Society as the Memorandum of Understanding and the Final
Agreement were being drafted, felt there should be no deviation from the Final
Agreement, even though the Orchestra’s deficit obligation of $34,000 was not large:
Such a deviation would set a very bad precedent whenever a problem arose
where one party would ask and perhaps obtain that the provision which is to its
disadvantage be changed.31

Moreover, he added that the Philharmonic Society should be open to the
possibility of making changes to the Final Agreement regarding future strike situations.
Lincoln Center pointed out that during the strike period, the Philharmonic Society did not
release its bookings of Avery Fisher Hall. Consequently, Lincoln Center could not sell
the Philharmonic’s unused dates to other producers: “Generally, a producer needs ‘lead
time’ of a month and one-half to market his show. Moreover … the picket lines would
have been a significant deterrent to most producers.”32
Lincoln Center, which believed that “the issue of equity, or moral responsibility
would emerge more compellingly in absence of the force majeure clause,” therefore
proposed a modification of the Lease Agreement be considered by the Philharmonic
Society. It noted that if a strike against the Center was by a trade union, which might
cause a heavier burden on the Philharmonic than on Lincoln Center, the Society would
certainly be considered for a modification of the Agreement as well. Eventually, the
Philharmonic agreed to Lincoln Center’s proposal to modify the joint Agreement, which
specified that:
31
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Prior to the expiration of the eighth full year thereof (i.e. June 1973), any Party
feeling aggrieved by the operation of any provision of this Agreement may
propose a modification thereof and the Parties will attempt to agreeon. If the
Parties are unable to so agree the matter will be referred to arbitration as
hereinbefore.33

While the strike had an impact upon both the Philharmonic Society and Lincoln
Center, it was obvious that both institutions collectively preferred to stay in a good
working relationship with each other. Following receipt of the Avery Fisher bequest,
moreover, the Society and Lincoln Center were entertaining the idea that the
Philharmonic might possibly become the full time occupant of Fisher Hall: “with the
Fisher gift such a full time occupancy might now be interesting to the Philharmonic,
whereas this was not feasible when the Hall first opened.”34 For the Philharmonic
musicians, however, the fact that the Fisher bequest did not go directly to the orchestra
pointed directly to the conflicts of interest that arose from Ames’s position as chairman of
both Lincoln Center, and the Philharmonic Society.

33

Article XVII of the Lease Agreement quoted in the report of the New York Philharmonic to its Special
Committee of Board of Directors, 25 January 1974, New York Philharmonic Archives, Orchestra
Committee Files, box 912-01..
34
Notes of the management’s meeting, December 12, 1973, New York Philharmonic Archives, Orchestra
Committee Files, box 912-01.

149
Chapter Seven: Conclusion
A year after the conclusion of the 1973 strike, the Philharmonic musicians
continued to feel a lingering discontent about the way the labor negotiations had folded
and the strike ended. One result of this was the musician’s demand that Ames
demonstrate more transparency in his running of the organization. On 22 January 1975,
Ames finally held a meeting with the entire Orchestra, in hopes of improving the
relationship of the orchestra to the Society by answering lingering questions within the
Orchestra.
The Philharmonic musicians all shared the same impression of Ames: that he was
distant, and that he had never shown any interest in getting to know the members of the
orchestra. He was asked why he did not sit face-to-face with the orchestra committee
during the contract negotiations, and why he left for Italy just as the strike began. Ames
responded that he was aware of the prevailing problems, and that while the
management’s capable lawyer, Martin Oppenheimer, was representing him in the
negotiations, that he was always in the next room to the negotiating session and always
participating in the management’s caucuses on all crucial decisions. He noted that Carlos
Moseley was absent from most of the negotiations, and that Harold Lawrence was new to
the management’s team, and that these two factors had made negotiations more difficult
for both parties. He went on to note that some orchestras have board members sit at
negotiation meetings, and that while the Philharmonic Society had not done so in the
past, he was willing to consider it as a procedure in the next negotiations. Regarding his
trip to Italy, Ames contended that his family had arranged the trip eight months in
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advance, and that he went because he was always within twelve hours of the negotiating
table. He said that:
other members of the Board were authorized to act for me. I kept in touch by
Transatlantic phone almost daily while I was away. I even talked with Mayor
Lindsay from Italy and offered to come back if he wanted me, which he did not.1

One of the musicians expressed his view that it was unethical of Ames to send
“propaganda” letters to the musicians’ spouses while the orchestra was on tour in Spain,
and asked him why he did not directly communicate with committee members Bernsohn
and Mansfield. Ames answered that he believed it was the Society’s obligation to
communicate with the orchestra as a whole, and to fully advise each of the musicians of
what the Society was proposing and why they were proposing it:
We are not an impersonal corporation, we are your Society, and you are not tens
of thousands of faceless people, but the artists of the New York Philharmonic.2

He went on to say that while it would be impractical to negotiate a contract with the
entire orchestra, it was important for every musician in the orchestra to understand what
the position of the Society was when the two parties had reached an impasse.
Questions concerning the Fisher donation were raised: what was its true amount,
and why did it go to the concert hall and not to the New York Philharmonic. Ames
explained that at the time of the negotiations (1973), the gift had a value of $10 million,
of which 80% was in support of Avery Fisher Hall. As of 1975, however, due to the
volatility of the securities market, the total value of the gift had decreased to $6.5 million.
In terms of why Lincoln Center would be the recipient of the money instead of the
orchestra, Ames said that it was Lincoln Center that was approached by Fisher’s agent,

1
2

Notes of Amyas Ames’s meeting with the Orchestra, 22 January 1975. Files collected by Gabriel Banat.
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that Lincoln Center owned the building, and that they approved the change of the name
because the gift would be beneficial to the Philharmonic as well as Lincoln Center:
The income from the gift to the New York Philharmonic will be close to
$150,000 and as it is an endowment, this will happen year after year.3

Ames’s answer regarding the Fisher bequest did not put to rest the lingering question,
both for the musicians and for the public, as to whether Fisher himself had known, when
he first approached Lincoln Center in 1973, that his donation would be used to pay for
most of the 1976 renovation—at a cost of $6.4 million—of what was then still known as
Philharmonic Hall. The work done in 1976 was the fourth in a series of renovations that
the facility had undergone since opening on 23 September 1962, the total cost of which
had risen to $28,535,000.4
At the meeting, concerning repertoire and conductors were raised. The musicians
pointed out that the Philharmonic’s programming was the most difficult among American
orchestras, and that Pierre Boulez’s “mediocre” artistry was not helping the box office
intake, and yet the Society had renewed his contract through 1977. Even the New York
Times had reported that Boulez’s personal programming ideas had created a “fierce
outburst” of grievances from its audience during Boulez’s first years on the podium
regarding his mixture of contemporary music and avant-garde materials.5 Ames’ response
was that the New York Philharmonic was greatly admired, and was the envy of many
other orchestras for having Boulez as music director:
[Boulez] is not a mediocrity in any sense of the word, and neither the music
world nor the world at large regard him that way. He has set out to help the
Philharmonic Society and its audiences to come fully into the twentieth century,

3
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through the realization that the future of symphonic organizations may be bleak
indeed if serious efforts are not made in this direction.6

Ames added that the Society had thousands of new subscribers and persons attending the
concerts, and that there was an increase in box office receipts of over $100,000 in the
year since Boulez became music director during the 1972-73 season. Moreover, Ames
stated that the Society expected to fill the Hall to 96% of capacity during the 1974-75
season.
Ames also weighed in on the orchestra’s newly created artistic committee, stating
that the Society regarded the artistic committee and the orchestra committee “highly
important” in bringing together the two parts of the Society—i.e., the orchestra and the
management—and that he was confident that these committees would be the “channels
through which problems and misunderstandings can be processed.”7 The musicians
specifically wanted to know which of the many problems brought before the Society by
the artistic committee had been resolved to the satisfaction of the orchestra members and
how many more were still pending. Ames responded by giving two examples. First, he
said that after the artistic committee voiced a concern over the 1975 Rug Concert
programs—which included too much repertory to allow for effective preparation—the
Society had cut the number of concerts by two, reducing the repertoire to be covered and
increasing the rehearsal time for what remained.
Second, he noted that members of the artistic committee had criticized the
audition procedure as being unreasonably “time-consuming.” Ames promised the
orchestra that new audition procedures were being formulated, and that a revised letter to
applicants was being discussed in their next meeting: “Many other matters have been
6
7
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discussed in these meetings, and I have asked that a complete listing of them be prepared,
so that they can be reviewed.”8
In closing, Ames assured the musicians that his dual leadership of the
Philharmonic and Lincoln Center would not cause conflicts of interest because whenever
a situation arose that called for negotiation between the two institutions, he would recuse
himself and delegate the matter to members of the Lincoln Center and Philharmonic
boards of directors to resolve. He emphasized that the Philharmonic was a great
organization, and that the orchestra and its management needed each other: “I believe we
can put the troubles of 1973 behind us, and can approach the difficult times ahead with
great confidence by working together.”9
*****
To a great extent, the 1973 strike had earned the Philharmonic musicians a place
in the Society’s artistic functioning to which they were not previously entitled. The strike
tour was a historic undertaking that should be remembered as a pivotal moment in the
orchestra’s history. During the tour, the musicians were able to play as a self-managing
group and to achieve a mission no one would have thought possible. The musicians
repeatedly characterized their performances during the strike tour with the expression:
‘we played our hearts out.’ And they reported that the feeling and the meaning of making
music as an orchestra was entirely different on that tour: each musician had a sense of
ownership and self-sufficiency that they had never felt before, and which infused their
ensemble playing with a sense of spontaneous brilliance.

8
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While the contract that was agreed upon at the conclusion of the tour was only for
the next three years, the ten-week work stoppage had shown the Society that its
musicians were a force to be reckoned with, and that they would fight for what they saw
as correct and fair. Today’s Philharmonic musicians owe a debt to their predecessors for
the innovations they achieved, and for preserving the Orchestra’s long tradition of
musical excellence in the face of pressure to compromise.
According to the Philharmonic violist Kenneth Mirkin,10 who has served on every
negotiating committee since 1985, the 1973 strike certainly made a significant difference
in the Philharmonic’s subsequent negotiations; until recent years, the musicians had been
able to negotiate for comparable contracts equal to those demanded by the other big five
orchestras. During the past four decades, the Philharmonic musicians have seen a steady
of increases in their salaries, and more importantly, the relations between the
management and the musicians have been kept on good terms. Mirkin pointed out that
the one time that the contract negotiations became bitter again was in 1995, when the two
sides did not come to an agreement on time, and the musicians had to let one strike
deadline pass and postponed a second. On 28 September 1995, a Philharmonic
performance was delayed for thirty minutes because the two sides had debated passed the
concert time while the audience waited.11 O’Brien recounted that the musicians had even
planned ahead by making arrangements with the owner of the gallery across the street
from Lincoln Center to play a free concert, in case the concert at Avery Fisher was
cancelled – “We would have played the Mendelssohn’s ‘Reformation’ Symphony no. 5

10
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with a reduced string section, ... free for all who could fit into the gallery.“12
Nevertheless, the musicians eventually were able to ratify a three-year contract that made
them the highest paid American orchestra in the final year of that contract.
On 12 December 1997, almost a year before their three-year contract was to
expire, the musicians ratified an unprecedented six-year contract agreement. It was the
longest contract ever for a symphony orchestra; not only it had raised the Philharmonic
musicians’ base salaries above $100,000 for the first time in the industry, but also
guaranteed labor peace for six years until 2004.13
*****
Until the economic recession in late 2007, there was stability in American
orchestras; musicians’ salaries and benefits were good, and most of the major orchestras
had fifty-two-week seasons. Starting in late 2007, most American orchestras have been in
financial jeopardy. From small-budget local ensembles to the top-ten American
orchestras, each organization has had to deal with cancellations, reductions, freezes, etc.,
in order to survive a climate of greatly reduced financial support.
Among the worst cases is the Honolulu Symphony Orchestra. In October 2009,
the orchestra filed for Chapter 11 protection14 and announced the cancellation of all
performances for the remainder of the season. In December 2010, following the
orchestra’s failure to meet a deadline for filing a plan of reorganization, the U.S.
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Bankruptcy Court agreed to convert the orchestra’s bankruptcy case from Chapter 11 to
Chapter 7,15 thus ending its operations after 110 years.
✣
In January 2008, the Columbus Symphony Orchestra issued a plan to reduce the
number of full-time musicians from 53 to 31, to cut wages by 30%, and to cut twelve
weeks out of its forty-six-week season. The musicians and the local union responded by
publicly stating that they would not accept the elimination of any orchestra personnel,
even if that meant the loss of all jobs. After five months without concerts, the musicians
accepted a pay cut from an average of $55,000 to about $34,000, and a reduction in the
season from 46 to 38 weeks.16
✣
The Charleston Symphony described its 2008-2009 season as the worst fiscal
crisis in the organization’s seventy-two years of history. In order to stabilize operations,
all of its musicians and staff members agreed to take an 11.4% pay cut for 2008-2009
season, and a 25.1% pay cut for 2009-10 season. Despite these cuts, a constant decline in
fund-raising continued to plague the orchestra, and in March 2010, all concerts remaining
in that season were canceled.
✣
On 17 January 2010, the musicians of the Cleveland Orchestra went on strike for
two days, following a proposal by their management to cut salaries by 5.5%. But by
agreeing to a pay freeze during the first two years, a 3% increase in the first half of the
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third season and a 2% increase in the second half, the two sides were able to reach a
settlement and to avoid any further cancellation of concerts. To give their management
some budget predictability, the musicians also agreed to an extra ten rehearsals or
concerts without pay.17
✣
By August 2008, the Baltimore Symphony Orchestra’s investment portfolio had
fallen by 21%, forcing wage freezes and other concessions on its musicians by April
2009. Just three months later, the musicians agreed to another pay cut of 12.5%. In March
2010, the musicians agreed to yet another pay cut: a freeze for the 2010-2011 season, and
a 16% pay cut for the following season “By the 2012-2013 season, base pay for
[Baltimore Symphony Orchestra] members will be $67,600- essentially the same as it
was in 2001.”18
✣
On 4 October 2010, the musicians of the Detroit Symphony Orchestra went on
one of the longest strikes in the history of any North American orchestra. At issue were
its management’s proposals to reduce salaries by 30% and to “redefine” their work rules.
According to the musicians, their management had imposed a new rule that “a musician
can be fired under the guise of failed artistic competence.”19 The strike cost each
musician about $55,000 in salary. Many resigned and sought work elsewhere.
✣
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The board of the Philadelphia Orchestra voted on 16 April 2011 to file for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, making it the first major American orchestra to do so. On 13
October 2011, the musicians approved a four-year contract that included significant
concessions on their part: a) 15% pay cut; b) a reduction of the full-time members of the
orchestra from 105 to 95 members; c) and a change from their defined-benefit pension
plan to a 401(k) plan.20 The morale of its musicians suffered greatly, and many of its
most esteemed players subsequently resigned. More difficult to measure but just as
significant was the demoralizing effect upon the orchestra’s audience.
✣
The Syracuse Symphony Orchestra started reporting serious problems with its
finances in 2009, and asked its musicians to agree to a two-year wage freeze to help
stabilize the organization. In March of 2011, it was announced that the organization was
operating under a $5.5 million deficit and a $2.5 million unfunded pension liability,21 and
that more concessions totaling $1.3 million from the musicians would be necessary.
When the musicians rejected this, the orchestra’s board of directors voted to suspend
operations, and in April 2011, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, “effectively ending a halfcentury of music in Upstate New York.”22
✣
Yet another orchestra filing Chapter 7 in April of 2011 was the New Mexico
Symphony Orchestra.23 Following years of financial turmoil, the organization cut off all

20

Peter Dobrin, “Philadelphia Orchestra and its musicians agree to labor concessions,” The Philadelphia
Inquirer, 14 October 2011. http://articles.philly.com/2011-10-14/news/30279549_1_philadelphiaorchestra-musicians-john-koen.
21
Melinda Johnson, “Syracuse Symphony Orchestra will file for bankruptcy, board announces,”
http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2011/04/post_411.html. Accessed 28 August 2014.
22
Senza Sordino, June 2011, 5.
23	
  Founded in 1932.	
  

159
employees’ health insurance in 2009, and for the four months prior to filing for
bankruptcy, the musicians and staff worked without pay.24
✣
The Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra finished its 2009-2010 season with a deficit
of about $2 million. The musicians agreed to one of the biggest pay cuts in the
orchestra’s history: a 9.7% reduction for the first year; a freeze for the second year; and a
possible increase in the third and final year.25 Moreover, they agreed to donate $200,000
to the orchestra’s annual fund as well as agreeing to a conversion from a defined benefit
pension plan to a defined contribution plan for members with less than five years of
service.26
✣
In 2009, the musicians of the Colorado Symphony agreed to a 24% pay cut. On
21 September 2011, the musicians voted to accept another pay cut of 9% in response to
their management’s report of an expected $1.2 million deficit at the end of the 2010-2011
season and the possibility of cancellations in the next two seasons.
✣
On 25 August 2012, after the musicians had rejected the Atlanta Symphony
Association’s proposed concession of $5.2 million, the Association locked its musicians
out. On 26 September 2012, the musicians accepted a two-year contract that included the
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$5.2 million in concessions. Under the new agreement, each musician was to take a 17%
pay cut in the first year, and a 14% pay cut in the second year; the number of musicians
was to be reduced from 95 to 88; to fund the musicians health insurance premiums and to
increase flexibility in working conditions, the orchestra’s fifty-two week season was
reduced to forty-one weeks in the first year, but increased to forty-two weeks in the
second year.
Only two years later (7 September 2014), the Association locked its musicians out
again, because its parent organization, the Woodruff Arts Center, announced that it could
no longer afford the orchestra’s continuous yearly deficits. The lockout lasted for two
months until the two sides reached a four-year agreement on 8 November 2014. The new
contract offers a small increase for the musicians, but also requires them to contribute
more for their healthcare plan; the number of musicians will remain at 77 for the first
year of the contract, and a goal of 88 musicians by the fourth year.
✣
After more than five weeks of lockout, the musicians of the Indianapolis
Symphony Orchestra ratified a five-year agreement on 15 October 2012. The new
contract, which represented $11.5 million in concessions from the orchestra members,
included: a 32% pay cut in the first year ($53,000), with raises in each subsequent year of
the contract (topping out at $70,000 by the fifth year); and a reduction in the season to
thirty-eight weeks in first year, with the season increasing to forty-two weeks by the fifth
year.27
✣
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On 21 October 2012, the management of the St. Paul Chamber Orchestra decided
to lock its musicians out. The lockout lasted for more than six months, the musicians
went without pay or benefits. On 29 April 2013, the musicians felt that the best way to
save their orchestra was to ratify the regressive contract proposed by their management,
thus ending the first work stoppage in the history of the orchestra. The new three-year
contract guaranteed the musicians a thirty-two week season but reduced their salary by
18.6% (to $60,000 for all three years). It also reduced the size of the orchestra from
thirty-four members to twenty-eight.28
✣
On 1 October 2013, the New York City Opera announced that it would file for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and shut down all operations after an unsuccessful
emergency fund-raising campaign. Following its move from Lincoln Center in 2011, the
opera company had struggled to raise the necessary operating capital to sustain itself;
moreover, its endowment had reportedly decreased from $48 million in 2008 to a mere
$5.07 million by June 2012.29 It gave its final performance on 28 September 2013.30
✣
In April of 2012, the Minnesota Orchestra Association told its musicians that if
they did not agree to drastic cuts, the orchestra’s endowment—more than $150 million—
would be exhausted within five years.31 After rejecting their offer to submit the entire
contract to binding arbitration, the Association locked its musicians out on 1 October
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2012. It was not until 14 January 2014, following sixteen months of labor battles, that the
musicians announced they had reached a new three-year contract agreement with their
management. Under the new contract, the musicians would take a wage reduction of 15%
in the first year, a 2% increase in the second year, and 3% in the third year. They would
contribute more to the cost of health insurance.32
✣
On 30 June 2014, the board of the Metropolitan Opera (hereafter, either the
“Met,” or the “company”) sent an open letter to the general public via the New York
Times in which it stated that the company’s box office had declined from 92% in 2008 to
79% in 2013, and that its endowment was less than its annual operating budget of more
than $300 million. The company’s board of directors proposed to double its endowment
over a five-year period, and to cut its personnel expenses (administrative staff and
workers who were represented by some fifteen different unions) by 16%. It was not until
23 August 2014, that all of the unions reached an agreement with the company. It
stipulated that both the company and the union workers would make compromises: the
union workers would recognize the financial instability of the company and would accept
significant cuts; the company, in turn, would forego its drastic demands and would agree
to cut costs of its own.
*****
Some of the disputes, discussed above, between orchestra musicians and their
respective managements during the past seven years have ended in disaster. Venerable
organizations in Honolulu, Albuquerque, Syracuse—even New York City—have closed
their doors and ceased to exist. For those musicians who lost their jobs and their
32
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livelihood, these have been difficult times indeed. For those who retained their jobs only
by agreeing to cuts in pay in the midst of an economic climate where expenses continue
to rise, the times have also been difficult. While there are signs that the classical music
industry is recovering from the financial downturn that followed the banking crisis of
2007, there is still a profound sense of concern within the industry about its future.
Moreover, the lingering effects of long, hostile contract disputes has had an especially
demoralizing impact upon orchestral musicians. Yet in the midst of all the bad news,
there are some organizations that have weathered the storm, and which appear to be on
the path to recovery.
At its annual board meeting in December 2013, the Detroit Symphony, citing a
remarkable set of statistics—a “43% increase in fund-raising ($18.9 million), a 100%
increase in the donor base over 2011, and the second consecutive year of subscription
sales growth”33—announced that it had achieved its first balanced budget since 2007.
In that same month (December 2013), the Cleveland Orchestra announced that,
for the first time in years, its fiscal year ended with a balanced budget ($48.2 million).
The announcement cited increases in the orchestra’s audiences, in its endowment, and in
the number of student attendees.34
In December 2009, the Cincinnati Symphony Orchestra received the stunning
news that a long-time arts patron from Cincinnati was donating $85 million to the
orchestra so as to ensure that the Cincinnati Symphony would have a full complement of
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musicians with fifty-two weeks employment.35 Since then, the orchestra’s endowment
has increased by 43%, the number of gifts has increased by 94%, and there has been a
double-digit increase in attendance.36
The Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra has reported a 19% increase in ticket sales
(from 93,337 tickets to 110,770) for the 2013-14 season. Of these, more than 45,500
tickets were for subscription concerts, and represented a 30% increase in subscription
sales.37
In June of 2014, the Chicago Symphony Orchestra Association received two of
the largest donations in its 123-year history: a $17 million gift to the Association’s
endowment and general operating funds, and a second gift of $15 million to support the
work of the Chicago Symphony’s institute for Learning, Access and Training.38
Even the Minnesota Orchestra, which had endured one of the most devastating
contract disputes in recent history, has been the beneficiary of unexpected support. On 27
August 2014, the orchestra’s management announced that during the past three months, it
had received four donations totaling $13.2 million. The largest of these—a bequest of
$10 million—was given by an anonymous donor to the organization’s “Building for the
Future Endowment.”39
*****
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While the New York Philharmonic has not had a work stoppage since 1973, the
relations between the musicians and the Society has been seriously tested of lately.
During the negotiation process in December 2011, the Society sent out a letter to each
Philharmonic musician stating that an “unrestricted” portion of the Society’s endowment,
which historically had been used to cover budget deficits and pension shortfalls, had
declined “from $75 million in 2008 to $7 million in 2011,”40 because the Society has
tapped into the endowment excessively, and because a new State law has imposed
restrictions that made it more difficult to use more of the endowment. The letter’s
purpose, ostensibly, was to persuade the musicians to agree to the Society’s proposals. In
order to address the financial health of the Orchestra, the management indicated, the
following would be necessary: a) a migration from the defined-benefit pension plan to
different pension arrangement; b) a wage freeze for the following two seasons; c) a
change in the health insurance plan; and d) certain changes in working conditions and
media agreement.
The letter, however, only served to antagonize the musicians, who immediately
suspected that the management was trying to circumvent the elected orchestra committee,
the union, and the orchestra’s lawyer. Newton Mansfield, who had been in the orchestra
for more than fifty-one years at the time, and had served on many committees, said that:
The last time I received such a disturbing piece of news was in 1973 when we
[the Orchestra] received a letter from Aymas Ames, which became the opening
gun for the 1973 strike.41

In response, the musicians of the orchestra voted unanimously to strike. Given
that there was an upcoming European tour on the schedule, the strike vote demonstrated
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both the solidarity of the musicians and their determination to fight the management’s
proposed cuts and changes. Unlike the 1973 negotiations, however, which ended in
deadlock and led to a strike, both parties to the 2011 negotiation had a sincere desire to
reach an agreement, and in fact, did so just in time to avoided cancellation of the
upcoming tour.
*****
Nevertheless, there is a gathering storm on the horizon of the American
symphony orchestras. Iván Fischer, the prominent Hungarian conductor and founder of
the Budapest Festival Orchestra, in a recent interview with the London Times, predicted
that:
Symphony orchestras in their present form have only a few more decades left at
most. Their financing is already a vulnerability. Will American-style civic pride
or the goodwill of European politicians really be enough to feed these large
beasts that are basically the same now as they were a century ago? And is that
rigid formation really appropriate for today, or are we simply stuck with it? I
think we are stuck with it. I would welcome a more flexible musical family that
could adapt its size and resources to what different composers and audiences
required. In Budapest we have a pool of musicians doing a variety of activities.
Those orchestras that are flexible will survive; the rigid ones won’t. The same
thing happened to dinosaurs, I think.42

This description of the future of the symphony orchestra—perhaps fate would be
a better adjective—is perhaps the worst-case scenario. But there is not an orchestral
institution active today does not fear that Fischer’s prediction will in fact come to pass. In
today’s world, orchestras have not only to cope with fund-raising challenges, they must
also deal with an aging, shrinking concert audience. While most orchestral musicians
would undoubtably prefer to focus primarily upon repertoire from the classical canon, it
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is clear that they have been playing more “pops” concerts than ever. The reason for this,
of course, is to attract a younger and more diverse audience. This seems, in fact, to be a
validation of what Iván Fischer says about the need for a more flexible musical
organization, one that can swell or shrink, depending upon the demand.
*****
The most recent contract agreement of the New York Philharmonic, ratified on 11
December 2013, guarantees the musicians an increase in salary totaling 6.5% over the
course of the four-year agreement. Yet the Philharmonic players will still not be the best
paid musicians in the country, despite the extreme demands of both schedule and
repertoire that the Philharmonic player must negotiate with unmatched skill. In fact, their
base salary has been less than that of the Los Angeles Philharmonic, the Chicago
Symphony Orchestra, and the San Francisco Symphony for many years. And given the
provisions of the latest contract, the Philharmonic musicians will have to start
shouldering the cost of their health insurance premiums beginning 2015.
*****
The Philharmonic concluded its 2013 fiscal year with a deficit of $6.1 million.
According to its President and Executive Director, Matthew VanBesien, this was mostly
the result of the musicians’ woefully underfunded defined-benefit pension plan and the
shrinkage of the Orchestra’s endowment as a consequence of the recession. Yet
VanBesien pointed out that the orchestra’s fund-raising efforts in 2012 brought in a
record $31 million.43 Moreover, the Philharmonic Society has, in recent years, begun to
change its strategy regarding the running of the Orchestra. In 2012, for instance, it
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announced that the Orchestra would commit itself to a four-year partnership program
(beginning in 2014) with the Shanghai Symphony Orchestra. Its dual goals will be to
bring world-class music to China, and to help turn talented young players into
professional musicians. By having a residency in Shanghai, the financial capital of Asia,
VanBesien said that the Philharmonic could potentially attract international sponsors.
Furthermore, in March 2014, the Philharmonic announced another similar partnership
program in Santa Barbara, California.
*****
The Philharmonic continues to be known as one of the busiest and hardest
working orchestras in the world, yet its musicians’ salaries and benefits have fallen
behind those of other orchestras whose seasons and repertoire are not the equal of the
Philharmonic’s. Given the Society’s unsuccessful attempt in 2011 to change the
musicians’ pension plan, but their continuing claim that the current plan is putting the
financial stability of the organization in jeopardy, the future of labor relations between
the musicians of the New York Philharmonic and the Philharmonic Society promises to
be difficult. From the perspective of the musicians, their two highest priorities are to
safeguard their current defined-benefit plan, and to achieve parity of pay scale with the
other big-five orchestras, if not also to exceed it.
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